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Across stages 1 and 2, the research showed that the relationship between 
an innovation’s NHS origin and its subsequent adoption by the wider NHS is 
not a simple one. The blurred boundary between NHS-developed and 
commercially-developed technologies makes it difficult to prove beyond 
doubt that one or other origin has a positive or negative impact on 
adoption. There is, however, strong evidence to suggest that the origin of 
an individual technology does give rise to certain characteristics that 
encourage or inhibit its adoption, but looking across a range of technologies 
there is not a consistent pattern of benefits or disbenefits. In short, being 
NHS-developed can, under certain circumstances, bring significant 
advantages in terms of securing adoption, but this is not the case for all 
technologies. There are circumstances where it does constrain adoption. 
For example, NHS origin can have a negative impact on potential adoption 
due to the technology produced having a rather narrow focus. Narrow 
applicability may be the result of a single inventor taking a somewhat 
blinkered view of the purpose of the technology being developed or the 
range of its possible uses. In contrast, the more market-oriented approach 
taken by a commercial developer usually ensures that the scope of a 
technology is extended to attract as broad a market as possible. It was also 
found that the simpler the technology, the less marked the effect of origin. 
By examining specific issues that arose in the pairs of cases, such as, 
external adoption drivers, evaluation and evidence, professional and 
structural barriers to adoption and adoption decision-making, it has been 
possible to make a number of suggestions. These suggestions centre on: 
the need to consider the market implications at an early stage and take 
these into account when deciding the form, scope and wider design 
features of the innovation; the need for a project champion; changes to the 
form and quantity of technology evaluation that is undertaken; 
improvements to adoption support; and changes to culture and the need 
for ways to build commitment during adoption. Overall, it is suggested that 
consideration should be given to creating systems for technological 
innovation in healthcare that have structures and processes to support 
adoption at their heart. These systems would need to operate at different 
levels. At one extreme there could be a need to look across the NHS and at 
the other a system would need to operate at the level of the individual 
technology and treat each innovation as an individual project or part of a 
portfolio of projects, depending upon the nature of the technology. 
Conclusions 
It is clear from this research that the origin of the technology does affect 
adoptability in terms of both the extent of adoption (within a site and 
across sites) and the level of success achieved in an individual adopting 
site. It is also clear that being NHS-developed sometimes has a positive 
effect and sometimes a negative. Paying attention to the issues identified 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
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by this research could increase the proportion of NHS-developed 
technologies that gain a positive advantage from their NHS origin. 
However, it is fair to say that this research has shown that many of the 
adoption problems encountered by NHS-developed technologies are shared 
by those developed independently of the NHS so many of the 
recommendations that will be set out here apply to technology adoption by 
the NHS generally. 
The overall aim has to be to create an effective system for innovation. This 
report concludes that this system should draw on open innovation 
strategies developed in other sectors and makes some suggestions as to 
how this should be done. 
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The Report 
1 Introduction 
The very wide diversity of healthcare technologies is in part reflected in the 
definition of medical devices used in the EU Medical Devices Directive1: 
…any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other 
article, whether used alone or in combination, together with any 
accessories, including the software necessary for its proper application 
intended by the manufacturer to be used for medical purposes for 
human beings for the purpose of: 
 diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of 
disease, 
 diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or 
compensation for an injury or handicap, 
 investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or 
of a physiological process, 
 control of conception, 
 and which does not achieve its principal intended action in or 
on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or 
metabolic means, but which may be assisted in its function 
by such means.1 p.23 
This definition focuses primarily on healthcare technologies that are either 
physical objects or pharmaceuticals but healthcare technologies can take 
many other forms. For example, they also include ‘soft technologies’2 such 
as the practices, procedures and services designs used in patient care that 
also contribute to the healthcare technology system. These soft 
technologies include knowledge embodied in the processes and procedures 
used to support patient care - e.g. surgical procedures, care plans and 
protocols.  
Because of this diversity it is important to adopt a definition of healthcare 
technology that recognises the complex nature of healthcare technology 
and the systems within which they are used. The definition of healthcare 
technology used in this research is the definition put forward by the 
International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment. It 
has been chosen because it provides a wider perspective on healthcare 
technologies within wider healthcare systems. It says that healthcare 
technologies include: 
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…prevention and rehabilitation, vaccines, pharmaceuticals and 
devices, medical and surgical procedures, and the systems within 
which health is protected and maintained3 p.99 
For more than a decade, reports (for example, Culyer4, Baker5 6, The NHS 
Plan7, Cooksey8 and Darzi9) have been calling for greater and swifter 
development and adoption of innovative technologies by the NHS. Most 
recently, Liddell, Ayling and Reid’s report entitled Innovation Health and 
Wealth, Accelerating Adoption and Diffusion in the NHS10 p.7 has said: 
The purpose of the NHS, and everyone working in it, is to promote health 
and wellbeing, and to provide high quality healthcare, free at the point of 
delivery to everyone who needs it. … Innovation has a vital role to play in 
fulfilling this purpose by improving the quality of care for patients, 
releasing savings through productivity, and enabling the NHS to make its 
contribution as a major investor and wealth creator in the UK. 
In recent years the Department of Health has set up a number of new 
institutions and agencies to support innovation. For example, the 
Modernisation Agency was set up in 2001 with the aim of improving and 
redesigning services7 p.60 and NHS-based innovation hubs were introduced 
in 2004/2005 and, as part of their remit, given responsibility for technology 
transfer out of the NHS11. Further reviews highlighted additional 
requirements for innovation and adoption support, for example the HITF 
Report12, leading to the creation of the NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement (NIII) and the National Innovation Centre (NIC) and the NHS 
Technology Adoption Centre. Following the Cooksey Report8 Academic 
Health Science Centres (AHSCs), Health Education and Innovation Centres 
(HIECs) and biomedical research centres and units were set up to improve 
knowledge translation and increase the speed at which research knowledge 
is embedded into clinical practice. The National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) has also become much more involved with non-
medicine health technologies. Now further changes are envisaged. (See 
Health, Innovation and Wealth10 . The current infrastructure of 
organisations will be redeveloped with some bodies being discontinued, 
merged or replaced, as the NHS seeks to provide more effective support for 
innovation and adoption. Though adoption of new ideas and technologies is 
regarded as a challenging issue and reflects the complex network of 
interactions required to achieve adoption13. 
Another move has been to fund research into innovation in healthcare 
through the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR). One of the many 
outputs from the NIHR’s Service Delivery and Organisation Programme 
(SDO) - a systematic literature review of the organisational factors which 
influence adoption in the NHS by Robert et al.14 – formed the stimulus for 
the work reported here. The review explored a wide range of organisational 
factors and processes which are likely to determine the extent and rate of 
technology assimilation within NHS organisations. The review was very 
comprehensive but one aspect it was not able to shed much light on is 
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whether NHS-developed technologies are adopted into the NHS any 
differently from those technologies developed commercially. This is an 
important question for two reasons. First, it is important to know whether 
the balance of influence on technology development between technology 
users and technology suppliers impacts on the success or failure of the 
adoption process. For example, it may be the case that because NHS 
developers are motivated by professional concerns and problems with 
which they have personal involvement they have limited concern for the 
future market and are therefore essentially producing innovations for which 
there is little or no applicability elsewhere. On the other hand, commercial 
technology suppliers may focus on extending or improving their current 
range of products and ignore unmet needs that care providers in the NHS 
are experiencing. Secondly, there are costs associated with developing 
technologies within the NHS and supporting their commercialisation and 
these costs may not be justified if the benefits gained from successful 
adoption into other parts of the NHS are not materialising. 
NHS-developed innovations are also of interest to the wider academic 
community because they represent an important class of open innovation15, 
and combine aspects of user-led16 and lead user innovation17. 
NHS staff such as clinicians, nurses and those in professions allied to 
medicine, are often particularly well-placed to recognise the clinical need 
that denotes an opportunity for innovation. The majority of staff lack the 
time and other resources to develop significant innovations but some of 
them do go on to develop viable solutions in the form of new devices and 
equipment, information systems, redesigned services and procedures and 
the like. The resulting technological innovations are thus often the product 
of pre-existing knowledge held by the NHS staff that can be re-configured 
or translated into new knowledge; they benefit from a staff member’s tacit 
and situated knowledge18 of how things work and what forms of 
presentation of an idea would be acceptable or unacceptable to colleagues 
and potential users. 
Research questions 
The highest level aim of this research project is to help the NHS fulfil its 
aspiration to become more effective in technology adoption. It does this by 
providing insights into the enablers and barriers to successful adoption of 
technologies by the NHS.  
Before the research began a set of initial research questions was drawn up 
to guide the research. These were: 
 Do user-developed products perform differently in the technology 
assessment processes (evidence-based and preference-based) 
underpinning adoption decisions? 
 What part do informal professional networks play in adoption decisions? 
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 Does the origin of the technology impact on the compatibility of a 
technology for adoption within an NHS organisation. 
 Do user-developers have a greater opportunity to gather evidence and 
develop implementation guidelines that support the adoption decision 
process and does this allow them to achieve better trialability? 
 Does the source of the technology impact upon the perceived relative 
advantage and the perceived complexity and if so, how? 
However, after a fuller literature review had been conducted and initial 
conversations had taken place with members of bodies supporting 
innovation in the NHS such as Innovation Hubs, the NHS Technology 
Adoption Centre (NTAC) and the NHS National Innovation Centre (NIC) it 
became clear that some of the questions, such as ‘What part do informal 
professional networks play in adoption decisions?’ were too narrow. A 
mapping of the area to be covered by the research (see Figure 1) was 
therefore looked at again to re-determine what the focus of the research 
should be given the purpose was to shed light on NHS adoption of NHS-
developed technologies and compare adoption of NHS-developed 
technologies with non-NHS-developed.  
 
 
Figure 1. The initial focus of the research 
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The work done to build Figure 1 in combination with the findings of the 
literature review led to the following revised set of questions: 
 To what extent has the development process that produced a 
technological innovation determined specific aspects of the technology 
that have an impact on its adoption? 
 For a specific adoption context, what are the main factors that mediate 
the success of adoption and to what extent is this success related to the 
technology’s origin? 
 How do external adoption drivers in combination with an innovation’s 
origin impact on the potential for adoption?  
 Does the adoption process differ for NHS-developed technologies when 
compared with those that are commercially-developed? 
Structure of this report 
This report begins with a review looking at the literature that underpins this 
study of the adoption of NHS-developed innovations by the NHS itself. First 
it reviews several key reports on specific aspects of innovation and 
adoption in the NHS. It then considers the wider literature that supports an 
understanding of innovation characteristics, adoption context, external 
adoption drivers, and adoption processes. It then sets out the methodology 
used to undertake this research. 
The research has been conducted in two stages. Stage 1 was a survey to 
ascertain the characteristics of a wide a range of NHS-developed 
technologies. The findings of this stage are presented in Section 4 and are 
used to identify six theoretically important NHS-developed technologies 
that are taken forward into Stage 2. Stage 2 took each of the six 
technologies in turn and paired it with an equivalent commercially 
developed technology. Case studies were then developed for each of the 
resulting pairs of technologies. These case studies are presented in 
Sections 5 to 10. 
A discussion of the research findings can be found in Section 11. This is 
followed by a final section headed ‘Recommendations and conclusion’. 
Suggestions for future research are provided at the end of this section. 
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2 Innovation and adoption of healthcare 
technologies: a literature review 
This review considers the literature that underpins a study of the adoption 
of NHS-developed innovations by the NHS itself. This area cuts across 
many of the streams within the extensive innovation literature because the 
role of the NHS in developing and adopting healthcare technology is 
complex. Innovation can be regarded as a specific process but it can also 
be viewed as a product of a process. In terms of innovation as a product, 
NHS-developed innovations may be artefacts, procedures, organisation 
designs or complex combinations of two or all three of these. When 
considering the processual nature of innovation, the role played by the NHS 
and its staff may be viewed in many ways: as consumers of healthcare 
technology; as sophisticated users of technology; as active developers of 
new technologies; or as a complex hybrid of two or more of these roles. 
Because the NHS is a complex network of hundreds of organisations, 
political, structural and cultural factors all influence the extent and success 
of innovation and adoption initiatives. 
This review is structured in two sections. The first examines several key 
reports on specific aspects of innovation and adoption in the NHS. These 
reports provide a foundation for identifying the literature relevant to this 
report. The second allows the guiding questions for the study to be defined. 
It looks at innovation characteristics, adoption context, external adoption 
drivers, and adoption processes. 
2.1 SDO Studies addressing technology adoption 
Over the past few years six reports published by the NIHR SDO programme 
have addressed areas that are important to this research. Though they are 
not all explicitly about technology adoption they do all consider wider issues 
that are related to technology adoption. The first two reports considered 
look at adoption in broad terms and encompass the uptake of technical 
knowledge, the adoption of specific technologies and adoption in relation to 
the technology-enabled change of large-scale services. The next two 
consider knowledge mobilisation and networks identify bodies of knowledge 
from the wider literature that inform an understanding technology adoption. 
The final two reports each look at specific cases of technology adoption. 
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How to Spread Good Ideas A systematic review of the literature 
on diffusion, dissemination and sustainability of innovations 
in health service delivery and organisation 
Greenhalgh et al.19 make a very important contribution to the 
understanding of adoption of innovation by the NHS. Their report’s primary 
focus was the adoption of organisational innovations that affect health 
service delivery and organisation. Although their focus was not specifically 
on technology all of the case studies they present have some technology 
content. Two of the cases they examine, telemedicine and electronic patient 
records systems, clearly have high levels of technology dependence (see 
p.297) but even organisational innovations they look at, such as integrated 
care pathways and GP fundholding, have some level of technological 
dependence. Indeed, Greenhalgh et al. acknowledge that even innovations 
that may seem to be simply organisational depend on embedded 
technologies. Their report thus presents a useful starting point for this 
review. 
Greenhalgh et al. consider many of the themes identified by Rogers20 in his 
work on the diffusion of innovations and look at them in the context of 
healthcare systems in general and the NHS specifically. Overwhelmingly, 
their conclusion is that adoption of innovations is complex with multiple 
factors influencing the extent, success or failure of the adoption. Particular 
factors they note (p.323) are: 
 attributes of the innovation 
 adoption process engaged (or not) by individuals 
 communication and influence 
 inner context or user system 
 external context 
 implementation process 
 Nature, capacity and activities of external change. E.g. active 
dissemination campaign 
Greenhalgh et al.’s report also echoes concerns about technology adoption 
from the wider literature. Very importantly it warns against taking a 
technological determinist view of healthcare technology adoption that 
assumes technology can be treated as a ’black box’ and its implementation 
will inevitably lead to specific pre-identified changes. Such an assumption 
has been shown to be unreliable by many notable studies, not least Barley 
in his study of the implementation of CT scanners21 22, but is nevertheless 
prevalent in the real world. 
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Robert et al.’s far-reaching review also encompassed literature related to 
some important areas of the organisational theory literature. For example, 
it considered routinisation theory and the role of organisational routines in 
structuring healthcare processes. The literature about organisational 
routines is very relevant in terms of understanding how routines structure 
practices in organisations23 and how organisational learning is preserved 
across generations of staff24. Robert et al. highlight the importance of 
routines in structuring behaviour for individuals, groups and at an 
organisational level. In relation to technology adoption the report identifies 
the extent to which it is important to consider routines because they can 
underpin the nature of work, professional identify and the role of 
technologies.  
Technology structuration theory was also included. By reviewing a range of 
structure-agency models such as scripts22, adaptive structration theory25 
and interpretive flexibility26 27, Robert et al. highlighted the role of 
technology adoption in creating and re-creating social structures. Robert et 
al. also highlighted the role of technology in enabling the agency of 
individuals to affect change to organisational structures and re-shape the 
technology itself. Finally it emphasised the relevance of actor-network 
theory28 when looking at how adoption of technology takes place within 
complex networks of relationships and understanding how the embedding 
of new technologies into a network can have unintended consequences.  
Robert et al. set out four broad challenges for healthcare organisations in 
adopting innovative technologies. The first relates to adoption decision-
making. This includes the formal structures that are needed to support 
effective decision-making and the role of health professionals, patients and 
external sources of advice, in assimilating and monitoring the 
implementation of innovative technologies. The second challenge is the 
need to ensure organisations have sufficient absorptive capacity to allow in-
ward flow of knowledge, skills and know-how and to support adoption 
processes. The third challenge is the need to create an organisational 
climate in which adoption processes are not limited by political, financial, 
managerial or informational factors act and are therefore able to support 
innovation adoption rather than inhibit it. The fourth challenge concerns the 
organisational readiness of an organisation to adopt technological 
innovations. In essence this represents the specific organisational 
capabilities that are required to facilitate effective technology adoption.  
Research utilisation and knowledge mobilisation: a scoping review 
of the literature 
A different perspective on innovation adoption issues is available from Crilly 
et al.29. They report the findings of a systematic review of the literature 
addressing the problem of mobilising knowledge created through research 
within the NHS. This review was conducted in the context of a need to 
improve knowledge translation, and in particular the perceived gaps in the 
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process of translating knowledge from “bench to bedside”8. Much of Crilly et 
al.’s report is concerned with how research impacts on practice in 
healthcare organisations. Its underlying themes are evidence-based 
practice and policy and it presents a number of propositions that guide 
further investigation of the role of knowledge mobilisation in healthcare 
(p.213). Each of these are relevant to managing knowledge to support 
technology adoption.  
The shift towards evidence-based medicine30 and policy31 raises key 
questions about technology adoption. For technologies that enable/require 
changes in procedures and processes being able to meet the demand for an 
evidence-base will require clear recognition of whose evidence counts and 
agreement about what is regarded as a legitimate epistemological basis for 
validating knowledge. For example, should the basis of evidence for 
implementing a new technology into a specific context be focused on strict 
scientific reproducibility, reflected in the primacy of systematic reviews of 
multiple clinical trials? Or alternatively, should the basis of evidence that 
underpins the use of a new technology take into account broader forms of 
evidence and wider concepts of knowledge? and how does the contested 
nature of knowledge affect decisions to adopt a technology? 
Information technologies are almost becoming a ubiquitous feature of 
healthcare technologies. Crilly et al. highlight that from a knowledge 
management perspective the role of information technologies has gone 
beyond simply providing a data-processing function and becoming 
increasingly social and interactive. The implication of this for technology 
adoption is that human interaction with embedded information technologies 
will change how individuals and teams work and how patients interact with 
healthcare services. 
Crilly et al. also emphasise the role of knowledge management in 
underpinning the ultimate performance of healthcare organisations. Within 
their report it is evident that technology and its adoption can be seen as 
both a result, and an enabler, of organisational learning, communities of 
practice and R&D activities. Though not making an explicit link, the report 
sets the basis on which technology adoption needs to be considered from 
the perspective of the resource-based view of the firm (RBVF)32-35. In fact, 
the adoption of technologies may be viewed from the perspective of how 
healthcare organisations develop new technological capabilities, or abandon 
old ones. This shows that technology adoption should not be seen 
simplistically in terms of technical implementation. Instead, a healthcare 
organisations ability to adopt new technologies should treated as a dynamic 
capability34-38. 
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Networks in Health Care: a Comparative Study of Their 
Management, Impact and Performance  
Ferlie et al.’s review39 focused on the role of network forms of organisation 
within the NHS to facilitate service improvement and innovation. It raises 
issues that are pertinent to understanding how technological innovations 
are adopted into practice. The role of networks of various types in the 
technology adoption process is shown to be subtle and far-reaching and the 
report acknowledges several advantages and disadvantages of various 
network forms within the healthcare sector. The report is careful to 
highlight how network forms of organisation effect change differently to 
market-based or centralised, command and control structures (p.184). 
Ferlie et al. show that the recent change within the NHS from large 
vertically integrated organisations, towards more network oriented forms of 
organisation is part of a more general shift observed in several other 
sectors. 
Ferlie et al. highlight the medical and healthcare professions as specific 
forms of network, building on earlier concepts such as the invisible 
college.They reiterate that the healthcare sector can be characterised in 
terms of professional networks embodying the rather clannish character of 
professional groups that transcend allegiance to specific organisations. In 
terms of the success of technology adoption, the power of professional 
groups to accept or reject a technology can be very important. Professional 
bodies influence the accreditation and training standards that advocate, or 
reject, a specific technology. Furthermore, the extent to which professional 
bodies validate a new knowledge is crucial to the uptake of a new 
technology. The power of such professional bodies is such that it seems 
that individual health professionals will be less likely adopt a new 
technology before their own profession has accepted it. 
Ferlie et al. also reflect on more recent moves to standardisation of expert 
knowledge. This is perhaps best expressed in the move towards the 
bureaucratisation of medicine (see for example Harrison40). This is linked to 
the increased emphasis on evidence-based practice that has in part 
replaced reliance on the professional judgement of individual clinicians. 
Ferlie et al.’s report might suggest that the challenge in gaining the 
adoption of a technology has changed from the need to convince individual 
clinicians to change practice, to one of convincing regulatory bodies of the 
relevance of a technology to a specific guideline. Though the extent to 
which evidence-based practice has now overridden professional judgement 
remains to be proven. 
Ferlie et al. discuss the extent to which networks are now seen as an 
alternative organisation form, shifting power and control away from the 
management of healthcare service through strict hierarchical structures, 
and links it to the application of ‘New Public Management’ within the 
healthcare sector. For example, in areas such as cancer care and 
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cardiology, formal networks have been created to review performance, 
consider alternative practices, communicate knowledge and champion 
changes in practice. Such networks are important to the adoption of new 
technologies. They provide mechanisms through which knowledge 
associated with innovative technologies can be created, validated, stored 
and disseminated. Instrumental use of the network form may be critical to 
creating the consensus amongst key stakeholders that is essential for 
adoption. 
Ferlie et al. focus closely on the role within networks of ‘epistemic 
communities of practice’ and its effect on technology adoption. They 
highlight that methods for creating and validating knowledge will differ 
between groups, such as medical scientists, research scientists, social 
scientists, policy makers and commissioners. In the context of technology 
adoption this might suggest that differences in epistemology needs to be 
considered when looking for the most appropriate way to evaluate a new 
technology. If this is not done key stakeholders may question the validity of 
those evaluations. 
The review also includes discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of 
networks that is of particular relevance to technology adoption. They note 
that a strength of networks is that they are well placed to address the 
‘wicked problems’ commonly encountered within public-sector services 
(p.186), see also Ferlie et al.41. Considering the extent to which 
technological innovations create or ameliorate such problems is important, 
especially in key strategic areas that address complex issues, for example, 
dealing with long-term health conditions. The potential for networks to act 
as implementation networks makes them especially relevant to adoption 
and diffusion of technologies, especially in the case of novel technologies. 
The use of networks to promote technology adoption is however, potentially 
problematic. Ferlie et al. point out that the potential for a network to lose 
focus or become simply a ‘talking shop’ is a very real one. It can also be 
difficult to find a balance between being overly focused on implementation 
of top down initiatives or over emphasising emergent initiatives at the 
expense of high-level objectives. Insufficient resources, a heavy 
administrative burden and the need for skilled management can also make 
networks ineffective. Ferlie et al. also suggest that there is potential for 
networks to become dominated by an ‘elite professional group’. This may 
have a pro-adoption effect - for example, where a network is linked to key 
opinion leaders and other senior members of a professional group, the 
network can act as a strong advocate for adoption of a specific technology 
– but it may lead to an innovative technology being resisted by a 
professional group that has the power to prevent adoption. 
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Understanding the Implementation and Integration of e-Health 
Services. 
Mair et al.’s42 study is specifically concerned with implementation of e-
Health technology and its successful integration with NHS services and so 
provides useful insights into adoption of technology into healthcare 
settings. Its emphasis on the broad domain of information systems for 
management, communication and decision-support rather than a specific 
category of healthcare technology means that it takes a slightly different 
perspective from the other SDO reports considered here. 
The conclusion of Mair et al.’s report provides some useful guidelines for 
research into the more general area of adoption. Having undertaken a 
systematic review of they have found that though there is a consideration 
of the context in which adoption occurs, especially in terms of 
organisational factors, more specific issues of the workability of a system 
are less well reported (p.44). In particular they stress the need for clear 
analysis of the work required by health professionals to make e-Health 
systems function well in practice, for example through the use of their 
Technology Adoption Readiness Scale (TARS) (p.93). 
A further point made by Mair et al. is the need for monitoring and 
evaluation of new e-Health services. The primary purpose of this should be 
to build an evidence-base to inform adoption by other organisations. This 
perhaps resonates with a wider issue raised in all of the reports looked at 
here. It is the question of how evaluation should be carried out and for 
whom the outputs of evaluation should be targeted. As Ferlie et al. note, 
different groups of stakeholder produce and use different types of 
knowledge and knowledge objects. Because a randomized clinical trial is 
seen as the ‘gold standard’ in technology evaluation staff are perhaps 
discouraged from evaluating implementations using methodologies other 
than the randomised clinical trial, even where those methodologies would 
be more appropriate and/or it is not practicable to undertake a randomised 
clinical trial. 
Other issues relating to technology adoption were also addressed by Mair et 
al. For example, the level of dialogue between designers, implementers and 
users of e-Health systems, mirroring concerning in the wider IS literature 
around user-involvement in systems development (see for example43 44). 
They also pointed to the need for the rationale, safety and reliability of 
systems to be communicated clearly to potential system users. 
Finally, Mair et al. builds upon their own previous work on a model of 
normalisation of technology into practice. The Normalisation Process 
Model45 provides further insights into technology adoption and is discussed 
later in this review. 
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Evaluation of the National Infarct Angioplasty Project  
The issue of technology adoption has also been addressed by Goodacre et 
al.46 in an SDO-funded evaluation of the National Infarct Angioplasty 
Project. Their study looked at the implementation of primary angioplasty 
using a radically re-designed service, signifying a change in service design 
from the existing thrombolysis-based service. In doing so they considered 
the whole healthcare technology system and not just a single device or 
procedure. In light of the discussion above it is interesting that they note in 
the foreword to their report that while there was a large body of evidence 
supporting the long-term benefits of primary angioplasty in treating heart 
attack, an evaluation at the level of service-delivery was still needed. 
Goodacre et al.’s evaluation was broad and far reaching. It considered four 
areas: models of delivery; workforce implications; patient/carer 
satisfaction; and economic evaluation. The findings considered factors such 
as variations in the extent of implementation (for example, the extent to 
which a full 24/7 services were established across all sites) and provided 
detailed analysis of issues raised during implementation. The findings also 
reflected more general concerns about adoption of technologies into the 
NHS including: 
 requirements for radical transformation of existing service delivery 
models; 
 serious implications for job roles, skill levels, working practices and 
quality of working life issues; 
 Impact on the experience of patients and carers and the need to 
manage expectation; 
 risk that implementation of sub-optimal service designs preclude the 
achievement of a technology’s full benefit; 
 mismatch between national payment tariffs and local costs over the 
short, medium and long term (see also Moore47); 
 tension between the role of national implementation programmes to 
drive radical change and pressure for incremental, locally-driven 
change. 
Overall, Goodacre et al.’s evaluation highlights the range of evaluation 
information that is, or could be, used by potential technology adopters 
when considering embedding new technologies into new service-designs 
and emphasise that there is a need to move beyond a narrow consideration 
of outcomes or cost-benefit analysis.
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Summary 
Table 1 brings together the key themes highlighted in these six recent SDO reports. It relates the 
issues raised and locates them within the framework suggested by Greenhalgh et al.19. 
Table 1. Themes developed in the SDO Reports 
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2.2 Key factors affecting technology adoption in the NHS  
The six SDO reports reviewed have raised a number of key issues with 
respect to the adoption of innovative healthcare technologies into the NHS. 
The remainder of this review will examine these further by using the 
literature to develop a model of the system through which NHS-developed 
technologies are adopted into the NHS. It is this model that will guide the 
first stage of this research. Figure 3 sets out the framework that will be 
used for this.  
 
 
Figure 3. Factors affecting NHS adoption of NHS-developed technologies 
Adoption of healthcare technologies is affected by the attributes of the 
technologies themselves such as their perceived relative advantage, their 
compatibility with existing structures and processes and their complexity. It 
is also affected by the nature of the adopting context. Acting upon this 
context are the external drivers of adoption such as legal, economic, 
political and social factors. The extent and success of adoption will also be 
dependent on the nature of the adoption process itself. Specific process 
models and methodologies for managing implementation project are 
important but, factors such as support from formal and informal networks 
may also have a profound effect on the progress of adoption and diffusion 
of innovations.  
2.2.1 Innovation characteristics 
The extent to which adoption of an innovation takes place relies on a range 
of factors, including the characteristics of the innovation itself. Part of the 
adoption decision is likely to be based on the technical specification of an 
innovation but the wider innovation literature suggests that other 
innovation characteristics will also be relevant. Greenhalgh et al.48 p.594 
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discussed the attributes of an innovation that affect adoption as suggested 
by Rogers20, namely, relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability and observability. Their conclusion was that although there is 
evidence to suggest that technologies do have characteristics that impact 
on their adoptability, innovation attributes on their own do not provide a 
full understanding of adoption behaviour. 
Several authors have suggested that technologies have certain inscribed 
characteristics that reflect encoded knowledge36 49 50. Encoded knowledge 
may have been deliberately embedded into software, as would be found in 
decision-support systems, but, more subtly, technologies can also reflect 
tacit knowledge51. Suchman has termed this situated knowledge and 
describes how it is developed through pragmatic and situated interaction 
with a technology18. Situated knowledge is the product of complex social 
learning processes and is therefore difficult to capture52. 
Situated knowledge embedded within a technology can mean that a 
specialist technology fits with the specialist practice of a certain 
professional group and is therefore more attractive to that group, thus 
making the technology more likely to be adopted. However Sole and 
Edmondson53highlight that because situated knowledge results from 
learning processes and interactions in a distinct locale it may not always 
transfer well to another locale and therefore be of limited use. This point is 
also picked up by Orlikowski26 who notes that technology reflects the 
organisational rules and procedures from the organisation where it was 
developed. The implication of this is that a technology is not independent of 
the values, skills and knowledge of the originating organisation. An innate 
characteristic of the technology will be inscribed ways of working that 
reflect particular values, world views, procedures, processes or even 
existing service-designs. 
Innovation/development process 
The characteristics of a healthcare innovation can in part be determined by 
the nature of the processes through which it has passed before becoming 
available for adoption. For a simple technology the effect might be minimal 
or non existent but as complexity increases the effects are likely to grow. 
Complex innovations will follow trajectories mediated by the capabilities 
and resources made available during development. The concept of 
knowledge assets is important here. Teece54 has explored the relationship 
between the progress and success of innovation processes and the extent 
to which complementary assets have been accessed. The innovation 
process does not simply rely on the novel idea produced in a moment of 
invention. Critical to successful innovation is matching up a novel idea with 
other complementary assets, such as intellectual property and 
organisational capabilities34.  
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Rosenberg55 emphasised that the innovation process cannot be treated as a 
black box; clarity is needed about the detail of the activities that constitute 
innovation. Since then, various process models of innovation have been 
suggested. These have increased in sophistication over time as the range of 
activities and their inter-relationships have been described in greater depth. 
Several authors have reviewed these models and have linked them to 
distinct generations of model, with each generation having a distinct 
emphasis. (For a full review see56-59). First and second generation models 
were concerned with viewing technological innovation in terms of either a 
technology push60 or pull61. Third-generation models recognised the 
limitations of these early perspectives and incorporated the concept of close 
coupling. This allows innovation activities to be seen as a logically 
sequential, though not rigidly continuous, interaction between research and 
customer demand62 p.50. Fourth-generation models incorporated the 
iterative process of interaction and collaboration between technology 
suppliers and customers20 62 63. The most sophisticated process models to 
date (fifth-generation) are concerned with increased strategic and 
technological integration64. This integration of processes has led to the 
recognition of the role of national systems of innovation65-67, evolutionary 
models68-71 and distributed models72 73. 
The simplicity of linear models of innovation is attractive but not very useful 
if it is simply hiding the true complexity of the innovation process. In recent 
years they have been generally discredited due to their lack of 
sophistication. Van de Ven et al.74 p.10 argue that the parallel and recursive 
activities involved in innovation are better characterised as forming a 
nonlinear, dynamic system. Godin75 suggested that linear models have 
continued to guide public policy, principally because they lend themselves 
to easy statistical measurement but at best they represent ‘…a theoretical 
construction of industrialists, consultants, and business schools, seconded 
by economists.’  
The convenience of assuming process linearity has been taken up by the 
innovation diffusion literature. For example, when describing his six-phase 
linear model of diffusion, Rogers20 p.158 is careful to note how it is affected 
by serendipitous events and so should be used as a ‘…general guide to the 
process from which many innovations will deviate’. This suggests that both 
innovation and diffusion are subject to the effects of not just specific 
processes but also the diverse range of relationships and interactions that 
underpin the innovation process. 
A more realistic model for innovation in a sector such as healthcare are 
those that recognise innovation’s distributed and systemic nature. It has 
been suggested that innovations are created by innovation systems rather 
than being an output of a series of discrete processes76. The national and 
regional systems of innovation literature adopts a macro view of innovation 
processes and highlight the importance of an infrastructure of institutions 
to support innovation65 67 77. Within industrial sectors, sectoral systems of 
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innovation are based around networks of relationships78 or technological 
fields79. It follows from this that the mode of innovation development will 
not only define the process of innovation but also the relationships and 
types of interactions that impact upon its progress. Several modes of 
innovation development have been identified ranging from those that are 
highly structured, through to those that are more evolutionary. 
In many sectors, management of innovation has focused on the new 
product development (NPD) process. This emphasises planned phases of 
development to reduce risk, control costs and to ensure delivery of new 
products that meet defined customer requirements. Though varying 
between different classes of technology, there are common themes of 
clearly defined development phases. Cooper80 81 describes an innovation 
funnel model, distinctive in its use of a series of stage-gates to actively 
manage progress of projects through to subsequent development stages. 
This approach has been very influential and has informed the specific 
processes applied in several technology sectors. Similarly, approaches such 
as technology roadmapping attempt to link the portfolio of current 
technologies and capabilities with those required in the future. (See82-85 and 
for a review of roadmapping techniques see Kostoff and Scaller86.) Within 
healthcare there are distinctive sectorial approaches to the development of 
new products, such as the drug-development pipeline used within the 
pharmaceuticals industry. (See Northrup87 p.54.) 
An important theme in the NPD literature is the role of consumers and 
users of technology in the development of new or improved products. For 
example, in the healthcare sector, clinicians have made a significant 
contribution to the development of new healthcare technologies. Chatterji 
et al.88 concluded that physicians were very active innovators and found 
that in the US almost 20 percent of approximately 26,000 medical device 
patents had been developed by physicians. Of course patenting a 
technology does not automatically translate into successful innovation.  
Several authors have explored the role that end users of technology can 
have in its innovation processes. (See, for example, user-led innovation16. 
One model through which end users are supported in developing new 
technologies requires them to take on the role of lead users. Von Hippel17 
p.23 defines lead users as members of a user population who are at the 
leading edge of trends in the population and anticipate relatively high 
benefits from obtaining a solution to their needs. As a result of this 
anticipation they are willing to put effort into innovation. Hippel cites the 
work of Lettl et al.89 as an example of medical equipment innovation being 
driven by clinicians. However, much of the emphasis of the lead user 
approaches is based on the assumption that lead users will provide input 
into development of technologies, but the balance of control of the 
development and marketing will remain with technology manufacturers. As 
such, an important role of lead users is to articulate previously 
unarticulated requirements and propose viable solutions. Lettl90 noted that 
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their exposure to specific problem situations means that healthcare staff 
are in a position to define problem situations and then specify or develop 
viable, innovative solutions. As such, healthcare staff can be important lead 
users in the development of healthcare technologies. For examples of 
medical technology developed by lead users see17 91 92. 
Chesbrough has integrated many aspects of the research into innovation 
processes into a model of open innovation15. Central to Chesbrough’s 
approach is that innovation is not simply the preserve of internal R&D 
departments, a point that is likely to apply specifically to healthcare 
technology suppliers. As the previous examples show, institutions that 
deliver healthcare, and the people who work within them, can play an 
integral role in the healthcare technology industry innovation system. 
Central to an Open Innovation philosophy is the expectation that 
organisations will seek innovative solutions from outside (inward 
innovation) but will also manage internally developed innovations by 
passing them out of the firm in order to exploit them (outward innovation). 
(See, for example, Lichtenthaler93.) Within the UK there has been a gradual 
increase in interest in improving technology transfer from public sector 
research institutes (for example the Baker Report5). The development of a 
strategy for exploiting IP from within the NHS was outlined in a Department 
of Health framework and guidance paper11. A particular focus of policy 
became the role of NHS organisations as active partners in innovation in 
relation to the wider healthcare technology industry (see the HITF 
Report12). These initiatives have focused specifically on the role of NHS staff 
in innovation processes and attempted to address how innovation support 
can be provided to those NHS staff. During the first few years of the 21st 
Century the UK government encouraged the development of technology 
transfer offices within the NHS, known as NHS innovation hubs. These were 
modelled closely on commercial and university technology transfer offices. 
These were primarily focused on transfer of technology developed within 
the NHS to wider markets. Some successes have been reported (for 
examples see94,95) but the extent of success achieved in capturing and 
exploiting IP generated within the NHS for the benefit of the NHS remains 
uncertain. The concerns set out by Savory96 that a more broadly based, 
culturally-sensitive approach is required, still stand. 
Role of health professionals in innovation 
A paper written at the start of this research97 examined the role of 
professionals working within healthcare in innovation. It showed that the 
literature on the role of users in innovation has predominantly considered 
the private sector context. (See, for example, Thomke and von Hippel98 and 
von Hippel17.) However, there are reasons to believe that the healthcare 
sector is different from many others. Since ancient times, surgeons have 
taken the role of both designer and user of surgical instruments99 and 
clinicians have driven innovations in the design of healthcare service 
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delivery models100. Lettl90 argues that the enactment of these combined 
roles stems from the inventive and innovative personalities of the role 
occupants, alongside a context in which there is a high problem pressure 
and a lack of availability of relevant competences and resources. Expression 
of this behaviour has been highlighted by the entries submitted to recent 
innovation competitions, run within the NHS. Some very widely-used 
innovations have been developed by doctors, nurses, manager and 
auxiliary staff, often without formal involvement of NHS senior 
management94. The paper also maps the complex routes taken by projects 
based inside the NHS and the range of support on which they draw. This is 
reproduced here as Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Routes to market for NHS-developed technologies97 
2.2.2 Adoption Context 
The organisational context has been identified as an important factor in 
adoption of technology. It is widely understood that existing technological 
infrastructure creates both potential for, and barriers to, adoption of new 
technologies. Similarly, organisational factors such as structure and existing 
organisational capabilities can impact on the assimilation of new 
technologies. Leonard-Barton101 suggests that the development of core 
rigidities that tie the organisation to a specific technology is a danger for all 
organisations. The extent to which an organisation is able to adopt a new 
technology is closely linked to its ability to absorb and use new knowledge. 
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Readiness and absorptive capacity 
Whether a specific organisational context is ‘ready’ to accept a technology 
is likely to depend on many factors. Where information technologies are 
concerned, the technology acceptance model (TAM) developed by Davis102-
105, highlights the impact on a technology’s acceptance of users’ perception 
of usefulness and ease of use. However, the testing of TAM (for example, 
see106) has been based predominantly on an individual’s acceptance or 
rejection of a specific technology. The model has not considered the 
acceptance of technologies by teams, other social groups or by those who 
are part of the wider organisational/process context. In considering 
readiness it is therefore necessary to recognise that a broad set of social 
factors will affect adoption. 
Ability to absorb and apply knowledge is a prerequisite for an organisation 
that seeks to facilitate technological innovation. An organisation’s ability to 
apply knowledge from outside has been termed absorptive capacity107 108, 
or hybridisation109 110. In the healthcare sector, the term knowledge 
translation is used to refer to the transformation of research knowledge into 
practical healthcare applications111. Savory has suggested that an 
organisation’s ability to absorb, re-create and subsequently diffuse 
knowledge associated with technological innovation can be viewed as a 
knowledge translation capability112. Kogut and Zander36 113 highlight the 
inherent difficulty in transferring knowledge and emphasise that knowledge 
cannot be transferred unless it has been codified first. They also point out 
that it is easier for organisations to adopt proximate technologies than 
those that are completely foreign to an organisation. This preference for 
familiar technologies results in an organisation’s capability development 
following a path that is very dependent upon the organisation’s previous 
technological capabilities. 
Several mechanisms exist for transferring knowledge. Boisot114 highlights 
abstraction as an important process for supporting knowledge transfer. 
Abstraction is the process through which knowledge that was situated in a 
specific context is transformed so that it has a more general application. 
Abstracted knowledge has, therefore, been stripped of detail that is only 
relevant to a specific context. (Abstracting knowledge from its original 
context is said to reduce its stickiness115-117.) Typical examples of 
abstracted knowledge include scientific laws, generalised heuristics and 
‘best practice’. 
Linkages between individuals, teams, departments or divisions are central 
to the transfer of knowledge within and between organisations. These links 
can vary between strong, formal relationships and weak, highly informal 
ones. Intuitively, it might be expected that strong links will always be most 
effective for sharing knowledge but research has shown this not to be the 
case118. Strong linkages are most effective for transferring complex 
knowledge, though they are relatively costly to maintain. Weak linkages 
have been found to be more effective for transferring simple forms of 
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knowledge and these can be maintained for lower cost with, for example, 
less need for frequent contact or reciprocal arrangements. Strong links can 
inhibit wide searches for information by restricting searches to established 
communication channels119. It has also been suggested that loose inter-
personal ties are least likely to transfer redundant knowledge, that is 
knowledge already available within a group120. The implication of these 
strengths and weaknesses for maximising knowledge translation capability 
is to have strong ties where there is a clear need but also provide 
organisational support to promote weak ties. 
Within healthcare, the challenge of absorbing new knowledge and the 
technologies to which it is related is significant. Central to this is the ability 
of health professionals to absorb new knowledge by, for example, 
interpreting the evidence from evaluations. Citing the very slow uptake of 
day-surgery for hernia operations, Maynard121 argues that use of evidence 
to support changes in practice in healthcare has been poor for many 
decades. He puts the blame for this on failures in both the supply and 
demand side for clinical evidence. Where the supply side of is concerned, 
he suggests it: 
may be corrupted by poor quality science, imperfectly detected by 
weak peer review and by quasi-academic competitors such as 
consultancy firms, patient lobbies, ‘experts’ and think tanks who may 
be driven not by the simple pursuit of knowledge as in the academic 
nirvana, but also by varying forms of partisan self-interest. (p.254) 
For the demand side failures he suggests clinicians, politicians, policy-
makers and other stakeholders have limited capacity for evaluating new 
evidence: 
The demand side of the market for evidence is characterized by 
considerable potential interest, but a fragmented capacity to access 
and process information in a way that is consistent with the efficient 
formulation and appraisal of public policy. Political imperatives are to 
act swiftly rather than to think, articulate objectives, design evidence-
based options, pilot them with evaluation and implement or not. 
(p.254) 
This would suggest that the absorptive capacity of the NHS to adopt 
technologies is limited by lack of availability of the right quality and 
quantity of evidence and because of shortages of the skills, resources and 
political climate that is needed to evaluate evidence and draw the right 
conclusions.  
Team learning has been shown to be important in the implementation of 
new technologies. Edmondson et al.122 found that even amongst high 
performing surgical teams, differences in team learning affected the uptake 
of new technology. This suggests social learning processes that enable 
learning at team, group and other levels are an integral part of the 
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adoption of new technology, with success closely correlated to efficient 
learning processes.  
The importance of individual and social learning to adoption was also 
highlighted by Funk et al.123. They investigated the barriers that prevented 
nursing staff from using research findings. The top four factors they found 
were: 
 Values, skills and awareness of the adopter. How well equipped is the 
adopter to make sense of the innovation? How open to change are they 
and do they have the skills need to understand the innovation and 
evaluate it? 
 Characteristics of the adopter’s organisation. How supportive are other 
categories of staff? Does the adopter have sufficient organisational 
power to effect adoption? 
 Characteristics of the innovation in terms of the quality of research 
underpinning it. Is there clear evidence of effectiveness and is the 
evidence credible to the adopter? 
 Characteristics of the communication relating to the innovation. Is the 
information in a form and easily accessible to the adopter? 
All of these resonate with wider adoption issues. 
Building on the work of Funk et al., Closs et al.124 also looked at hospital 
nurses’ use of research findings. They concluded that ability to make 
changes to practice was affected by: the amount of time provided for 
research, research facilities; peer support; and the authority the nurses 
held in the organisation. Very importantly, they also found nurses lacked 
the skills required to make sense of the statistics supporting use of a 
research finding. This suggests that training staff so that they are able to 
analyse, understand, and interpret research findings is an important pre-
requisite for adoption of evidence-based practices. 
Ability to make use of research findings is not just a hurdle for nursing 
staff. It can apply, to varying degrees, to categories of healthcare staff This 
suggests that the integration of staff with research as part of their remit 
into teams providing and/or managing care may facilitate more effective 
technology adoption. An example that highlights this is the case of research 
radiographers and their role in assimilating new techniques and 
technologies into normal practice. A survey of the profession in 2007 
showed that radiographers with an explicit research role had a key role in 
adoption of new techniques, especially where the application of 
computerised technology in radiotherapy is concerned125. The study 
concluded that the presence of a research radiographer within a 
department was vital for improving uptake of new techniques and 
technology. Importantly, it also found insufficient funding and training and 
lack of clearly defined allocation of research time, all tended to inhibit 
effective transfer of new research into individual clinics. 
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2.2.3 External Adoption Drivers 
Not surprisingly, decisions to adopt technology are only influenced by 
factors internal to an organisation. The SDO reports reviewed earlier in this 
section highlighted the extent to which external drivers influence adoption 
of technologies. For example, government have an interest and an 
important part to play in funding, supporting, encouraging or mandating 
the adoption of healthcare technology. 
Two drivers, in particular, deserve further consideration. The first is the 
extent to which external networks influence technology adoption. The 
second is whether the growing application of regulatory processes to 
healthcare systems leads to increased adoption of technologies that 
monitor and control healthcare processes. The latter may have a broader 
impact in encouraging adoption of technologies that support the 
implementation of protocols or other standardised procedures and in turn 
trigger adoption of technologies needing fewer skills and/or less exercise of 
professional judgement. 
Networks 
Networks can be an important structure through which the results of 
research can be communicated. They can support communication between 
organisations and enable specialist staff to maintain relationships based on 
disciplinary rather than organisational affiliations. Currie et al.126 highlight 
the role of networks in public-services, including healthcare, as a means of 
gaining improvement in service-delivery. They identified four ideal types of 
network: managed networks; inter-organisational partnerships; 
professional networks; and communities of practice. All four of these have 
the potential to influence innovation and adoption of healthcare 
technologies. 
Edwards highlights that managed networks within the healthcare sector are 
concerned with the formal integration of staff across organisations 
delivering a healthcare service: 
Development of managed networks represents a strategy improving 
healthcare delivery and involves ‘linked groups of health professionals 
and organisations from primary, secondary and tertiary care working 
in a coordinated manner, unconstrained by existing professional and 
(organisational) boundaries to ensure equitable provision of high 
quality effective services’127 p.63 
Development of managed networks in the UK NHS has been encouraged by 
government policy as a means of improving care and many networks are 
now well established. (For specific examples of such networks see Ferlie et 
al.39.) The aim of these networks is primarily to provide a basis for sharing 
and dissemination of evidence. Their formal constitution can, however, also 
make them accountable for achieving performance improvements. One 
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such example is the NHS Cancer Plan128. Addicott et al.129 note that the UK 
cancer networks’ formal constitution and their role in co-ordinating clinical 
services mean that they are more politically accountable than more 
informally constituted networks and that there is a danger of managed 
networks becoming over-regulated at the expense of energy and creativity. 
The role of professional networks are a significant feature of the medical 
profession. The ‘invisible college’ has long been recognised as a powerful 
force in scientific research communities. Crane130 suggests two aspects of a 
social organisation are important: the interaction between the most active 
and influential members of the area and the ‘rank and file’; and the role of 
‘outsiders’. In clinical research it is likely that groupings based around 
professional specialities will play a vital role in validating new knowledge 
and defining ‘best practices’. As noted by Menchik and Meltzer131 
professional networks are important influence systems and provide a forum 
in which members can gain status and esteem for their work and where 
members can influence the behaviour of other network members. They also 
highlight the extent to which professional networks, underpinned by 
journals and conferences, are central to the peer validation of new medical 
knowledge and its diffusion across a professional speciality. As such, the 
role of professional networks can be seen as critical to the adoption and 
implementation of new knowledge and technologies. West et al.132 stress 
that in developing dissemination strategies it is critical to consider the 
available social networks of health professionals. However, an alternative 
perspective is that professional networks primarily serve the interests and 
autonomy of their members. (See, for example, Sheaff133 and Waring134.) 
Nevertheless, in the context of innovation and improvement of healthcare 
there are signs that professional networks have successfully drawn in 
health professionals and allowed them to operate as ‘…shapers and quiet 
system architects’41. 
Communities of practice have been identified as specific types of network in 
which members of communities are able to share explicit and tacit 
knowledge135. A distinctive feature of communities of practice is that 
members share similar roles or carry out similar work. Wenger136 has 
suggested three further distinctive features: reciprocity between members; 
shared sense of belonging; and a common repertoire of languages, 
routines, artefacts, instruments and styles. Within healthcare communities 
of practice are important social structures through which knowledge is 
created and shared. Their importance lies in being able to reach outside 
professional silos and cut across organisational boundaries. Unlike managed 
networks theirs is an informal position and this gives them a distinctive role 
in supporting innovation and technology adoption. 
Regulation and clinical governance as a driver of change 
One important example of how a tension for change in the NHS has 
generated innovation is the development of clinical governance systems. 
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Since the 1990s, the development of clinical governance systems has been 
a major component of the NHS’s quality improvement strategy137. The 
clinical governance agenda forms an integral part of the strategy for setting 
standards, improving quality and monitoring services138. A direct result of 
several high profile clinical failures, such as those at Bristol and Liverpool 
hospitals139 140, has been that the emphasis of clinical governance has 
broadened and self-regulation and clinical autonomy have been restricted.  
The nature of clinical governance has changed over the last decade. Initially 
high-level performance indicators underpinned clinical governance 
initiatives141. Subsequent additions to clinical governance initiatives have 
refocused away from national targets towards improvement approaches 
based on defined processes such as those found in National Service 
Frameworks (NSFs)142. Wider initiatives have seen the creation of 
institutions to evaluate new healthcare technologies through rigorous 
health technology assessments, most notably the creation of the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
An integral part of clinical governance is the adoption of evidence-based 
approaches to treatment of patients but also the configuration of services. 
Harrison suggests that the development of clinical governance is an 
example of wider modernisation initiatives within the NHS40. More 
specifically, he suggests that the implementation of clinical governance 
represents a shift towards a scientific bureaucratic approach to medicine. 
Such an approach emphasises the implementation of externally derived 
medical knowledge within standardised rule-based protocols, even though 
this may cut across traditional assumptions about use of professional 
judgement. The extent to which this shift has actually affected behaviour 
has been contested by Greenhalgh et al. who suggest that this overly 
rational approach treats the spread of innovative practice simplistically and 
often ignores contextual issues19. Furthermore, the extent to which 
guidelines have been implemented successfully has been questioned. It has 
been suggested that context and underlying social relations have had a 
significant effect on take-up, one example being implementation of National 
Service frameworks in GP surgeries143. 
The shift towards bureaucratic scientific medicine however is potentially 
very disruptive to healthcare processes and structures. First of all, it opens 
the effectiveness of the processes up to scrutiny. By placing measures on 
process outcomes it has been possible to compare the performance across 
institutions. This benchmarking has shown not just where best-practices 
exist but where poor practices continue. Critically, where poor performance 
does exist its increased visibility means that the pressure to align processes 
with care guidelines or evidence-based procedures is significant. 
Secondly, the prescription of an optimum process means that the 
capabilities required of staff delivering healthcare processes has to change. 
Instead of demonstrating specialist knowledge and relying on clinical 
judgement, health professionals may be expected to follow precisely 
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prescribed processes. This has important implications for who undertakes a 
procedure and where it takes place. For example, procedures normally 
carried out by specialist staff in secondary care settings may be transferred 
to community-based staff with less training. Christenson144 145 has 
highlighted that it is this shift in the user of a technology that is significant 
in defining a healthcare technology as disruptive. Thus the shift towards 
scientific bureaucratic medicine creates opportunities for technological 
innovation. One of these is the development of information systems that 
can be used to manage scientific bureaucratic medicine and wider clinical 
governance initiatives. Another opportunity is the development of 
sophisticated systems for gathering data and allowing analysis and 
information retrieval to support the application and monitoring of care 
guidelines. The development of such systems goes beyond administration. 
Increasingly, the development of new technologies has the effect of 
‘informating’146 healthcare processes by allowing aggregation of detailed 
data across large numbers of patients. This technological innovation then 
also becomes a part of the system of scientific bureaucratic medicine by 
collecting and analysing data, so contributing to bodies of evidence. For 
example, collection of data has shown that adherence to resuscitation 
guidelines varies considerably. In one study it was found that only 40 per 
cent of patients received treatment in accordance with specific 
guidelines147.  
2.2.4 Adoption Process 
Evaluation and evidence to support adoption decisions 
A key part of the decision-making process that underpins technology 
adoption is the availability of supporting evidence for a technology’s 
effectiveness. Within a healthcare setting the evaluation of a technology 
can take a number of forms and include technical, economic and social 
assessments. Adoption decisions involve a number of stakeholders and so it 
is important that the evidence used to support adoption is not just sufficient 
but also relevant and addresses the concerns of all parties. The health 
technology assessment (HTA) process is the established mechanism for 
assessing an innovative technology’s effectiveness. The primary function of 
this is to assess: ‘whether a specific technology works, for whom, at what 
cost and in comparison to which alternative technologies.’148 Within a 
translational research pathway HTA is a key component of the final 
assessment of whether there is a valid business case for using the 
technology in clinical practice. This assessment has been termed as the 
fourth hurdle in translational research and is closely coupled to 
remuneration decision-making within healthcare systems This hurdle is 
different from those encountered in earlier stages in translational research 
pathway because they are concerned with technical assessments of 
efficacy, safety, and the like whereas the focus of the fourth hurdle is 
health economics. It thus marks a move away from scientific assessment to 
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consideration of the complete value chain for a technology149. The economic 
evaluation assesses the technology’s potential for cost minimisation, cost 
benefit, cost effectiveness and cost utility3 p.107. However, wider aspects of a 
technology may also be considered within an HTA, such as ethics, legal, 
organisational and social. For this reason HTA constitutes a complex 
assessment requiring data from a broad range of sources and sophisticated 
assessment methodologies. It is rooted in the assessment of 
pharmaceutical technologies but is now being used, with little or no 
modification, to assess a much broader range of technologies. 
This raises the question whether assessment methodologies should be 
applied without careful reference to the type of technology being assessed. 
For example, where the case of diagnostic technologies is concerned, in 
2011 the UK’s Centre for Health Technology Evaluation said the following: 
The evaluation of diagnostics differs from the evaluation of treatments 
in several ways. The most important difference is that diagnostic tests 
have few direct outcomes, that is, outcomes affecting the patient that 
come directly from the test itself. Most outcomes of interest follow 
from treatments that are either initiated or not initiated based on the 
results of the tests. The second important difference is that tests are 
frequently done in conjunction with other tests or measurements, and, 
where this is the case, it is the composite of the series of tests that is 
used in clinical decision-making. 
These two important differences make the evaluation of diagnostics 
complex. Only very rarely do studies of diagnostic tests follow patients 
through treatment to final outcomes. Also, evaluation of diagnostics 
usually requires that the clinical management process is described and 
that the effects of that process are known or assumed. If the effects of 
treatment are not known, analyses can be performed, but the validity 
of the results will be less certain in ways that may not be completely 
specifiable. This increases the uncertainty with which decisions can be 
made on use of diagnostic technologies.150 pp19p.19 
Many countries now have institutions that formally operate the HTA 
systems such as NICE in the UK and CADTH in Canada. (For a 
comprehensive review see Hutton et al.151.) However as the range of 
technologies they assess increases, the challenge might be to provide a 
suitable range of HTA methodologies that are appropriate to all the groups 
that are available. Furthermore, there is also the question of lack of 
consistency and coherence between arrangements in different countries152. 
Within healthcare, the dominance of a scientific paradigm means that for 
pharmaceuticals and other healthcare technologies, experimental 
approaches to validation are seen as fundamental. The gold-standard for 
assessing healthcare technologies is therefore the randomised clinical trial. 
It can be argued that such trials represent a relatively narrow approach to 
assessment that underemphasises the context in which a technology is 
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used. It has therefore been suggested that other methodologies that 
extend the scope of healthcare technology assessment are needed3 p.134. For 
example, surgical procedures have been identified as particularly 
problematic where evaluation using randomised clinical trials is 
concerned153. One alternative that has been suggested is the use of 
registries to monitor outcomes of procedures154. 
HTA processes increasingly rely on systematic reviews to assess whether a 
technology is effective. As a result, the style and structure of academic 
papers describing trials of healthcare technologies has become critical. 
Although such reviews are applicable to pharmaceuticals, other healthcare 
technologies may present challenges. For example, diagnostic technologies 
can differ on several performance measures including: type of technology 
employed; fixed and variable costs; risk and acceptability to the patient, 
and balance between accuracy, speed and convenience of use. Reid et al. 
highlighted the limitations of many trials of diagnostic tests and suggested 
the need for adherence to methodological standards155. At the root of their 
concern was the diverse range of approaches to assessment being 
employed and the consequences of this when comparing different studies. 
Recent research has attempted to apply a wider approach to evaluation in 
healthcare by applying realistic evaluation. This approach was initially 
developed by Pawson and Tilley156 to assess programmes, such as public 
health initiatives. At the heart of this approach is a concern to identify not 
just what outcomes are achieved but also the specific factors that show 
utility in a specific context. Two examples of the use of realistic evaluation 
in healthcare include: the assessment of large-scale service changes157; 
and clinical guidelines158. Its potential use specifically within health 
technology assessment is, however, only yet at an embryonic stage.  
Implementation 
Almost the final stage of adoption is implementation. After that, all that 
remains it to monitor the effects of adoption and seek further opportunities 
for innovation and improvement. Karsh159 suggests that implementation 
science should be applied to healthcare technologies emphasises the need 
for implementation processes to include: 
 top management commitment 
 clear lines of responsibility/accountability 
 structured implementation project 
 training 
 pilot testing 
 clear communications 
 user-participation 
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Closely related to the implementation of new technologies is the literature 
on implementation of evidence-based practice. For example, Ryecroft-
Malone et al.160 have proposed the PARIHS framework to identify the key 
factors in implementing evidence-based practice. This framework does not 
explicitly address implementation of technology but it is relevant because 
technology often codifies evidence-based practice in which case 
implementation of the technology and evidence-based practice occurs 
simultaneously. 
More recent work on the PARIHS framework has attempted to make it more 
sutable to guide task-oriented implementations, such as a new procedures 
or care processes161. All of these approaches share a concern to ensure that 
evidence, contextual readiness and facilitation issues are addressed during 
implementation and that a means of assessing implementation success is 
put in place. A recent review162 has concluded that the PARIHS framework 
provides a useful heuristic for planning implementation in a healthcare 
setting, though it also stresses that in the examples of implementations 
where PARIHS had been applied it had been applied mainly retrospectively 
and not at the planning stage. Importantly though, the framework 
highlights a range of factors relating to types of evidence supporting 
adoption and contextual factors that might help or hinder implementation. 
The approach taken to implementation needs to vary according to the type 
and scale of the technology being adopted and the level and type of 
consequential changes it brings about. For example, some technologies can 
be just purchased and put into service whilst others require strategies such 
as pilots and phased roll outs. It is worth noting, however, that the overlap 
between development of an innovation and its implementation into practice 
can be very blurred when the development takes place at the 
implementation site. Metcalfe and Pickston163 describe the development of 
innovations in hip replacement and intraocular lenses. Common to both is 
the extent to which implementation is linked to the trialling and 
experimentation. Like other sectors such as computer software, (see for 
example Crinnion43), it is common to develop and use prototypes with the 
intention that they will be improved incrementally over time. In cases such 
as these, less structured approaches to implementation are often the norm. 
Implementation can take the form of evolutionary prototyping or trialling.  
For more complex technologies and for those that require or lead to wider 
changes such as changes in practice of healthcare staff and changes to a 
process involving several stakeholders or cutting across departments, or 
even organisations, or need to be rolled-out across many locations, 
implementation needs to be treated as a formal process. It needs to draw 
on project management skills and expertise and make use of the project 
management methods and techniques.  
The end point for successful implementation will normally be the point at 
which the technology has become integrated into everyday practice. Mair et 
al.42 have described this in the context of e-health technology as 
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Figure 5. Guiding questions for this research
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
This study set out to explore issues that affected the adoption of 
technologies into the NHS and how the origin of the technology impacted 
on the adoption process. The literature review section concluded by setting 
out a preliminary framework for the study. The framework identifies key 
issues to which the subsequent fieldwork needed to be sensitive. Yet, it was 
important that any further issues would also be revealed, recorded and 
included in the analysis. For this reason the research was designed to be 
predominantly exploratory and the methodological approach has reflected 
this requirement. 
The general approach taken in designing the methodology was to develop 
rich descriptions of technologies, their characteristics and adoption in 
specific context. The research design therefore focused on building detailed 
narratives of technologies that provided deep insight into a few specific 
examples, rather than attempting to build statistically significant samples 
that might allow generalised statements about all NHS-developed 
technologies, their development and subsequent adoption. The emphasis 
was therefore on building theory, rather than testing theory. 
Case study research is important when the phenomenon cannot be studied 
out of context for, example through experimental methods164 p.13. The 
research needs to focus on a specific instance of a phenomenon and the 
various interactive processes that affect it, or for ‘sticky, practice-based 
problems where the experiences of the actors are important and the 
context of action is critical’165 p.80. The case study approach allows the 
researcher to adopt a holistic view of the context and to ‘…retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’164 p.2. In addition to where 
the phenomenon is closely coupled to its context, it has been suggested 
that case research is beneficial where the research and associated theory is 
exploratory and in its early, formative stages166. Eisenhardt makes it clear 
that case studies are important where research in the area is still 
exploratory and needs to focus on ‘…understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings’167. There is now a tradition in using case study 
methodologies in exploratory research in the fields of information systems 
and innovation studies, see for example Walsham168, Suchman18, 
Bessant169, Howells109, Jones170, and Leonard171. 
Walsham has emphasised that detailed case study research creates the 
opportunity to gain a deep understanding of a phenomenon, through the 
development of thick description that supports understanding of the 
‘…subtleties of changing interpretation’172 p.103. This complements Strauss 
and Corbin’s view that taking an approach that is open to the idiosyncrasies 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
50 
 
of a particular case, results in an increased scope for emergent issues to 
arise, grounded in the data collected173. In contrast the use of research 
methods, such as surveys, would yield much less detail of the process to be 
understood. 
A potential strategy for developing a rich understanding of a phenomenon, 
such as an innovation process, is to adopt a process theory based 
approach. This emphasises patterns in events, in contrast to variance 
theory in which explanations are based on causal relationships between 
independent and dependent variables174. Based on this, narrative strategies 
of qualitative process research175 can be used to construct from data a 
story that emphasises the chronology of events, as well as the concepts, 
understanding and ultimately theory linked to the data collected176 177. Such 
a strategy is potentially problematic due to the fluid characteristics of 
process phenomena178, and the difficulty in isolating units of analysis in an 
unambiguous way175. Thus in researching an innovation or adoption 
process, it is necessary to recognise the relevance of both variables and 
events. For example, within an innovation process there will be a number of 
events triggered by actors that are seen as significant, however, contextual 
variables such as the prevailing norms and values will also impact on the 
process. Such a strategy does risk what Pettigrew described as ‘death by 
data asphyxiation’179 due to the large data sets required. This in turn leads 
to the problem of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant data, 
though many techniques have been devised for organising and making 
sense of such data (see for examples Miles and Huberman180). It is also 
made more complex due to the possible non-linearity of an innovation 
process181. 
An important part of the development of a rich description is the iteration 
between theorising and observation. This has been described as an 
interplay between researcher and data: 
Analysis begins with the first interview and observation, which leads to 
the next interview or observation, followed by more analysis, more 
interviews or fieldwork, and so on. It is the analysis that drives the 
data collection. Therefore, there is an interplay between the 
researcher and the research act. Because this interplay requires an 
immersion in the data, by the end of the inquiry, the researcher is 
shaped by the data, just as the data is shaped by the researcher.173 
p.42 
An important benefit of adopting a multi-case research design is that the 
development of multiple viewpoints on specific phenomenon are developed. 
For a research design where all cases share similar context, for example 
the NHS, the cases provide specific perspectives on common areas of 
interest. In this way, perspectives on major institutions will yield a range of 
insights into their inter-relationship. This could be viewed as a form of data 
triangulation182 in which multiple sources of data are used to develop a 
converging line of enquiry164 p.99. The use of several data sources within 
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each case (various informants, documents etc.) allow details of a specific 
case to be triangulated. This is an important strategy as in developing an 
understanding of when and why decisions were made, it is useful to be able 
to compare accounts in both interviews and documentary evidence. 
It should be noted however that where a participant’s account does not 
triangulate with another source e.g. an account given in a publication, it 
does not immediately mean that either account is false. The differences in 
the accounts of events provided to researchers may be incomplete due to: 
time constraints in data collection; complexity of events; limits of the 
research participants’ memories; differences between written and oral 
communication conventions; or participants’ reticence to supply a full 
account. It is also plausible that the perspective of participants changes 
over time. While triangulation is a useful tool, it is important to recognise 
its limitations, especially where assessment of a truth is based on 
repeatability of an observation across several sources. 
This suggests that research can adopt an interpretive position on the nature 
of fact. Stake highlights that while much qualitative research is concerned 
with using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning and to verify the 
repeatability of an observation, another important function if to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen183 p.443. 
This is a position advocated in information systems research where 
Walsham notes that: 
…I take an interpretive study to mean that multiple perspectives are 
provided by participants, and thus that the interesting data study 
cannot be ‘triangulated’ to provide a ‘true’ interpretation, since whose 
truth should be chosen? The interpretive researcher filters participants’ 
statements and actions through a lens of his or her own subjectivity, 
and then produces a ‘story’ about the events that have occurred and 
some reasons for them. The purpose of the story, again, is not to tell 
‘the truth’ about the case study but to tell a ‘truth’, namely the 
researcher’s own thoughts and ideas concerning the phenomena at 
issue.168 p.7 
This shows that the concept of triangulation has been dismissed in 
interpretive research, as an interpretive approach is based on different 
assumptions to positivist approaches, making triangulation simply not 
possible184 p.67. The role of multiple cases should therefore be seen as 
allowing a range of perspectives to be developed, on a range of 
phenomena, rather than simply as a basis for triangulation data. 
An important issue in case study research is the extent to which the 
findings of a case can be generalised. Case study research does not follow a 
sampling logic, as in statistical generalisation, where the research seeks to 
generalise from a sample to the wider population. Instead, case research is 
concerned with analytic generalisation as distinct from statistical 
generalisation164 p.32. Analytic generalisation represents the process of 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
52 
 
generalising from empirical descriptions to theory and has received the 
attention of several social science and information systems researchers164 
167 172 173 185-188. Walsham highlights the potential of four categories of 
generalisation that may be gained from case studies: development of 
concepts; generation of theory; drawing of specific implications; and 
contribution of rich insight172 p.110. 
The area of NHS-developed innovation in the NHS is characterised as novel 
and an expanding area of research. For this reason, it was important that 
during the course of the research, the methodology adopted must be 
adequately flexible and capable of evolution. This study has not set out to 
prove a specific a priori theory or hypothesis established from the start. 
Instead, the research was concerned with exploring specific research 
questions and then through analytical generalisation164 p.32 189 p.120, develop 
theory that would aid the explanation. This mirrored the concerns of 
Easterby-Smith et al.190 p.47 when suggesting the use of an inductive or 
grounded approach; an approach benefiting from flexibility and a potential 
to provide both explanations and new knowledge. 
The research design adopted for this research followed a multiple case 
study method. This drew on Yin’s case study method164 p.50. The design was 
based on three phases concerned with: research definition and design; 
preparation, data collection and analysis; and finally cross-case analysis 
and conclusion. In common with Yin’s model the research design 
incorporated feed-forward and feed-back loops that allows the experience 
gained from each case study to be fed into other parts of the research. The 
overall design of the research is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Overall design of the research 
An integral part of both Stage 1 and Stage 2 was the gaining of ethical 
approval and R&D permission for access at individual NHS trusts. 
3.1.1 Stage 1 
The purpose of Stage 1 of the research was to ascertain the characteristics 
of a wide a range of NHS-developed technologies so that six theoretically 
important technologies could be selected for further study in Stage 2 of the 
research. It was decided that this would be achieved by conducting a series 
of telephone interviews with the developers of the technologies, their 
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industrial partners (if any) and adopters and by studying any published 
information about the technologies that was available. 
The first step was to undertake four parallel streams of activity: conduct a 
literature review to inform the research; identify technologies for inclusion 
in Stage 1; apply for ethical approval and the permissions needed to 
undertake the work; and build a database to hold the data gathered. The 
results of the literature review appear in Section 2 of this report. 
The first ports of call to find out about technologies that had been 
developed within the NHS were NHS innovation hubs, the NHS National 
Technology Adoption Centre (NTAC) and the NHS National Innovation 
Centre (NIC). Because the sample had to satisfy particular needs, the 
snowball sampling technique191 192, as recommended by Robson193 was 
used. This, augmented by use of internet search engines, delivered a list of 
technologies for further investigation. Further additions were made to this 
list as Stage 1 proceeded in order to build as large and varied a sample as 
possible. Application for ethical approval for the research was made via the 
Integrated Research Application System (IRAS). A protocol was developed 
and participant information sheets and consent forms were drawn up. (see 
Appendix 1) 
 
Figure 7. Research protocol  
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ways: to populate a spreadsheet; and to write ‘stories’. Essentially, the 
spreadsheet provides a data set that makes it easy to look across all 36 
technologies or across technologies in the same class. It provides a 
snapshot of the characteristics of the technologies with some indication of 
the level of adoption each had achieved at the time the survey was 
undertaken.  
The second form of analysis consisted of interpreting the data relating to 
each technology so that it, in effect, told the story of the technology and 
drew out its important characteristics. Each story provides a concise 
narrative of each technology’s significant characteristics and its 
development within the NHS. As in much qualitative research, the emphasis 
here was on interpretation194. It should be noted that particular regard was 
paid to ‘contextuality’195 p.16. This was because the purpose of Stage 1 was 
to select technologies that would become the cases for Stage 2 of the 
research and, as Yin164 p.13 says, a case study is ‘an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident’. 
The whole set of technologies were then viewed alongside each other so 
that important themes and sets of characteristics could be identified that 
would allow judgements could be made about which technologies to 
investigate further in Stage 2. This activity was informed by the literature 
review and provided five dimensions against which each technology could 
be mapped. The results of this mapping exercise allowed theoretical 
sampling to take place167 196 p.519 where each of the six technologies to be 
taken forward to Stage 2 represented either a theoretical category or a 
polar type. 
3.1.2 Stage 2 
The purpose of Stage 2 of the research was to compare the adoption of 
NHS-developed technologies with the adoption of equivalent commercially-
developed technologies. The first task, therefore, was to identify a 
competing or equivalent technology for each of the six technologies 
selected at the end of Stage 1. When this had been done, primary and 
secondary research started in order to gather data that would allow six 
pairs of comparative case studies to be developed which in turn would allow 
similarities and differences between and across pairs could be identified. A 
variety of methods were used to gather this data. These included visits to 
adoption sites to interview adopters, telephone interviews with adopters 
and other stakeholders and study of secondary sources such as refereed 
journal articles, government-backed reports and other items of grey 
literature such as newspaper and magazine articles and sales catalogues 
and brochures. In recognition of the substantial differences in nature, scale 
and scope between the six cases, unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews were used so as to allow questions appropriate to the individual 
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pair of cases to be asked whilst at the same time covering some specific 
topics such as adoption decision making, implementation processes and 
reactions to the adoption across all cases. Notes were taken during each 
interview and a summary sent to the interviewee who was asked to confirm 
in writing that the summary was accurate and authorise inclusion of the 
data within any publications associated with the research. 
The methods used to draw lessons from the cases varied a little across 
cases depending upon the nature of the pair of technologies being studied 
and the extent to which adoption had taken place. In all cases, however, 
the emphasis was on: 
 Answering the question: Is the adoptability of the NHS-developed 
technology greater, less or no different from than that of the competing 
or equivalent commercially-developed technology? 
 Shedding light on the much wider topic of healthcare technology 
adoption within the NHS. 
Although the emphasis of the research was on technology adoption into the 
NHS, understanding the broader context NHS policy was also critical. For 
this reason, two higher levels of data collection took place. All three levels 
are shown in Figure 8. Level 1 is concerned with NHS policy and is, of 
course, tightly coupled to government policy more generally. Data sources 
included NHS and government documents such as policy papers but also 
care guidelines and recommendations from various agencies. Level 2 is 
related to the management of technology adoption within the NHS and 
includes the innovation and adoption management services that are made 
available to managers and clinicians. These services may be provided from 
within the NHS (for example, the NHS-based innovation hubs) or by 
commercial companies offering management services. Level 3, where the 
primary research was undertaken, is concerned with the specific adoption 
projects carried out within the NHS. 
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Figure 8. The three levels of Stage 2 data collection 
The research was therefore based on a multiple case study design, with the 
individual cases contributing an understanding of processes in the NHS. For 
each case, the unit of analysis is the adoption of technology into the NHS, 
however for the overall study the unit of analysis is adoption processes 
more generally across the NHS. 
Framework for analysis of Stage 2 
Data from the case study interviews was analysed using a framework that 
comprised three stages. The purpose of the stages was to analyse data 
systematically, starting with individual interviews, then through the 
development of themes and issues, backed up where necessary with 
verbatim quotations, before aggregating all the information gathered for an 
individual case. This framework is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. The Stage 2 framework 
The first stage was to convert data held in interview notes or recordings 
into an initial summary. The interview summary provided a written account 
of the content of the interview that presented only the views and 
perspectives of the participant to which it related. No additional analysis 
was included although the order of the content of the summary was not 
necessarily the same order in which it emerged during the interview. This 
re-ordering was carried out to group together data related to themes and 
issues raised in the interview or of particular interest to the researcher. Any 
queries or additional questions raised in reviewing the interview were also 
added to the summary. The summary was not therefore a transcript of the 
interview; it represented the data that was perceived as being useful to the 
research. Once the summary had been produced, it was sent to the 
interviewee to give him or her the opportunity to add, amend or remove 
material from the summary before authorizing its inclusion in the analysis.  
The second stage of the analysis process involved aggregating all the 
interview summaries into a single case. This allowed data relating to 
common themes to be combined, while maintaining any multiple 
perspectives identified within the case. Some quotations from participant 
interviews were retained to provide a link with base data and introduce the 
voice of the research participant into the final case study197. The report also 
incorporated material from secondary data sources, such as published 
articles about aspects of the case. An important part of the aggregation of 
the summaries was the use of various analysis techniques that allowed the 
ordering of concepts and viewpoints emerging from the analysis. 
The final stage of the analysis was to develop a completed case study of 
the adoption. The final case study thus provided a comprehensive account 
of the adoption process. An intended consequence of the research design 
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was that the six pairs of cases were not similar in terms of length and 
complexity so it was not appropriate to force them into the same 
presentation format. Instead, each case was structured in such a way as to 
allow its contribution to the research to be maximised. Nevertheless, there 
are certain topics that are common to all of the case reports. These include: 
 background and context  
 overview of the technology 
 key emergent themes and issues raised by the adoption 
As each study was completed it was fed into the cross-case analysis. 
The cross case analysis used a similar analytical framework to the analysis 
of the individual cases. Figure 10 summarises the way three streams of 
analysis contributed to the research. 
 
Figure 10. The cross case analysis 
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4 Stage 1 Results and findings 
4.1 The technologies surveyed 
The search for technologies that met the five criteria set out in Section 3 
revealed the first point of note emerging from this research. During this 
search a substantial number, though meeting most of the criteria defining 
NHS-developed, had to be excluded from the study on the grounds that 
they were yet being marketed back into the NHS. 
Some technologies that had been developed within the NHS and featured 
on various websites linked to the NHS, often in connection with the award 
of some form of innovation prize, had not been brought to market even 
though the website gave the impression that they were, or had been about 
to become, available some time ago. Initial investigations of other 
technologies found that they appeared to have no adopters beyond the 
developing site. For example, where one monitoring technology was 
concerned, IP had been protected and a license agreement made with a 
commercial partner in 2006 and it had won an Innovation Award in 2008, 
but when the commercial partner was asked in August 2010 to identify 
adopters he was only able to express hope that the technology would be 
available by 2011. An assistive technology that was a finalist in the same 
innovation competition in 2008 was also not on the market two years later. 
When contacted in September 2010 the developer explained that attempts 
were still being made to attract the funding needed ‘to conduct testing to 
prove that it works’. Yet another assistive technology was awarded an NHS 
innovation prize in 2005 but by 2012 was still being flagged as ‘available to 
license’ by its local innovation hub. 
Obviously, the long period of time between invention and development into 
a marketable product, is a normal part of healthcare technology 
development and it is likely that many technologies excluded from Stage 1 
will eventually come to market. Stage 1 therefore only provides a 
‘snapshot’ view of the development of a number of technologies. However, 
several other important factors seemed to be at play including: 
 Delays caused by slow or inadequate evaluation 
 Technology was not really suitable for commercial development and so 
the intention to exploit was over-optimistic. 
 Technology fitted a very narrow niche for which there was only a very 
small market in the NHS or the wider healthcare sector. 
 Technology was novel and useful but required more significant 
investment than was available and required integration with other 
technologies in order to develop a commercially viable system. 
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 A technology, though effective, lacked a viable business model. 
 Development stalled due to difficulties in gaining interest from funders 
or industrial partners. 
A further issue in identifying technologies was the extent to which some 
technological innovations, though developed by NHS staff, are never 
recognised as developed within the NHS. One example is cases where NHS 
staff have worked on projects in their own spare time and have licensed or 
are selling the technologies themselves. For these innovations, trusts may 
even be unaware of their existence and so normal NHS innovation 
management processes are bypassed. It is unclear whether this group of 
innovations is substantial or comprises just a small number of innovations. 
It also varies according to the time at which they were developed. Until 
2002 there were few mechanisms available within the NHS to support 
innovation and exploit IP. 
The number of technologies that did meet all of the five criteria and 
therefore could be included in the survey was 33. These are shown in Table 
2 where they have been classified into eight types. The numbers of 
interviews generating data used in the analysis are shown in Table 3 Almost 
all interviews were conducted over the telephone and lasted between 14 
and 83 minutes.  
 
Type of technology Number included Codes allocated
Assistive 1 A1 
Clinical IS/Decision making 6 C1-C6 
Infrastructure 5 I1-I5 
Learning/Training/Teaching 3 L1- L3 
Measuring/Monitoring 3 M1-M3 
Security/Quality assurance 4 Q1-Q4 
Medical/Surgical instrument 6 S1-S6 
Therapeutic 5 T1-T5 
TOTAL 33  
Table 2. Technologies included in survey classified by type 
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 Number of 
interviews 
Developers 22 
Adopters  15 
Partners 16 
Total 53 
Table 3.  Number of interviews included in analysis 
The data gathered from interviews and other sources for each of these 33 
technologies is presented in one of two ways. Appendix 2 provides a data 
set that covers: 
 The originating organisation (usually an NHS trust) and the job role of 
the developer(s) 
 Who else assisted the development and/or is now supplying it 
 Trigger for the start of the development process 
 Clinical or operational need(s) addressed 
 Perceived degree of novelty of the innovation 
 Form any evaluation took 
 Benefits claimed 
 Adoption triggers 
 Whether adopters were aware the technology was NHS-developed  
 Adoption guidance available 
 Financial and other costs of adoption 
 Consequential changes brought about by adoption 
 Potential size of market(s) 
 Amount of adoption and discontinuance (if any) 
 Other information about the development of the technology 
Empty cells in this data set signify that the information was not available or 
there was no consensus between different data sources. 
Appendix 3 contains a narrative for each technology that adds greater 
depth to the data included in Appendix 2. Each narrative emphasises those 
aspects that are important in relation to the adoption of that particular 
technology and provides background information that helps to explain why 
the characteristics of the technology are as they are. 
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4.2 Categorising the Stage 1 technologies 
The purpose of the Stage 1 survey of technologies was exploratory and 
aimed to ascertain the characteristics of the technologies. Within the 
technology literature several attempts have been made to describe 
configurations of healthcare technology. (See, for example, Adams et al.198 
p.367-369. 
 Novelty 
 Departure  
 Disruption 
 Risk Ideation 
 Uncertainty 
 Scope 
 Complexity 
 Adaptabilty 
 Relative advantage 
 Actual operation 
 Observability 
 Profile 
However, for many dimensions of configurations such as those suggested 
by Adams it is not easy to collect data to allow the dimension to be used 
reliably. For example, novelty, disruption, uncertainty and relative 
advantage of a technology can be perceived and assessed very differently 
by different observers. For example, in this survey a pattern was seen 
across a number of technologies where the developer believed the 
technology lay at the higher end of the novelty spectrum but adopters and 
the commercial partners rated the technology as lower down the scale 
where novelty was concerned. 
4.3 Selection of the cases for Stage 2 
Based on the Stage 1 survey a number of candidate dimensions were 
considered and five chosen that would allow six theoretically interesting 
case studies to be selected. The basis for selecting the five dimensions is 
that they represented important characteristics of the technologies where 
adoption is concerned and each one covered a range of values/categories 
that discriminated between technologies. They were also five dimensions 
where substantial amounts of data were available. The five chosen 
dimensions were: 
 Balance of Control 
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 Complexity of technology 
 Complexity of the adoption process 
 Potential benefits 
 Supporting evidence 
Balance of control 
The first dimension used for categorising the Stage 1 technologies was the 
balance of control maintained between NHS staff and commercial 
technology suppliers during the innovation process. For some technologies 
the amount of control maintained by an NHS inventor was minimal, 
whereas for others NHS staff continued to play a significant role even after 
the product was launched on the market. Each technology was placed into 
one of five categories: 
 Insular with no support: technologies where the whole of development 
was done within the NHS with minimal support from outside. 
 Contract in support from wider NHS: development was controlled mainly 
by NHS staff, though some extra support was co-opted into the project 
from other parts of the NHS. 
 Contract in support from outside NHS: development was controlled 
mainly by NHS staff, though some extra support was co-opted into the 
project from outside the NHS. 
 Licence to commercial partner: development controlled in its early 
stages by NHS staff until the technology reached a point where IP was 
licenced to a commercial partner, who then assumed control. 
 NHS staff as lead users: NHS staff took important development roles 
and their input was significant, but the balance of control was 
overwhelmingly towards a technology supplier. The staff or NHS trust 
involved maintained rights to the IP developed. In these projects the 
NHS took on the role of lead users. 
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Figure 11. Balance of control during development 
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Complexity of technology 
The range of technologies included in Stage 1 was very broad. An important 
dimension on which to categorise them was their complexity. Technologies 
were ranked from low to high in accordance with their relative complexity.  
 
Figure 12. Complexity of technology 
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Complexity of adoption process 
The extent to which adoption of technology represented a complex process 
was a defining feature of the Stage 1 technologies. Technologies in Stage 1 
were ranked from low to high according to the relative complexity of 
adoption, taking into account factors including: levels of training, changes 
required to infrastructure, service re-design etc. 
 
Figure 13. Complexity of the adoption process 
Potential benefits 
The benefits of an innovation can include improved services and financial 
savings. However, perception of potential benefits is inconsistent between 
stakeholders so it was decided to categorise potential benefits on the basis 
of relative improvement in services and/or efficiency. 
 Improved patient or staff experience with little or no financial benefit: 
These benefits were mainly based on improvements to experience of 
patients or staff. Reduced distress, discomfort, risk or inconvenience, 
were the principal benefits.  
 Improved outcomes with little or no financial benefit: Implementation 
results in improved patient outcomes. 
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 Improvements and some financial benefit: Implementation results in 
improved service provision and limited financial savings. 
 Improvements and mid-range financial benefits: Implementation results 
in improved service provision and financial savings. 
 Improvements and substantial financial benefits: Implementation results 
in improved service provision, with significantly improved service 
design, accompanied with significant financial savings. 
 
Figure 14. Potential benefits 
It was difficult to collect sufficient reliable data to categorise some 
technologies and so the following were omitted from this categorisation: L1, 
L2, M2, Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4. 
Supporting evidence 
The extent and type of evaluation carried out on the Stage 1 technologies 
varied considerably. Existence of supporting evidence is a factor in adoption 
and so technologies were categorised by the level and type of evaluation 
and the rigour with which supporting evidence to support adoption was 
gathered. 
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 Purely subjective/anecdotal: Very little or no evaluation has been 
undertaken, though subjective judgements by staff/patients suggest 
some benefits exist. 
 Some data: Though not systematically evaluated, some data (for 
example operational performance) has been produced that suggests 
benefits exist. 
 Systematic evaluation: A systematic evaluation of some kind has 
produced evidence suggesting benefits, though the evaluation falls short 
of a rigorous clinical trial. 
 At least one rigorous trial: At least one formal clinical trial completed 
that supports adoption of the innovation. 
 Substantial clinical trial data: A substantial amount of clinical trial data 
has been produced that supports adoption of the innovation. 
 
Figure 15. Supporting evidence 
This dimension is not meaningful for technologies C1, I5, Q3, Q4 and S5 so 
they have been omitted. 
Purely subjective/
anecdotal Some data
Systematic 
evaluation
At least one 
rigorous trial
Substantial clinical 
trial data
Low High
C6
Q1
A1 C2 C3
I1
I2
I3
L1
L3
M1
M2
Q2
S1
S2
S3
S4
S6
T1
T2
T3
T4 M3
C4 C5
L2
T5
I4
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
72 
 
4.4 Stage 1 analysis 
Each of the Stage 1 technologies were ranked on each of the five 
dimensions and a polar diagram produced. These are included in Appendix 
3. By looking across the range of technologies it was possible to identify 
technologies that would provide six theoretically interesting case studies. 
Figure 16 shows the results of this analysis. The six technologies that were 
identified for investigation in Stage 2 have been shaded on each figure and 
are: 
 C3: a telehealth system 
 I2: a basic item of equipment 
 M1: a technology for informing diagnosis 
 M3: a technology for monitoring during surgery 
 Q1: a clinical assurance technology 
 S3: an engineered component 
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Figure 16. The six selected technologies 
 © Quee
al. und
Health.
Project 
 
5 C
C
re
p
e
co
o
sc
n
th
a
cl
5.1 D
B
si
C
g
b
cl
th
C
in
T
1
2
3
4
5
In
fo
co
5.2 C
C
th
to
fa
n’s Printe
er the term
   
08/1820/2
3: a te
3 and C3a
motely co
atients’ se
lectronic q
nsultatio
utcomes. 
reening o
ot address
eoreticall
pplications
inics; GP 
ata col
oth cases 
tes where
3 case res
athered fr
een comp
inician res
e technol
ase resea
terviews w
hese were
 a GP su.
 a GP pra.
 a pharm.
 a prima.
 a prima.
 the GP p
r the prim
mmission
3 and i
3 compris
e questio
 define co
ster and 
r and Cont
s of a co
52           
lehea
 are both 
llecting h
lf assessm
uestionna
n and can 
C3a uses 
r help to 
ing the sa
y interest
 that are 
surgeries;
lection
draw on t
 adoption
earch was
om the m
lemented 
ponsible 
ogy’s ado
rch for C3
ith stake
: 
rgery that
ctice that
acy group
ry care pr
ry care pr
ractices t
ary care 
ing staff 
ts deve
es a clinic
nnaires to
mplex ro
more easi
roller of HM
mmissioni
              
lth s
telehealth
ealth infor
ents of th
ire to con
then be u
various di
deliver lon
me clinic
ing pair. T
used in a 
 pharmac
 for the
he experie
 occurred 
 carried o
ain stakeh
with addit
for develo
ption. 
a was con
holders a
 had pilote
 was an e
 that ado
oviders ba
ovider in a
he adoptio
providers 
based out
lopme
al questio
 patients.
uting rules
ly. The an
SO 2013.
ng contrac
74 
ystem
 technolo
mation fr
eir symp
duct an in
sed again
agnostic d
g-term m
al areas, t
ogether t
range of s
ies; and p
 cases
nces of s
when the 
ut at five
olders at 
ional data
ping C3 a
ducted on
nd additio
d C3a 
arly adop
pted C3a 
sed in an
 rural are
n decision
the decisi
side the o
nt 
nnaire bu
 The ques
 so as to 
swers are
 This work
t issued by
  
gies that 
om patien
toms and 
itial asses
 after trea
evices to 
anageme
hese two 
hey repres
ettings in
atients’ ow
 
taff in ear
technolog
 adoption 
each site 
 from pub
lso provid
 five impl
nal data f
ting site 
into its ch
 urban are
a of the U
s were m
ons were 
rganisatio
ilder and a
tionnaire 
allow pati
 inputted 
 was produ
 the Secr
provide th
ts. C3 col
quality of 
sment pr
tment to 
undertake
nt of cond
technolog
ent teleh
cluding: o
n homes
ly adoptin
ies were m
sites. Inte
was collec
lished sou
ed additio
ementatio
rom publis
ain of pha
a of the U
K 
ade by pr
made prim
ns. 
 system f
builder inc
ents to an
using eith
ced by Sa
etary of S
e means 
lects data
life. It us
ior to a cli
determine
 populati
itions. Th
ies form a
ealth 
utpatient
.  
g sites an
ore mat
rview dat
ted and h
rces. The
nal insigh
n sites th
hed sourc
rmacies 
K 
actice sta
arily by 
or admini
ludes a fa
swer que
er touch-s
vory et 
tate for 
of 
 on 
es an 
nical 
 
on 
ough 
 
 
d at 
ure. 
a 
as 
 
ts into 
rough 
es. 
ff but 
stering 
cility 
stions 
creen 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
75 
 
computers located in a clinic or from home using a web interface. Once a 
questionnaire has been completed the system produces an analysis of the 
data entered that can be added to patients’ notes. Typically the results 
from a questionnaire are supplemented by information gathered during a 
clinical interview and then used by a clinician to inform clinical decisions. 
Since its initial development, variants of C3 has been developed to support 
a range of questionnaires. The original questionnaire is the one that has 
been adopted most widely by NHS trusts and is the focus of this case. 
The system uses anonymised codes to hold the data so minimising the risks 
of holding patient data. The range of benefits delivered by C3 include: 
increased throughput of patients in clinics; improvements to the 
effectiveness of clinical interviews; better triage of patients to appropriate 
pathways; more objective assessment of treatment outcomes; and 
clinicians being able to carry out consultations remotely, for example by 
phone. 
The idea for C3 came from a hospital consultant who subsequently 
assembled a team to develop a prototype system. This team included 
clinical staff, technical staff from the hospital’s medical physics department, 
and academic staff.  
The first questionnaire designed for use on C3 assessed elderly patients 
and so design focused on ease of use in order to minimise the level of 
support needed from healthcare staff. Because the questionnaire addressed 
symptoms that were potentially difficult or embarrassing for patients to 
discuss they welcomed being able to communicate via a questionnaire 
rather than face-to-face. It reduced their anxiety and embarrassment and 
this in turn led to improvements in the quality of information received by 
the clinician. 
Over several years the team iteratively improved a working prototype, 
implementing the various versions into clinical use in the hospital and local 
community and modifying existing service designs as they went along in 
order to accommodate the system more effectively. The cycle of iterative 
implementation and revision incorporated several clinical trials. Some of 
these focused on reliability and validity of the questionnaire instrument 
whilst others considered the system more broadly in terms of the 
acceptability of the questionnaire system to patients and its organisational 
fit. A number of peer-reviewed papers reported the findings from these 
trials. 
In collaboration with the local NHS innovation hub the IP associated with C3 
was protected and a spin-out company formed to commercialise the 
technology. This spin-out company was a partnership with a small, local 
software house with previous experience of developing healthcare 
information systems. It led to two important developments. First, it 
completely reverse-engineered the system and rewrote the software to a 
commercial standard. Secondly, it developed the system into a web-based 
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service. The company now licenses the system as a hosted service that 
includes user support. Adopting trusts purchase an annual licence to use 
the technology. 
5.3 Adoption of C3 
The clinician who developed C3 works in a specialist area that has only 
been regarded as a distinct professional speciality for about the last fifteen 
years. He is therefore part of a relatively small professional group and 
perhaps as a consequence the group forms a close-knit network of 
clinicians across the country. It is this professional network that has been 
most important in encouraging adoption of C3. It is the case, however, that 
although C3 is valued by clinicians, it does not provide large-scale 
improvements in outcomes or savings to the NHS so it has not been 
identified as strategically important by individual NHS trusts. 
The professional group using C3 is supported by regular programmes of 
workshops and conferences that create plenty of opportunities for joint 
research and exchange of ideas. Clinicians in the group are generally well 
informed about developments in treatment at other trusts. It is this 
network of relationships that has been most important in creating 
awareness of C3. In some cases there is a long-term, collaborative 
relationship between C3’s developer and clinicians at adopting sites. At 
others adopters had more distant relationships with the developer and 
became aware of C3 from presentations he made. Whichever was the case, 
across all sites investigated for this research C3’s developer has provided 
significant support to adopters both prior to the adoption decision and 
during implementation. Adopters feel that this support has only been 
possible due to the developer’s own role as a practicing clinician. One 
clinician reflected that in comparison with a commercially developed 
system, C3 was viewed less suspiciously, and that clinicians sensed that 
they were not just dealing with a ‘rep’. 
5.3.1 Evidence 
Adoption of C3 was found to be heavily influenced by three forms of 
evidence. The first, relating to clinical validation of C3, was drawn from the 
published trials carried out at the developer’s trust. This validation was 
crucial to adopters recognising the feasibility of using C3. Without it, it 
seems unlikely that any centres would have adopted C3 so this evidence 
can be seen as ‘qualifying’ C3 for potential adoption, though on its own the 
evidence was unlikely to guarantee adoption. The second was witnessing 
demonstrations by C3’s developer. It was these demonstrations that 
convinced clinicians that the system would work within their own context. 
In contrast to published trial data, this less formal contact with the 
developer was often critical in ‘winning’ the confidence of clinicians and 
making them enthusiastic to adopt C3 into their own trusts. Finally, the 
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internal hurdle faced by adopters was often the development of a business 
plan setting out the adoption case. This task was eased because the 
developer was able to provide a comprehensive set of data to support 
adoption in a format that allowed it to be easily assimilated into a business 
case. This data also went some way to providing information on wider 
benefits. 
5.3.2 Adoption and funding decision-making 
In general, the adoption of C3 has been championed by senior clinicians 
with little ownership of the adoption decision by senior trust management. 
The lack of strategic significance given to C3 by trusts has meant that 
funding of the C3’s implementation was generally ad hoc, with little formal 
strategic investment funding made available by trusts to purchase either 
hardware or software licences. Instead, implementations of C3 were 
commonly funded from a clinician’s own research project, surpluses from 
department budgets or charitable sources. For example, at one trust the 
adoption decision was driven by a consultant. Central to this decision was 
an informal, reciprocal agreement between the consultant and his 
department to use money from his research budget to fund the hardware, 
with the department paying for the annual licence fee. This arrangement 
was not without complications, however. Because the installation of the 
hardware was delayed the cost of the annual licence had risen significantly 
by the time it was in place so the department decided not to fund the 
licence after all. It was only the consultant’ s ability to negotiate a licence 
fee reduction that prevented the project being abandoned. Overall, trusts 
seemed to focus on the costs associated with C3 rather than its benefits. 
One trust did use regional innovation funding to finance the implementation 
of the system but where the others are concerned, without the 
entrepreneurial action of individual clinicians, funding would not have been 
obtained.  
At another trust the adoption decision followed a rather different path. 
Adoption of C3 into a particular department was suggested by a clinician in 
an allied department. This clinician was not a consultant but had taken 
opportunity of a free trial of the system to see how it would work with 
patients. As a result of this experience the clinician arranged for C3’s 
developer to present to a group of consultants in the main department. In 
addition, the clinician presented the results of her own pilot and produced a 
business plan for its implementation. The decision to adopt C3 was based 
on a consensus decision by consultants in the main department and the 
departmental manager. It was also agreed that the project would be led by 
the clinician from the allied department. Unfortunately, partly due to being 
based outside the main department, and partly because she did not have 
the seniority and power to drive the project forward, the clinician found it 
very difficult to maintain C3’s implementation as a priority when priorities 
changed in the main department. As a result the implementation eventually 
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stalled. At all but one of the other sites in this case study, implementation 
was led by a consultant clinician. At the remaining site the implementation 
was seen as a nurse-led project.  
The advantage of consultant-led implementation is that consultants usually 
have the organisational power to arrange funding and to bring about 
changes to services that are required as a consequence of adoption. An 
important feature of the consultant-led implementations, however, was the 
extent to which they had the time needed to manage day-to-day 
implementation issues. In some instances it was clear that the amount of 
effort required had been underestimated by the consultants and they were 
surprised by the scale and range of operational issues they had to deal 
with. Perhaps as a result, implementations were managed in a relatively ad 
hoc fashion. For example, one consultant characterised the approach he 
took as being based on “Let’s do it and trouble shoot as we go along”. He 
did not consider it to be a project that required a sophisticated approach. 
He saw his role to be directing staff to sources of information, negotiation 
and troubleshooting. However, during the implementation he found he had 
to personally intervene to test the system, train staff, solve technical 
problems and even counter staff resistance to the project. These 
interventions undoubtedly delayed the full implementation of C3.It was the 
case, however, that the clinician had little option other than to take control 
of the project. The work of managers in the department was focused 
predominantly on more general operational issues so they were unlikely to 
have sufficient time to spend on implementing new technology. Though C3 
was eventually implemented successfully, the consultant was aware that no 
formal evaluation of it was ever undertaken due to lack of time and the 
pressure to focus on the delivery of care to patients.  
The experiences of other trusts in this study illustrate how the success of 
implementation also depends upon other factors beyond project 
management style and ownership of the project by a senior champion. 
Despite C3’s design as a managed service, coordination of effective IT 
support was seen as a major risk to implementation and was cited as a 
major source of problems. These included problems associated with 
installation of hardware and the availability of technical support. Issues 
around information governance were also found to be major obstacles to 
implementation and slow to resolve. In one trust, responsibility for 
introducing the hardware was given to the trust’s IT department but they 
regarded it as low priority. As a consequence, IT problems were only 
resolved slowly. The lack of responsive IT support meant that the 
consultants who had taken the decision to adopt had to handle day-to-day 
implementation problems themselves, a task for which they were ill-
prepared and to which they were unable to devote sufficient time. 
Frustration with the situation was exacerbated because the hardware 
problems inhibited use of the system whilst at the same time they were 
wasting money on the licence fee. As a result, use of the system in clinical 
practice was abandoned. 
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In one trust, adoption involved a large teaching hospital and a smaller 
general hospital. Research at this site showed that the size of an adopting 
site can affect implementation. Significant differences in the extent of 
adoption were still apparent three years after adoption began. Use of C3 at 
the smaller hospital was far more extensive and sophisticated than at the 
larger hospital. The key reason cited for this difference was better 
communication and a high degree of cooperation between various 
departments in the smaller hospital. In the larger hospital adoption was 
impeded by more clearly defined (and possibly more rigid) job roles 
combined with more distanced communications between departments. 
At one trust investigated for this case (a District Hospital), C3 was adopted 
much more recently than at the other four sites. Their adoption was swift 
and smooth with minimal problems. It was driven by a consultant and 
undertaken by an enthusiastic team made up mainly of nursing staff but 
also including a representative from the IT department. Inclusion of the IT 
representative was seen as critical to successful implementation of system 
because it meant they avoided IT failures that would have upset staff and 
patients. Success was also attributed to the full support of the project that 
was given by the nursing team. This support was in turn attributed to their 
direct involvement in decision-making and provision of the opportunity to 
contribute to the development of operating procedures.  
The range of adoption experiences across sites suggests that though robust 
project management processes contribute to successful adoption, 
commitment, cooperation and enthusiasm from staff is also essential. 
5.3.3 Role change and workload 
A consequence of adoption is that changes to the patient consultation 
process require a change in the role of nursing staff. Introduction of C3 
requires nurses to provide additional support to patients and thus to have a 
sufficient level of IT literacy to be able to guide patients, some of whom are 
elderly and very infirm, in the use of the system. Willingness to embrace 
this role change was a critical factor in effective adoption. A relatively small 
number of nurses reacted negatively to C3 on the basis that they felt that it 
increased their workload and it was not part of their job role to operate 
computer systems. This resistance was overcome over time but where it 
occurred it represented a significant barrier to adoption. Furthermore, 
resistance was not necessarily limited to nursing staff. At one site, the 
project champion felt the technology might have been perceived as 
threatening to consultants because they saw it as diluting, or even 
removing, some aspects of their role. More generally, staff may harbour 
concerns that use of C3 in a patient pathway may not actually increase 
quality. At a site where implementation stalled, the satisfaction of 
department staff with the status quo was cited as a reason for the lack of 
motivation or ‘tension for change’, despite the benefits formally identified in 
the business plan. 
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5.4 Adoption of C3 into other specialisms 
C3 is a combination of two elements: a validated questionnaire and a 
questionnaire generator. Though the focus of this case has been on the 
adoption of the first questionnaire developed through relatively strong 
professional linkages of the inventor, it is also worth noting the extent to 
which adoption of the questionnaire generator has progressed. At the time 
of writing no further questionnaires have been developed and adopted on 
anything like the same scale as the original questionnaire. However, several 
questionnaires have been developed in separate and unrelated specialisms. 
This diffusion of the original questionnaire concept to new specialist areas 
represents a second dimension of adoption. In common with the adoption 
of the original questionnaire, the diffusion is based primarily on personal 
and professional relationships of C3’s inventor but the specialist areas for 
which questionnaires have been developed are un-related and diverse. 
They therefore represent an organic abstraction of the original concept to 
new domains that have relatively weak linkages with C3’s inventor. 
5.5 The C3a Technology 
C3a is a telehealth technology used to support patients with a variety of 
long term conditions that can also be used to carry out routine health-
checks. Variants of C3a have been developed to allow regular use by 
patients in their own home and on a self-service basis in GP surgeries, 
pharmacies and other community settings. All versions of the system are 
designed to be simple to use so that patients need minimal intervention or 
support from healthcare staff. 
C3a integrates with a number of standard patient record systems used as 
part of GP practice management systems. Providing appropriate 
communication infrastructure is in place (e.g. broadband), it can transfer 
readings taken remotely directly to a patient’s own electronic record, This 
integration with other NHS systems does, of course, require conformance to 
information governance requirements. 
C3a can be configured for tests using a range of interfaced diagnostic 
devices. Each configuration supports either the management of a long-term 
condition or a standardised health check. In addition to interfaced devices, 
C3a enables administration of a range of electronic questionnaires adapted 
from paper-based versions of clinically validated questionnaires in common 
use by GPs. 
5.6 Development of C3a 
Development of C3a was led by the Chairman of a commercial company. 
He had been involved in the commercial development of various healthcare 
information and telehealth applications since the 1980s. These included a 
clinical decision support system (CDSS) that has been widely adopted by 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
81 
 
clinicians in the NHS. The experience he gained from developing and 
commercialising the CDSS informed the approach he took when developing 
C3a, especially with respect to the importance he placed on gaining 
extensive clinical support and his recognition of the value of using direct 
feedback from clinicians to inform decisions about functionality and 
interface design.  
Development of C3a followed a strongly user-focused, incremental process. 
Several NHS sites were used as pilot sites to develop the various versions 
of C3a. User feedback was collected systematically used to identify 
potential improvements to functionality and interface design. This approach 
to development continued beyond the initial development phase and even 
now C3a is relatively mature the supplier works with customers to adapt 
the system to meet new requirements.  
5.7 Adoption 
C3a has now been adopted widely in the NHS. There are several hundred 
C3a installations in a range of settings that includes: GP surgeries; patients’ 
homes; pharmacies; and mobile use by community staff. The adoption has 
been driven through several mechanisms. In some cases individual GP 
surgeries and pharmacies have invested in the technology. In others the 
implementation has been organised by local primary care groups. A number 
of other similar, commercially-developed systems are available; 
competition from major healthcare IT providers and other smaller more 
specialised suppliers is significant. 
5.7.1 Awareness 
One of the GP practices looked at, and the pharmacy group, were both 
geographically close to the developer and, perhaps more significantly, staff 
within them had long standing relationships with the developer. As a 
consequence of this the GP practice agreed to act as a trial site and in 
return, the developer supplied equipment free of charge. The pharmacy 
was an early adopter. The second GP practice was also a relatively early 
adopter. It became aware of the C3a by chance when one of its GPs and 
the Practice Manager attended a conference. They were both already 
enthusiastic about the potential application of new diagnostic technologies 
in their practice and each had a strong interest in healthcare IT. Indeed, 
the GP was the local commissioning group’s clinical lead for IT. As a result 
of meeting the suppliers of C3a at the event they arranged for a 
demonstration of the technology to be given to the other GPs in the 
practice. The demonstration persuaded them that C3a would be robust and 
they agreed to go ahead with a local trial. (They are happy to say that this 
decision was based more on personal preference than a strictly evidence-
based assessment.) 
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Both primary care groups included in this case study became aware of C3a 
by conventional market scanning processes. The decision to commission 
C3a was based on a combination of both awareness gained through existing 
relationships and more formal tendering processes. In the case of the urban 
group, the commissioner had initially considered an alternative technology 
with which he was familiar from a previous role. However, problems in 
gaining agreement as to how the candidate technology would be integrated 
with other technologies meant that it was dismissed as an option. The 
commissioner then widened the search to other preferred technology 
suppliers but after a tendering process the other options were judged as 
over-specified and uneconomic. A decision was therefore made not to use 
preferred suppliers and, based on a recommendation by a commissioner in 
another trust, C3a was evaluated and then selected. 
When the rural primary care group was deciding which technology to adopt 
it invited a number of telehealth providers to tender, including the 
developer of C3a who had been very active in developing relationships with 
thought-leaders and decision makers in the region concerned. As a result of 
this process, C3a was selected. The developer believes that the company’s 
success was based on being able to show previous success, demonstrating 
understanding of the user’s requirements, ability to deliver, and 
competitive pricing. 
5.7.2 Drivers for adoption 
In terms of motivation to adopt, several factors were evident at the sites. 
These include internal and external concerns and are summarised in Figure 
17. 
 
Figure 17. Motivating factors in adoption of C3a 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
83 
 
The predominant concern for the GP practices was to reduce time spent on 
routine patient assessments by GPs, nurses and other practice staff. The 
potential to enable patients to undertake their own assessments on a self-
service basis made C3a an attractive option. A second significant 
motivating factor, shared by GP practices and the pharmacy group, was the 
opportunity to generate extra revenue by offering additional services. 
Aspirations to improve health democracy were identified as an important 
driver for adoption. A Pharmacy Manager believed tackling men’s health 
inequality should be a key concern and was aware of research showing that 
men were more likely to engage with pharmacists than GPs. Consequently, 
he saw C3a as a way of providing NHS health checks efficiently whilst at 
the same time improving men’s access to healthcare. The pharmacy’s shift 
towards use of C3 was also a way of improving services to patients. Some 
of these were small improvements in the flexibility of routine services 
through the provision of self-service elements, such as the processing of 
repeat prescriptions. Others were more significant improvements such as 
relocating population screening programmes and support for long-term 
management of conditions from hospital outpatient clinics to community-
based sites. The pharmacy group was also keen to start to provide novel 
diagnostic tests such as those for diabetes. The Pharmacy Manager saw 
that adoption of M3a would, therefore, provide a means of meeting 
objectives related to both the QIPP and the health–inequality agendas. 
The primary care groups’ decisions to adopt telehealth were strongly linked 
to central policy initiatives and priorities. For example, in the urban group, 
policy initiatives developing from Lord Darzi’s 2008 ‘Next Stage Review’9 
drove the search for suitable technologies that would enable the group to 
achieve policy objectives. Telehealth technology was seen as capable of 
supporting the QIPP agenda, particularly in relation to prevention initiatives 
(see for example ‘Putting prevention first’199). Significant funding 
accompanied these central initiatives and so reduced the financial barriers 
to implementation of C3a and other telehealth technologies. Similarly, the 
rural primary care group’s implementation of a small pilot study extended 
previous telehealth initiatives in remote rural areas of the UK. While this 
mirrored the urban primary care group’s motives, the pilot study had 
several additional specific purposes. First of all the project sought to 
explore how C3a could extend the support given to patients living in rural 
areas who suffered from long-term conditions. Within this, reduction of 
unplanned hospital admissions was a specific objective. Other aims were 
more focused developing staff expertise and wider organisational capability. 
Finally, the primary care group was keen to present an external view of 
itself as being innovative in its use of telehealth technology. 
5.7.3 Trialling, evidence and evaluation 
An issue that was raised by the adopters who were interviewed was the 
difficulty of gathering evaluation data to support the initial adoption 
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decision or review implementation. Part of this difficulty was the limited 
availability of formal clinical trial data that would allow generalisable 
evaluation of C3a. This lack of data was exacerbated because the adoption 
sites did not have sufficient time and resources to carry out long-term 
evaluations of their own implementations. This meant that the evidence 
base underpinning C3a could only grow slowly. 
The technology supplier has been proactive in evaluating C3a. By 
maintaining close relationships with key staff in early adopting sites he has 
been able to gather feedback to inform modifications and extensions to the 
technology. Through the use of automatic logging he has also built a 
significant store of usage and used it to calculate key performance 
indicators and generate comprehensive reports at individual installation or 
groups of installations level. Further refinements of the data logging 
mechanisms have also allowed feedback from peripheral devices to be 
collected. The information generated is important to the technology supplier 
and the early adopting sites but it also informs potential adopters about the 
potential for cost savings and the like. 
Unfortunately, in common with many telehealth technologies, lack of formal 
clinical trial data or published evaluations of specific implementations have 
made it difficult to satisfy the information needs of potential adopters, 
especially commissioners. Central to this problem is the extent to which 
each adopter prioritises performance indicators according to their own aims 
and context. Hence the perceived generalisability of data from evaluations 
between contexts can be poor. This was also exacerbated by the extent to 
which all the adoption sites implemented C3a as an evolving technology, for 
which features were still being added or changed. This meant that 
evaluations were done on a system with no fixed specification. Similarly, all 
the sites presented distinct contexts in which C3a was implemented. 
A final problem with the available evaluation data is its quality. One 
commissioner highlighted the fact that that commissioning decisions rely 
heavily on projections of potential performance that can be presented 
within business plans. Precise forecasts for C3a cannot be provided due to 
the poor quality of data that is available, especially where data collected 
from primary care providers and GPs is concerned because it is often 
imprecisely recorded and/or poorly coded. Furthermore, poor data quality 
problems are sometimes compounded by a lack of ability within 
commissioning organisations to apply health economic techniques when 
evaluating technologies. 
Some of the adoption sites have sought to address the above problems. 
Within the GP practices evaluation has drawn on existing evidence where 
available but has found that this is frequently oriented towards local trials 
that are limited in duration, scope and size and which often combine 
systematic assessments with subjective judgements of the technology’s 
performance. For example, at the GP practice where the early pilot was 
conducted a formal evaluation of C3a was not carried out by the practice. 
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Based on their experience though the practice staff believed there had been 
a very positive response from patients, to the extent that discontinuing the 
use of C3a would have prompted patients to complain. C3a was also 
perceived by practice staff as more efficient. In contrast, the early adopting 
practice’s approach to evaluation involved a short but intense single day 
trial in one of the practice’s clinics. The subsequent decision to install C3a 
into routine use relied on the staff’s belief that that C3a had been shown to 
be stable and usable by patients. However, no subsequent evaluation of 
C3a was conducted in the practice to assess either the impact on patient 
outcomes or efficiency. Overall, evaluation has relied mainly on anecdotal 
evidence that patients and staff have welcomed C3a. 
There was less scope for trialling C3a within the urban primary care group 
prior to making an adoption decision and so instead, the commissioner 
used a constrained range of criteria to evaluate candidate telehealth 
technologies. It was challenging to identify unequivocal evidence, 
acceptable to all stakeholders. For this reason the main evaluation strategy 
was based on ensuring, with a reasonable amount of confidence, that C3a 
was robust, safe and met information governance requirements. In 
addition, ease of use by practice staff and interoperability with existing GP 
information systems was an important criterion, especially as telehealth 
systems need to be able to operate alongside and in conjunction with 
technical and organisational systems within GP practices. Acceptability to 
GPs is therefore an important criteria, especially if one accepts the view 
expressed by a commissioner that it is more difficult to change clinicians’ 
attitudes and behaviours towards telehealth technologies than it is to alter 
those of patients. 
Evaluation was an integral part of the formal pilot study run by the rural 
primary care group. Quantitative evaluation used data generated by C3a 
and satisfaction surveys of patients and service staff. Qualitative evaluation 
of C3a was also carried out through interviews with staff, focusing on the 
extent to which implementation into routine practice had been successful. 
However, this evaluation also had limitations. The small size of the pilot 
study limited the statistical significance of the results and problems with 
delays and variation in implementation undermined the external validity of 
the findings. Despite its limited size, however, the evaluation was able to 
identify key adoption issues. These were associated with: rural settings and 
communication infrastructure; changes to responsibilities; roles and 
knowledge requirements that are brought about by adoption; and other 
changes to working practices. Despite their lack of statistical significance, 
these issues were regarded as insightful and of relevance to other potential 
adopters of C3a. This suggests that even small scale pilot studies may have 
a role to play in supporting widespread adoption of technologies, though 
the drawback remains that potential adopters are often only willing to 
accept data from large, rigorous trials. 
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5.7.4 Implementation, context and partnership 
There were differences in the way in which sites included in this case 
implemented C3a. These variations were not only due to differences in 
context. They also reflected the types of partnership involved in the 
adoption process. The most straightforward implementation was probably 
the early adopting GP practice. The implementation was wholly driven by 
the practice staff, with no involvement of the local PCT or commissioning 
groups. Looked at four years afterwards, C3a was well established and 
integrated into routine processes within the practice.  
The GP practice where the early pilot was conducted and the local 
pharmacy group were each implementing more complex configurations. 
After separate initial adoptions of C3a, they agreed to collaborate and 
integrate their systems. The intention was for assessments completed in 
the pharmacy to be transferred directly into a patient’s notes at the GP 
practice and if the results raised concerns an appointment with the GP 
would be arranged automatically. The implementation of the combined 
system was thus dependent upon a three-way relationship between GP 
practice, pharmacy and the local PCT. Critical to its success was agreement 
by the local PCT that it would manage the necessary IT infrastructure and 
various governance issues. This agreement was never fully achieved and 
progress in resolving issues was slow. Both the GP practice and the 
pharmacy found the PCT’s involvement impeded progress and both 
perceived the local PCT as overly cautious and too risk-averse. Further 
delays were caused by disagreements about responsibility for funding the 
equipment though this was ameliorated when the technology supplier 
offered some equipment free of charge. In addition, the practice’s patient 
group were not enthusiastic about the technology being located in the 
pharmacy as they felt a GP surgery environment was more commercially 
neutral than that of a pharmacy. Unfortunately, these issues were never 
properly resolved and so the integration stalled, though C3a continued to 
be used independently by the GP practice and pharmacy. 
The urban primary care group were very successful in achieving adoption of 
C3a. In part this was due to the policy initiatives on prevention and 
management of long-term condition that created a very positive climate for 
telehealth adoption. They implemented more than thirty systems into GP 
surgeries, pharmacies and other community-based settings at a total cost 
of several million pounds. A critical success factor was the support given by 
clinicians in acute trusts to the initiative, possibly as a result of the initiative 
being jointly managed by public health commissioners in the PCT and 
clinicians in the acute hospital. The commissioner believed that the 
initiative would have been less successful if specialist clinicians had resisted 
the shift in services from hospital out-patients clinics to community-based 
settings. 
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5.8 Findings and conclusions 
Several themes run through this pair of cases. A prominent feature of the 
C3 case the way a process of evolutionary prototyping allowed it to develop 
from an initial idea into a commercially robust product. Development 
expertise and committed application by clinicians resulted in a validated 
technology that met the needs of clinicians and was acceptable to patients. 
Despite the resulting prototype having to be reverse-engineered and then 
rewritten, the key functionality and interface design was well defined. This 
case therefore demonstrates the effectiveness of the prototyping approach 
in capturing and responding to clinical requirements. Similarly for C3a, 
development was based on a user-centred organic approach that allowed 
the supplier to develop the technology to meet the needs of adopting sites 
and also helped engender trust from potential adopters. The willingness of 
the supplier to collaborate with adopting organisations to refine the 
technology was seen as a significant factor in adoption decisions. Adopting 
organisations were able to request modifications and additions that allowed 
them to implement C3a more effectively and with greater success. 
A challenge for any computer-based information system is the extent to 
which the technology can be developed to reflect situated knowledge of 
potential users. To a large degree it is the extent to which situated 
knowledge is embedded within technology designs that determines how 
successfully the technology fits into a specific context. At the start of this 
research, it was hypothesised that one of the potential benefits of NHS-
developed technologies is that it will fit better into NHS organisations 
because of the direct involvement of NHS staff in the development process. 
Both C3 and C3a demonstrate that an explicitly user-centred approach to 
their development and refinement was highly beneficial and allowed the 
situated knowledge of NHS users to be taken into account when defining 
the purpose and user requirements of the technology. In both cases the 
NHS and its staff were prominent lead users of the technology being 
developed. Taken together this pair of cases suggest that NHS-developed 
and commercially developed technologies can derive significant advantage 
by formally recognising NHS staff as lead users.  
C3 also shed light on the complex trajectories of development NHS-
developed innovations can follow. Two dimensions of this were observed: 
development within a specific domain; and abstraction of the technology for 
application in a different domain. Much of the development effort for C3 
remained in the original clinical speciality but subsequently, the 
development of new applications of the technology in completely different 
clinical areas has required the core characteristics of C3 to be abstracted 
and reapplied. Abstraction of the technology to new domains is perhaps the 
more powerful mode of development. If successful it opens up significantly 
broader markets. Unfortunately, this in turn creates new challenges in 
development. First, new specialist teams are required to undertake the 
development in new application areas. The original development of C3 took 
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place in a team that possessed a well-balanced set of skills. In order to 
successfully develop new domain areas it is necessary to not only identify 
relevant new domains but also build committed teams to work on the new 
application. C3a also illustrated the challenge of managing technology 
trajectories into new areas, in this case in response to a new policy 
initiative or service priority. In contrast to an NHS-developed technology 
where the development team are very likely to be highly skilled and 
focused on one single speciality, commercial developers might be seen as 
less entrenched in a single specialism and so is more ‘nimble’ in forming 
new relationships to support application in new domains. 
There was little evidence that adoption of C3 was based on the high-level, 
strategic decisions of NHS trusts. Instead, decisions were usually taken by 
specialist NHS staff, predominantly consultants. One implication of this is 
that the responsibility to champion the adoption decision falls on an 
individual member of staff who might be remote from high-level trust 
support. This gives staff the autonomy to act but can also leave them 
relatively isolated during the adoption process. Even when potentially 
important benefits to a trust existed, not least in terms of improved 
efficiency or effectiveness, it was common for the adoption C3 to take place 
‘under the radar’ of senior trust management. 
The role assumed in leading an adoption project is varied and requires not 
just clinical but managerial skills. These include the ability to develop a 
business plan, negotiate funding and perhaps most importantly, those 
required for effective project management. For the sites adopting C3 there 
was little support from trust managers who do have the specialist skills 
required. This raises a question as to the types of management support 
that clinicians need when implementing technologies and how this support 
should be made available. Without such support failure is much more likely. 
The need for project-related skills is also highlighted in the C3a case. While 
the implementation of the C3a was generally unproblematic, it is notable 
that the two adopting GP practices undertook very little evaluation as part 
of their respective implementations, primarily due to lack of time and 
resource. This again suggests that provision of greater support for adoption 
projects may be a more general issue in the NHS. 
C3 and C3a illustrate how technology adoption is driven by the need to fulfil 
a specific clinical function whilst at the same time serving wider purposes. 
However, each case illustrates a very different way in which the wider 
purposes of a technology can impact upon adoption. 
The adoption of C3 was ostensibly driven by the primary need of adopters 
to gain clinical benefits, such as improved throughput, better patient 
experience and the ability to systematically assess the outcomes of 
treatment. However, there was also a less clearly articulated purpose 
behind the adoption of C3 that lay within the closely-bound professional 
network of clinicians interested in the emerging specialism. This was C3’s 
potential as a research tool that would allow the specialist area to build its 
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own knowledge base and thus form part of the specialism’s research 
infrastructure. In contrast, adoption of the C3a fitted different wider 
purposes such as concerns to improve health inequalities, and capacity 
building in the use of telehealth technology. Although the wider motives 
behind adoption of C3 and C3a are very different it is clear that such 
broader purposes need to be taken into account when encouraging or 
providing support for adoption. 
A common theme for both C3 and C3a adopters was the extent to which 
specific evidence of effectiveness was used. Both C3 and C3a present 
challenges in terms of providing comprehensive evidence to support 
adoption. The developer of C3 was extremely careful to follow a publishing 
strategy to show the technology’s effectiveness in clinical trials. However, 
the extent to which this evidence was instrumental in triggering adoption at 
other sites seems limited. For many adopters it was the direct 
communication with the developer that was most influential than the 
existence of the published evidence on its own. At best the published 
evidence ‘qualified’ the technology for consideration, but it seems likely that 
for some adopters it had minimal impact in the adoption decision. Similarly, 
there was a lack of definitive evidence that proved benefits of adoption of 
C3a. As with C3, the deciding factor affecting most adoption decisions was 
the outcomes of direct communications with the technology’s supplier. 
Though there was evidence relating to use of telehealth, much of this was 
linked to specific contexts and so its applicability to each adopter’s context 
was often equivocal. This suggests that decisions were based on adopters 
recognising how the technology would fit into the organisational context 
and work effectively. Published evidence played a part in decisions but the 
extent to which each adopter’s organisation was receptive to a technology 
was based on whether the technology is perceived as fit for purpose and 
adoption makes sense to the decision-makers. 
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6 I2: a basic item of equipment 
This pair of cases looks at two forms of portable drip stand, I2 and I2a. 
Compared with most technologies used in healthcare, drip stands are very 
simple, inexpensive products and on the face of it one might assume that 
over the years their designs have evolved to the point where there is very 
little to choose between different brands and models in terms of 
functionality and price. However, this is not entirely the case. Over time, 
requirements change and opportunities for innovation emerge. I2 
represents just such a departure from the established brands. It is a 
portable drip stands that originates from a care team working within a 
primary care trust. They used their own experiences of delivering care in 
the community, in particular their awareness of the difficulties of working in 
patients’ homes with heavyweight equipment, to devise a piece of 
equipment that is specifically designed for use during treatment in patients’ 
own homes. I2a is a commercially-developed competing product, also 
targeted at the home market. It is manufactured by a company based in 
mainland Europe and available from a number of suppliers in the UK and 
elsewhere.  
The main requirements for I2 and I2a are: 
 portability so that community nurses can easily transport them to 
patients’ homes 
 low intrusiveness so that patients are happy to accommodate them in 
their homes 
 competitive price 
 effective at fulfilling the care purpose for which they are intended 
 sufficiently robust to withstand everyday use and transportation  
These requirements mean that the drip stands designed for use in hospital 
wards are not particularly suitable for use in the community, especially 
where their weight and size are concerned. Equipment designed for hospital 
use is often over-engineered and thus heavier in weight and more costly to 
manufacture than is necessary for domestic use. 
The amount of care delivered in domestic homes and care homes is 
expanding rapidly and becoming more sophisticated so there is an 
increasing market for products such as I2 and I2a. There is a problem, 
however, in that many cases where products such as I2 and I2a would be 
very useful, improvised domestic equipment is often regarded as adequate. 
In some quarters there is no perceived need to invest in the healthcare 
technology even though the cost is relatively modest and the technology 
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offers real benefits in terms of eliminating potential hazards. Community 
nurses feel this attitude represents a less than professional approach. 
6.1 Data collection 
Data for this pair of cases was collected by interviewing NHS staff who 
were: supporting or delivering care in the community; had worked on the 
development of the technology; or had direct involvement in purchasing. 
Interviews were also conducted with people involved in the manufacture of 
I2. Some of the interviews were conducted over the telephone and the 
remainder were face-to-face. 
6.2 Development of I2 
I2 was developed during the period when the NHS was becoming much 
more proactive in exploiting IP developed by its staff. Initiatives set by 
national policy were being complemented by local initiatives, particularly in 
certain regions of the country such as the one where I2 was developed. The 
local trust had been proactive in setting up an innovation unit dedicated to 
the exploitation of IP created within the trust. This unit played a significant 
part in supporting the commercialisation of I2 and a range of other 
innovations. I2 is an early entry into the community practice area, but the 
trust hopes it may be the start of greater involvement in this area if I2 
continues to be successful. 
At present, the trust’s approach to innovation is reactive rather than 
proactive. Staff are encouraged to bring ideas to the attention of the 
innovation unit and are rewarded with a small share of any royalties. The 
composition of the portfolio of innovations sponsored by the trust is thus 
essentially determined by the ideas presented to the trust and there is little 
overall coherence to the innovation strategy.  
The unit has a policy of working with local SMEs to cover the detailed 
design, manufacturing and sales and marketing aspects of the innovation 
process. The reason for this is that although the trust is keen to see a 
return from its innovation activities, it does not wish to be directly involved 
in manufacture, sales, or support. In particular, it regards the risks involved 
in product liability to be incompatible with the mission of the trust. It is also 
the case that trust staff working in the innovation unit perceive their skills 
to be heavily oriented to development and design rather than marketing 
and sales. In accordance with usual practise, the SME for this particular 
project was chosen by the type of selection process that is sometimes 
referred to as a ‘beauty contest’.  
Approximately two years elapsed between the initial presentation of the 
care team’s ideas to the NHS development unit and I2 becoming available 
commercially and marketed to the NHS. During this time all the parties 
worked together to enhance product design, establish intellectual property 
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rights, gain regulatory approvals and to make sure appropriate 
arrangements were in place for manufacturing and marketing. Although it 
was not appropriate to patent the technology, design right applies, and the 
registered design is owned by the trust. Clearly, this gives very limited 
protection, but the relationship with the manufacturer is based more on 
mutual trust than rights. Other commercial manufacturers already produce 
very similar items, and could quite easily incorporate the improvements this 
exhibits into their own products.  
After I2 had been on sale for six months a decision was made to replace 
some steel components with ones made from rigid thermoset plastics. This 
was an important change which increased fitness for purpose and lowered 
costs. The design is now essentially stable and performing well, although 
some of the providers of care who were interviewed said they would like to 
have a similar but heavier duty version available to cater for a wider range 
of applications. Its manufacturer’s web site currently lists 40 NHS 
customers for the product. These are a mix of hospitals, PCTs, clinics and 
health centres. 
6.3 Alternatives to I2 
At the time I2 was developed, the alternatives available were heavier and 
more expensive but now there are a number of very similar commercial 
products. As a direct competitor, this case identified I2a. Interestingly, I2a 
is the ‘hit’ that appears when searching for ‘portable drip stand’ in NHS Cat 
from NHS Supply Chain (https://my.supplychain.nhs.uk/catalogue). Like 
I2, I2a is aimed at the homecare and emergency market and supplied with 
a carry bag. I2a costs a little over £100, which is roughly £30 less than I2. 
Companies selling I2a emphasise its ergonomic design, the speed with 
which it can be set up, its low weight and portability, and the small space it 
occupies when not in use.  
6.4 Adoption compared 
Adopters of I2 reported satisfaction with it and felt that it fitted its purpose 
slightly better than the other wholly commercial equivalents because it was 
marginally ahead on detailed design. Particular features mentioned in 
relation to this were ease of use and ease of cleaning, the latter being 
particularly important where infection control is concerned. They said they 
would not replace similar commercial items already in use but would 
purchase I2 if additional items were needed.  
The manufacturer of I2 reports some difficulty in NHS adoption due to it 
being a relatively ordinary product, for which most trusts have established 
suppliers, including the suppliers of I2a. It is also a disadvantage for I2’s 
manufacturer that I2a’s manufacturer offers a very wide range of 
equipment of this type and the less expensive items like I2a are often 
bundled in with more expensive equipment. In interviews, front-line staff 
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and the manufacturer of I2 both suggested that staff involved in 
authorising purchasing tend to favour existing suppliers rather than 
exploring new possibilities. 
Because this category of product is relatively inexpensive, NHS purchasers 
often do not spend a lot of time on its selection. Adopters of both 
technologies observed that in past years I2 and I2a would be the sort of 
products they might become aware of at conferences, either from 
manufacturers presentations, or recommendation from colleagues, but with 
tighter budgets there are fewer opportunities to attend this type of event. 
Therefore, this awareness/marketing opportunity is no longer available. 
‘Searching the web’ was the approach mentioned to identify products of this 
type and compare them with similar ones. As noted above, searching within 
the NHS Cat from NHS Supply Chain only reveals I2a. Users said that they 
did not regard endorsement by other NHS units as very significant, but all 
users of I2 also said they were aware that it was developed in the NHS.  
6.5 Discussion 
The I2 case demonstrates how development activities by staff within the 
NHS can lead to good design as a consequence of the opportunity this 
brings to engage in a collaborative design process. It also illustrates that 
staff within the community nursing sector are very adept at identifying 
particular needs in this rapidly expanding sector where many gaps remain 
in terms of the technology available to meet sector-specific needs. This is 
particularly true for very basic items where community nurses in the field 
are still having to improve suboptimal solutions from domestic or general 
purpose equipment even though simple, well designed, equipment could 
improve patient experience and ease the work of community nurses. This 
would suggest that the provision of support for turning ideas into products 
through collaboration between NHS staff and the healthcare technology 
industry can have potential benefits for the NHS. 
However, it does not follow that the NHS necessarily needs to be involved 
beyond the identification of need and guidance on what properties an 
effective solution needs to possess. As I2a shows, commercial developers 
are very happy to make such solutions available providing they believe 
there will be sufficient demand to justify their investment. It is essential for 
the NHS to evaluate the overall costs and benefits of involvement in 
projects of this type. This would require data to be gathered that is not 
readily available at present, especially where the costs of supporting 
development are concerned. Another linked issue is the choice of 
manufacturer. ‘Local’ was an important factor in the I2 decision but the 
choice of partner has meant that I2 is not part of a coherent range of 
products. Information gathered for this case has shown that this lack of 
coherence is damaging in terms of sales in a situation where high sales 
volumes are needed to generate a profit because the unit price is relatively 
low. The extent of this problem is hidden to a degree because I2’s 
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manufacturer is supported by development grant aid as well as commercial 
activity but complications such as this do need to be considered when 
evaluating costs and benefits to the NHS of ‘NHS-developed’ versus 
‘commercial based on need identified by staff within the NHS’. If such an 
evaluation shows that the former does not enjoy a reasonably strong 
advantage over the latter then other mechanisms such as those based on 
the concept of ‘lead user’ or ‘preferred customer’ should be brought to the 
fore. Indeed, this case, looking at very simple products, highlights the 
extent to which the existing initiatives in the NHS to improve procurement 
are probably well-founded. The role of effective procurement processes 
seems an important factor in gaining adoption. Initiatives such as pre-
commercial procurement activities, in which unmet clinical needs are 
identified and then the NHS actively seeks commercial partners that can 
develop appropriate solutions seem vital to an evolving NHS. 
Another question raised by this pair of cases is how best to organise 
purchasing. Adoption decisions of commodity items are relatively 
unstructured and are often based on minimal investigation of options with 
little effort put into the decision process. This is in part due to the relatively 
low cost of the technology when considered on a per item basis, but also 
because the differences between candidate products are relatively small. It 
is also exacerbated by the fact that purchasing of the technologies is 
frequently done on an ad hoc basis, for example when single items are 
needed to replacing broken one. It is also clear that staff have significant 
autonomy in the decision-making process and so have the authority to 
select technologies that they consider the best. However, lack of time can 
mean that they take the route of least resistance and make decisions based 
on satisficing rather than continuing to search and negotiate with 
colleagues until the optimal solution is found.  
The implications of understanding how adoption decisions for low-cost 
commodity items are made are potentially significant. The extent to which 
purchasers have a full knowledge of the range of technologies is likely to be 
limited, especially as staff might have little opportunity and/or motivation 
to carry out systematic searches. As a consequence, for some classes of 
technologies, especially commodity technologies, the most effective way of 
promoting adoption might be the centralised provision of approved 
products. This would allow them to be purchased based on systematic 
selection criteria. It would also allow NHS staff to be made aware of new 
technologies that meet the changing requirements of the NHS. It seems 
likely that for most NHS staff this would remove a significant burden from 
the decision-making process, while at the same time improving purchasing 
decision quality. Of course the implication of shifting procurement decisions 
to the centre is that an appropriate and systematic methodology is needed 
for assessing the commodity technologies. 
The cases also raise one more final point. Although this product is related 
to the need of the community nursing sector, there may well be similar 
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needs in other specialist sectors. The community sector is currently 
important because of its current rapid expansion, but is unlikely to be 
unique in having specialist needs which are best identified from the 
knowledge of front-line staff.  
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7 M1: a technology for informing diagnosis 
M1 and M1a are diagnostic technologies used to inform clinical decision-
making. Efficient use of novel diagnostic technologies has potential to 
improve clinical decision-making, in turn improving care and potentially 
reducing costs, and so these are examples of an important set of 
technologies. 
The pair of technologies do not address the same clinical need but they 
have several important characteristics in common that make them capable 
of being regarded as a theoretically important pair. They both potentially 
address a prevention agenda but one does this by screening for a specific 
medical problem whereas the other does it through improved decision-
making about choice of care pathways. Both technologies have the 
potential to reduce the level of variation in how well diagnosis is carried out 
and both allow testing to be carried out in a less specialised setting, when 
compared to the existing diagnostic tests they replace or augment. They 
also reduce the need for specialist staff to be involved in clinical decision-
making. Each technology can also be used away from specialist centres in, 
for example, satellite or community-based clinics and GP surgeries. Finally, 
both technologies have potential for delivering a reduction in cost to the 
NHS through the replacement of more expensive diagnostic procedures and 
the avoidance of unnecessary procedures.  
7.1 Data Collection 
Data for this pair of cases was collected from a variety of sources. Face to 
face and telephone interviews were conducted with clinicians, technologists 
and managers in a number of trusts. For the M1 case interviewees were 
based in five acute trusts, one of which was the trust where it was 
developed. All of these trusts had established clinical departments and had 
adopted M1 to some extent. For the M1a case interviewees were based in a 
GP practice or an acute trust. A smaller number of interviews were 
conducted with suppliers and other stakeholders. Further information was 
gathered from published sources including refereed journal articles, 
government-backed reports and other items of grey literature such as 
newspaper and magazine articles and sales material. 
7.2 M1 Case: Non-invasive urological testing 
M1 was developed by a team based in the Urology Department of a major 
NHS teaching hospital. Urology is an area where management of long term 
conditions is an important characteristic of the discipline. This management 
might include surgical or other types of interventions but it often consists 
almost entirely of ‘watchful waiting’. Specific care guidelines have been 
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developed by bodies such as NICE but there is still a significant variation in 
practice between centres. An important aspect of these guidelines was the 
use of the then new diagnostic test for measuring and assessing urological 
symptoms. This ‘gold standard’ assessment was established during the 
1990s and is an invasive test, requiring specialist staff and equipment. 
Since then several other non-invasive tests that were capable of being 
carried out by fewer or less specialised staff have been developed but these 
are not as comprehensive as the invasive test, as they measure a narrower 
range of indicators. Their advantages were that they could measure some 
indicators equally well and with less discomfort to the patient. Within the 
urology community there has been wide variation in the amount of 
attention paid by Urologists to the emerging, non-invasive tests despite 
their potential advantages over the ‘gold standard’ test. 
M1 is one of these non-invasive tests and despite substantial clinical 
trialling, marketing efforts from the supplier, support from the NHS-based 
development team and national initiatives across the NHS, adoption has 
been slow. This case will look at reasons for this slow adoption. 
7.2.1 The Technology 
M1 combines hardware used for taking measurements and software that 
allows an algorithm to be used to generate information to guide clinical 
decisions. The equipment has been designed for use in clinics and is either 
housed on a trolley or fixed to a wall. 
Though M1 measures a narrower range of indicators than the corresponding 
invasive test, M1’s algorithm has been shown to give reliable guidance to 
the clinician in deciding whether to operate, carry out further invasive tests 
or do nothing. It is its reliability as a predictor of the success of surgical 
intervention in alleviating symptoms that potentially makes it an important 
additional diagnostic for Urologists to use. The advantages for the patient 
are that it involves much less discomfort and has fewer risks than the 
invasive test procedure. The relative simplicity of M1 means it can in 
principle be used in clinics remote from a main hospital, as unlike the 
invasive test a dedicated clinic suite is unnecessary. The equipment capital 
cost is several thousand pounds but consumable costs are a few pounds per 
patient. 
The technology’s supplier emphasises several benefits in its marketing 
material. Primarily these benefits are related to reducing the number of 
patients undergoing invasive tests or receiving inappropriate treatment. 
These benefits are built into an economic case showing potential reductions 
in NHS costs based on the need for fewer staff, fewer surgical interventions 
and fewer complications associated with the invasive test procedure. The 
supplier also highlights improved quality through improved patient 
experience and increased choice of diagnostic test. M1 is not marketed as a 
complete replacement for the more sophisticated invasive test but its 
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diagnostic accuracy in predicting outcomes to surgery is used to emphasise 
its use as complementary testing device. 
7.2.2 Origin of M1 
The development of M1 was based on the work of technologists in the 
medical physics department of a large teaching hospital. The medical 
physics staff had significant experience in designing clinical measurement 
devices and M1 was one instance of a range of innovations that the team 
had produced. An industrial partner was involved early on in the project. 
The team started the development in response to two triggers. First, an 
academic paper published in the mid-1990s that suggested a novel 
approach to non-invasive testing. The second trigger was a national audit 
report produced by a team that included academic medical staff at the 
hospital and university. The audit findings highlighted that there was 
significant variation in methods used for treating patients with a specific 
urological condition and that the outcomes of treatment were very variable. 
Previous trials had established a gold-standard surgical treatment, 
however, the audit highlighted that the outcomes for a significant minority 
of patients undergoing this procedure were poor (20 to 30 per cent failed to 
gain substantial symptomatic benefit). The findings from the audit 
suggested the need for clinical decisions to draw on additional information, 
including that generated by invasive urodynamic testing, to support 
diagnosis. 
During the 1990s suggestions had been made by the wider urology 
community in the UK and abroad for improvements to diagnostic 
technologies. The hospital is a leading centre of urology research and staff 
at the hospital had been following these developments, testing them and 
developing their own methods. Through collaboration between clinical and 
technical staff in the hospital and local university the group were already 
active in developing novel approaches to treatment and diagnosis. This 
created a very positive environment for innovation of M1. 
Evaluation of M1 has been rigorous. Trials of the technology started on 
volunteers and then on patients. Using funding from charities, a clinical trial 
was carried out that assessed the reliability, acceptability and validity of the 
technology during clinical use over a five year period. A final study based in 
the hospital was a blind clinical trial. This showed that for certain groups of 
patients M1 was reliable in predicting the outcome of a surgical 
intervention. The clinical lead on the project believed that the assessments 
carried out in the hospital were much more rigorous than those carried out 
on many other diagnostic devices. Prompted by feedback from a national 
agency, a further multi-centre trial at six UK hospitals was carried to ensure 
that the technology’s benefits could be generalised to other sites. 
A large number of trials on various aspects of the science and technology 
underpinning M1 have now been completed and published in several dozen 
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peer-reviewed papers. Unfortunately, the extent to which these studies are 
accepted by the wider urology community as definitive proof of 
effectiveness in clinical and economic terms is unclear. 
Development of the technology has extended over several years and the 
technology’s patent is nearing its expiry date. This means the technology 
supplier risks being unable to make substantial profits from the technology. 
7.2.3 M1 Adoption 
Adoption of M1 has been in limited in the UK NHS, with just a small number 
of trusts adopting it into routine practice but adoption in the US, where 
several hundred devices have been sold, and some other countries has 
been more successful. A possible reason for the greater adoption in the US 
is the way funding works. The US healthcare system’s funding arrangement 
acts as an incentive for clinicians to provide additional diagnostic tests as 
they are often remunerated on the basis of tests performed.  
The overriding driver affecting adoption in the UK has been involvement in 
either the development or the trialling of M1. Perhaps taking part in a 
clinical trial of M1 has served to promote adoption because it has meant the 
sites involved have had access to loan equipment at low cost, have 
received significant staff training and support, and been able to trial the 
technology with relatively low risk. 
Several factors have been suggested to account for the limited take up of 
M1. The technology supplier believes that barriers to adoption are rooted in 
aspects of the professional context of urology. The professional body 
associated with the diagnostic test provided support during evaluation of 
M1 and played a part in communicating findings in its journals and 
seminars. Unfortunately, the technology supplier was unable to use this 
support as part of its marketing strategy because the professional body, 
out of a concern to remain impartial, was unwilling to be seen to 
recommend specific commercial products.  
A further challenge in marketing the technology to clinicians was how to 
couch the message to clinical Consultants that their current practice often 
leads to poor outcomes for patients. Though the general culture amongst 
clinicians is to strive to improve professional practice, building a business 
case for the adoption of M1 requires an acknowledgement of an existing 
weakness in current practice at a personal and organisational level. This 
acknowledgement may be seen simply as part of a professional approach to 
reflective practice and improvement but in a more politically-charged 
environment where scarce resources are competed for aggressively, such 
an admission may represent a significant yet subtle cognitive barrier to 
adoption. 
A small number of trusts have adopted M1, though the extent to which M1 
is used in routine practice varies. This variation reflects local differences in 
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the way services are configured. Adoption essentially adds an extra test 
into an existing pathway. This might be problematic where there is 
pressure on reducing time within pathways, perhaps to avoid breaching the 
18 week limit. Where clinicians have little faith in the benefits of the test 
there is little motivation to manage the re-design of an existing pathway. 
Four adoption sites with varying degrees of adoption and implementation 
into routine practice will now be examined separately. These can be 
summarised as: 
M1-SiteA Full implementation within the developer trust 
M1-SiteB Successful adoption into a trial site 
M1-SiteC Successful adoption into a trial site but later stalled 
M1SiteD Site involved in a trial but subsequently stalled 
M1-SiteA: Incorporation of M1 into routine practice is well advanced at the 
trust where it was developed. The device is now used to provide a non-
invasive urodynamic test as an integral part of a care pathway and has 
replaced an existing, though less sophisticated non-invasive test. The 
revised pathway has been implemented through the established hub and 
spoke relationship between the teaching hospital and the other trust 
hospitals. Assessment clinics are held at the teaching hospital and at 
several satellite hospitals. Each clinic is equipped with M1 and staffed by 
nurse practitioners who have been trained in its use and are able to 
interpret the data it gathers. The research nurse who had been involved in 
M1’s development played a large part in training the team of clinic nurses 
so that they are able to provide a full service to patients. 
The introduction of M1 and the consequences of the new configuration of 
clinics in the trust has been closely monitored and evaluated. Several 
benefits have been observed. Patients from a wide geographical area are 
assessed consistently across all of the clinics and the results made available 
to the Consultant Urologists. The number of surgical interventions carried 
out in the trust has been reduced and where they are carried out the 
proportion of positive outcomes has increased. In addition, fewer invasive 
urodynamic tests are carried out which reduces costs and the amount of 
discomfort for patients. 
M1-SiteB: Site B is a medium-sized district hospital that is part of a large 
NHS trust made up of a number of geographically dispersed hospitals. The 
hospital’s Urology Department has had a long-term (more than twenty 
years) interest in non-invasive methods of assessing patients, in part linked 
with the interests of the Consultant Urologist in the trust. Full adoption of 
M1 has followed earlier involvement in studies looking at the acceptability 
of the technology to patients. At the end of the original trial of M1, the 
hospital was given the opportunity to purchase the equipment at a 
significant discount. The Urology Department was able to use charitable 
funding to take advantage of this offer so the trust did not have to make 
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any significant financial contribution and no business plan was needed. It is 
now used routinely alongside invasive and other non-invasive tests and is 
operated by staff within the diagnostics section of the hospital’s Medical 
Physics Department. 
However, after the Consultant Urologist retired, the remaining Consultants 
working in the trust, and those who subsequently joined the department, 
each developed their own view of M1 and how it should be used. A 
technologist from the Medical Physics Department highlighted that this has 
affected the extent to which Consultants chose to refer patients to be 
tested using M1. As a result even within a single trust contrasting views of 
M1 existed. First a positive view that M1 was useful in predicting 
effectiveness of subsequent interventions. Second, a more negative view 
that it represented an unsophisticated test and was a poor substitute for an 
invasive test. A final view was that the detail of urodynamics tests was of 
little relevance to Urologists and that it was better to devolve the decision 
about choice of test to technologists. It was common for referrals from 
these Consultants to be much less specific in their requests for tests, 
possibly suggesting a lack of awareness in the relative value of various 
tests. 
No evaluation of the implementation process has been completed though 
an audit of patient data is planned that will review the care pathways used 
and the outcomes achieved. This will be undertaken once sufficient patient 
data is available. 
M1-SiteC: Site C is a large teaching hospital. It has adopted M1 into 
routine practice but over time usage has dropped to only occasional use. 
Adoption of M1 was led by a Senior Technologist in the clinical testing 
department. She had already been made aware of several early 
publications about M1 but it was a specific urgent request from a 
Consultant Urologist that led to her contacting M1’s supplier. The 
Consultant was treating a patient who was reluctant to undergo an invasive 
test so made a request to the Technologist to see whether any more 
acceptable non-invasive tests were available. The Technologist contacted 
M1’s supplier in the hope of borrowing a machine on a trial basis. By 
chance, this request coincided with the supplier’s efforts to recruit sites for 
a multi-site trial so the hospital joined the trial. The Technologist and the 
clinical testing department in general, all saw benefits from joining the trial, 
beyond just gaining access to the equipment. The trial gave the department 
the opportunity to assess whether the technology worked in its own 
service. (The Technologist said he was aware that even if devices were 
underpinned by good science they did not always work well in a clinical 
environment.) A broader reason for welcoming the trial was that it provided 
an opportunity to become engaged in some research-based work again and 
retain skills they were in danger of losing. The trust was able to buy M1 at 
considerable discount at the end of the study.  
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The Technologist noted that during the trial, Urologists had started to refer 
patients specifically for the M1 test, thus showing that they appreciated the 
additional information that it provided. But since the trial ended, the 
number of requests for tests has declined to one or two a week. Though 
one of the original team of Urologists still requests tests regularly, 
Urologists who have joined the hospital more recently seldom requested 
tests using M1. The current prevailing attitude amongst the hospital’s 
Urologists is that the invasive test is still the gold standard and therefore 
they favour it. They do not accept that there is an excellent case for adding 
M1 into the current pathway so progress towards making greater use of M1 
has stalled.  
An additional explanation for lack of adoption centres on the ‘ownership’ of 
the technology. The Clinical Testing Department have developed the 
capability and confidence to use M1 in routine clinics but complete 
implementation into routine practice depends on the Urologists committing 
to using the M1 test. Thus, the Urology Department has ownership of the 
decision to use the test and no matter how valuable the Clinical Testing 
Department regard M1 to be, the Urologists see it as low priority. 
M1SiteD: The large teaching hospital at site D provides an example of less 
successful adoption. This hospital too had been involved in some early trials 
of M1 but though it had retained the technology when this involvement 
ended it was no longer used. Over a year later, a Medical Physicist became 
interested in M1 and decided to use it as a basis for a post-graduate 
project. The project was supervised jointly by a Senior Technologist and a 
Consultant at the hospital. This project was, in effect, an audit, conducted 
over three months, comparing use of M1 with the invasive test. During the 
process of setting up the project, the technology supplier became involved 
in it, and subsequently the project became part of a national initiative to 
support use of the technology. As a result, the hospital received extra 
funding for the project. However, although M1 was used routinely 
throughout the 3 months in which the audit data was collected, its use on a 
routine basis stopped when the study ended. This was despite the trial 
providing positive evidence to support the validity and use of M1, however, 
staff shortages meant that it was not possible to use the M1 test. 
7.2.4  Adoption issues 
A number of issues relating to adoption and especially the slow adoption 
are raised in this case. Figure 18 summarises some of these issues. 
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Figure 18. Factors affecting the slow adoption of M1 
Evidence 
A distinctive feature of M1 is the existence of a significant body of evidence 
to support its adoption into the NHS. The subsequent slow adoption of M1 
has been disappointing and a prominent factor in this has been the extent 
to which the evidence has been accepted by potential adopters and 
regulatory organisations. This raises the question of whose and what types 
of evidence are taken on board when technology adoption decision are 
made. 
A perceived weakness in the existing evidence is that the majority of the 
studies were conducted within the trust where the development team were 
based. This has led to criticism that the trials lack independence and fail to 
demonstrate the extent to which results can be generalised to other trusts. 
The extent to which this has affected adoption is difficult to assess but has 
affected the developers of M1s’ ability to act as advocates for its adoption 
and providers of information and support to colleagues in other parts of the 
NHS. A clinician member of the development team had initially provided 
training at sites where trials were to take place but over time he had 
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consciously reduced the amount of support supplied out of a concern to 
appear impartial. The clinician felt by supporting the adoption of M1 he was 
undermining his own impartiality when planning and carrying out clinical 
trials. As a result of this perceived conflict of interest, the clinician believed 
their ability to influence clinical attitudes had been reduced. The team at 
the developing trust now see its main role to be the provision of objective 
evidence through formal publications. 
It was frustrating to the technology developers and supplier that the type 
and quantity of evidence produced to underpin M1 was incompatible with 
the methodologies used by various HTA agencies. The mode of evaluation 
used by NICE and other HTA oriented agencies is based predominantly on 
multi-centre randomised clinical trials. One member of the development 
team felt that this created confusion about what constituted ‘gold-standard’ 
evidence. In the case of M1, building a portfolio of supporting evidence was 
problematic as conducting a trial that assessed scientific, clinical, 
organisational and economic factors all together was challenging. Instead, 
the team had built up evidence by carrying out several individual studies to 
address factors separately. 
The difficulty in developing evidence for use of M1 is rooted in the extent to 
which its success is dependent upon effective incorporation into care 
pathways. This was highlighted in a report produced by a technology 
assessment agency that flagged the significant potential of the technology, 
yet raised concerns that additional evidence was needed. Its key criticism 
was that the existing evidence reflected the development and 
improvements to the technology but gave little validation of the method in 
a clinical setting. The agency did, however, acknowledge the difficulty in 
carrying out an economic analysis, especially as care costs varied greatly 
across the UK. Even across a small number of sites, variation in clinical 
pathways and practice would make it difficult to separate the impact of M1 
from variations in clinical practice. The only way to resolve this would be to 
change pathways before starting a clinical trial; this was a major hurdle as 
in order to carry out a coherent multi-site RCT it would be necessary first to 
affect significant changes in clinical practice across several trusts. This 
essentially created a ‘Catch 22’ situation in which the process changes 
necessary to ensure a reliable RCT, cannot be made without the results of 
the RCT first being available to prove the change worthwhile. 
Marketing 
One of the developers described the task of marketing M1 as challenging. 
At the core of this statement lies acknowledgement that adoption of M1 
requires Urologists to adjust their own practices, to accept the use of a new 
diagnostic test, and perhaps even to accept that their existing practices are 
sub-optimal. A consequence of this is that the technology supplier needs 
sales representatives who are capable of addressing detailed queries from 
clinicians and who possess the ability to use the published evaluation data 
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to address concerns. Urologists are the main decision-makers when 
adopting and assimilating M1 so sales representatives needs to be 
comfortable when engaging directly with senior clinicians. 
Ownership of the technology 
The ownership of M1 by a specific group of clinicians or technologists varied 
between sites. Sometimes this ownership was defined by the practical 
location of M1 within the geographical or organisational structure of the 
trust. Generally, ownership of the operation of M1 lay sometimes with 
nurses and sometimes with technologists. But inevitably at all sites the 
actual operation of the M1 test was controlled by a specific professional 
discipline. In contrast, the ownership of the decision to use the M1 test lay 
predominantly with Urologists. Though Urologists rarely administered the 
M1 test, their assumptions about M1 would affect the extent to which it was 
accepted into practice. 
A possible reason for variation in acceptance may have been differences in 
the level of interest and knowledge of urodynamic testing held by 
Consultants. A commonly expressed view of both clinicians and 
Technologists who had used M1 was that awareness of M1 amongst 
Urologists generally was low. Not surprisingly, this lack of awareness was 
seen as an obstacle to convincing clinicians that it provides a useful 
diagnostic. For some Consultants the assessment of patients was based on 
a single urological measurement combined with an assessment of 
symptoms. This group of Consultants believed the provision of additional 
urodynamic information was unnecessary. In contrast, some Consultants 
had more interest in the urodynamic test methods and welcomed additional 
information. This group were more motivated to adopt non-invasive 
measurements in order to gain extra information to guide their clinical 
decisions. Finally, a remaining group of Consultants were much less 
concerned to engage with novel urodynamic test methods and or the details 
of testing. This group were content to devolve the decision relating to 
choice of test to technologists and their expectation was that the chosen 
test would provide an unequivocal and definitive test result that could be 
used to guide their subsequent clinical decision. 
This suggests that that the adoption of M1 was affected by the levels of 
awareness of M1 amongst Urologists. As Urologists generally owned the 
decision to use M1 then poor understanding of M1 would lead to limited use 
of M1 in practice. Furthermore, technologists and nurse often had a 
significant technical understanding of M1, however, their ownership of the 
technology extend only to its use and had less influence on the decision to 
use M1 in routine practice. 
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7.3 M1a 
M1a is a diagnostic technology used to inform the clinical decision-making 
of GPs. It combines imaging technology, which provides specific images of 
skin lesions that can show patterns indicative of melanoma, with a scoring 
algorithm developed specifically for primary care. As a consequence of this 
assessment a GP might provide reassurance that the lesion is benign, 
suggest a period of ‘watchful waiting’, or to refer the patient to a specialist 
Dermatologist. M1a does not automate clinical decision-making but does 
provide the GP with information on which to base his or her decision. Its 
use can complement and support the use of best practice guidelines and 
helps to ensure the most appropriate pathway is chosen for a patient. It 
has the potential to improve outcomes, reduce patient anxiety and reduce 
costs. 
M1a addresses an area of dermatology that is challenging for GPs. 
Assessing skin lesions requires significant knowledge and experience and 
has traditionally been undertaken primarily by visual assessment with the 
naked eye or augmented with use of a checklist such as the seven-point 
checklist200 as recommended in the NICE guidelines for referral for 
suspected cancer201. Magnification equipment or other imaging devices may 
also be used to help the GP’s decision-making. Although there is a well-
established set of guidelines on assessing melanoma, studies have 
suggested that even with additional training GPs can still be highly sensitive 
but less specific for the diagnosis of melanoma202. The consequences of 
missing a melanoma can be very serious for a patient but the effects of 
overly-cautious referrals to specialist Dermatologists are increased anxiety 
for patients and unnecessary referral costs to the NHS. 
Development of M1a took place over several years. The core of the 
technology was invented by a post-graduate research student who 
subsequently gained funding and support to develop it further. A university 
spin-out company was then formed to commercialise the technology into a 
saleable product. Early prototypes were large and expensive, but by 
incorporating some emerging complementary technologies it was possible 
to develop versions of M1a that were less complex, more portable and less 
costly to manufacture. Although the spin-out company developed the 
technology as a skin cancer diagnostic it also produced variants for use in a 
number of non-medical markets so the core technologies used in M1a are 
also applied to a range of settings beyond the NHS including private clinics 
and the cosmetics industry. 
The international academic literature contains a significant and growing 
body of knowledge on diagnosis and treatment of skin lesions, especially 
those that are forms of skin cancer. The development of the M1a is well 
documented in this academic literature. Over an extended period, studies 
have been done on various aspects of the technology underpinning M1a 
including: comparison of its underlying imaging technique to other existing 
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dermatological technologies and assessing the embedded algorithm’s 
performance. 
7.3.1 Experience of an early adopting GP practice 
The adoption site where this research was conducted was a newly 
established GP Practice based on a new housing. The Practice GPs were 
keen to develop efficient and effective processes and, as one GP put it, 
“believed that the practice needed to be innovative and to ...change what 
people knew as general practice”. They aimed to develop an ‘inverted 
pyramid structure’ where the emphasis was on using nursing staff and 
healthcare assistants to provide routine services, thus freeing up time for 
GPs to focus on non-routine care. The practice was enthusiastic about the 
use of ‘near-patient testing’ and were actively searching for technologies 
that allowed checks to be carried out by nurse/healthcare assistants or 
even by patients themselves. They saw active involvement of the patient as 
an important factor in helping patients to self-manage their healthcare. 
The decision to adopt M1a was championed in the Practice by a GP who had 
heard about it whilst working in a BUPA clinic. At that time there was very 
little published data that could support an evidence-based decision to adopt 
M1a. Consequently the decision to adopt M1a into the practice was made in 
a state of partial and equivocal knowledge about M1a’s effectiveness in a 
GP setting. However, two triggers were important in the practice’s adoption 
of M1a. The first was the case of a patient who presented very late with a 
malignant melanoma. None of the GPs had any specialist interest in 
dermatology and this case flagged up the need for the practice to review its 
diagnostic strategy in this area. A second trigger was that the newly-
established practice had money available to spend on technology as part of 
its start-up funding. This made M1a affordable and so it was worthwhile for 
the Practice to seek advice from several sources, including the local hospital 
Consultant Dermatologist and a local GP with a specialist interest in 
dermatology, about its potential benefits. As a result, though aware that 
they would be a relatively early-adopter of M1a, a purchase decision was 
made. 
For about six months M1a was used by the GP Practice in parallel with their 
standard approach to assessing patients concerned about skin lesions. 
During that time approximately fifty patients had been screened using the 
technology, five of which were referred to hospital. On the basis of their 
experiences it was decided to use the technology on a routine basis. In 
particular, they were pleased with M1a’s ability to: 
 provide improved imaging 
 make objective comparisons between readings taken across several 
months 
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 the ease with which the results given could be communicated to 
patients, other GPs and specialists 
When M1a was initially considered by the practice, three possible ways of 
implementing it into the practice were considered, based on whether it 
would be used: 
 solely by the GPs 
 by a nurse or healthcare assistant with referral to a GP when it was felt 
to be necessary 
 by the patient who would then forward the results to the GP 
The third option of allowing patients to use M1a was quickly discounted. 
However, the possibility that nursing staff would undertake the monitoring 
was taken more seriously in the practice. However, it became apparent that 
nursing staff were reticent to take on responsibility for referring patients. 
(This anxiety was heightened by the severe consequences of missing a 
diagnosis.) For this reason the practice decided that M1a would be used 
solely by GPs as an integral part of the consultation with their patients. 
During a consultation the GP explains how M1a is used and discusses with 
the patient the interpretation of its results. The Practice finds patients react 
well to its use. Patients often seem to be relieved to see technology being 
used in the assessment. But more significant is that it forms a valuable 
focus of discussion during a consultation. Patients are able to understand 
what features of a skin lesion the GP is looking for and how the information 
from M1a informs a clinical decision. This has been found to be important in 
improving the level of patient participation in clinical decision-making– an 
important quality outcome. 
The practice is active in adhering to the national care guidelines and M1a is 
regarded as a valuable tool to support diagnosis and guide the referral 
decision. They regard M1a as “adding science into a referral decision”. The 
lead GP likened the technology to other diagnostic tests, such as the PSA 
test used for prostate cancer, highlighting that it does not provide definitive 
diagnosis on its own but adds objectivity to his decision, particularly when 
used over time. 
There is, however, a medico-legal dimension to the use of M1a. Where it 
flags up a case for which the scoring criteria indicating the patient should 
be referred, a GP is in a position where he or she cannot legitimately 
override that information, whatever his or her own professional view based 
on observation. This may result in more false-positive cases being referred 
to the hospital. 
As a result of implementation in the Practice believes M1a has contributed 
to the wider quality agenda of the practice in four ways: 
 Increased patient involvement in clinical decision-making 
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 Supporting the implementation of best practice guidelines 
 Providing increased objectivity and the ability to audit clinical decisions 
 Increasing the number of clinicians whom patients can consult regarding 
skin lesion issues (not just the ‘specialists’), thus increasing their access 
options 
7.3.2 Consultant Dermatologist Perspective 
The Consultant Dermatologist from the local hospital who had initially 
advised the early adopting Practice had a general interest in devices that 
could aid assessment and diagnosis of skin lesions. This interest included 
M1a, for which she had acted as an advisor during its earlier development. 
The Consultant had been positive about M1a and encouraged the Practice 
to adopt it. 
In common with several other Dermatoloists she had used M1a in her own 
work. Despite the fact that it had been originally developed for use in 
General Practice, she had found it beneficial to use the images it produced 
to inform her own clinical decision-making. However, she did not use the 
output from the algorithm, believing that it was better to rely on her own 
judgement. She welcomed the use of additional technologies, but was 
cautious in relying on them in isolation, believing instead that inspection of 
lesions still required careful application of experience and judgement, a skill 
one of her colleagues likened to “…appreciating a good wine”; suggesting 
experience inspecting lesions gained over many years was still vital to a 
reliable diagnosis. She believed this to be why some Dermatologists had 
been slow or even reticent in adopting technologies such as M1a 
themselves.  
Reflecting on the use of M1a the Consultant believed it provided valuable 
information in her own practice. However, based on her experience of the 
patients referred, she perceived the algorithm to be overly cautious and 
tended to over-refer patients. The Consultant observed that use of M1a, by 
GPs or herself, had not necessarily improved diagnostic certainty but could 
actual have reduced it because of the increased detail given. Images 
produced by M1a often showed more underlying detail than might be 
apparent using other imaging techniques. However, this extra information 
could be ambiguous, increasing uncertainty rather than narrowing the 
diagnosis. As a result, she believed use of M1a has tended to lead to more 
excisions. 
It is apparent from this Dermatologists view of M1a that benefits from its 
adoption into General Practice was by no means clearly defined and it is 
likely that her view, if shared by other Dermatologists, would potentially 
impact on the wider adoption of M1a. 
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7.3.3 Clinical trial of M1a 
Part of the M1a’s development has involved a clinical trial to assess its use 
in GP practices. Funding for the trial was made available at a similar time to 
when M1a was being taken up by early adopting GP practices. However, 
several years passed between gaining funding and the trial getting under 
way. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the results of the trial were 
unpublished. 
A dilemma for the team developing the clinical trial was in what sense the 
technology should be evaluated. One possibility was to compare use of the 
technology against common standards of practice in GP surgeries. 
However, it was understood that diagnostic practice was not consistent 
across all GP surgeries and that not all practices even applied best practice, 
as defined by national NICE guidelines. Instead, the clinical trial compared 
the use of the technology with best practice procedures against the use of 
best practice procedures alone. Hence, the trial was able to make 
conclusions about whether the technology improved on best practice alone. 
During the clinical trial some interesting issues were raised that potentially 
provided insight into adoption behaviours. When setting up the trial 
surgeries were encouraged to include nursing staff as lead clinicians in the 
study. However, only two out of thirty surgeries included nurses as lead 
clinicians. GPs were generally very concerned about the reliability of their 
referrals due to the dangers of missing a positive case. For this reason they 
may have felt less inclined to include nursing staff in the diagnosis process. 
Overall, assessments of the participant’s experiences of M1a during the 
clinical trial showed that it was regarded very well by both lead clinicians 
and patients. To a certain extent this may indicate that technology 
reassures both clinician and patient by respectively providing a framework 
for applying best practice and an impression that the examination given to 
the patient is rigorous and ‘scientific’. It is important to note that it may not 
necessarily be more accurate than the clinician assessing the lesion without 
the use of technology. 
7.3.4 Adoption issues 
This case provides an example of M1a’s implementation by an early-
adopting group of clinicians. Though now fully embedded into their normal 
practice its ultimate use differs from that initially envisaged by the lead GP 
in the practice. Furthermore, the adoption benefits are very different from 
those anticipated. Anecdotally, M1a has not led to a reduction in NHS costs 
through a reduction in referrals. Indeed both the GP practice and the 
hospital Consultant believed that the use of M1a had actually increased 
referral rates and the number of excisions carried out on patients; 
suggesting that the practice may not have achieved an improvement in the 
sensitivity and specificity of GP referrals. However, other benefits were 
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unanticipated, especially the improvement in quality of service provided by 
the GP practice. 
Adoption of a technology may, to a greater or lesser extent, support use of 
best practice. The GP Practice in the case adopted M1a as part of a wider 
concern to improve its ability to identify malignant lesions at an early 
stage. Central to this strategy was the consistent application of best 
practice guidelines. M1a has many key features of best practice embedded 
within it, both in terms of the software algorithm but also through the 
interface that it presents to users. The case highlights the difficulty of 
making an assessment of the wider benefits of implementing a technology, 
for example by facilitating better decision-making, an interest in a 
specialism, or consistent application of best practice. Conventional health 
technology assessment methodologies are not able to assess technologies 
in his respect, especially where there may be a synergy between adopting a 
technology and ensuring the application of best practice; This is particularly 
relevant in areas where there are concerns over variation in practice (for 
example see more general concerns in variability of cancer referrals in The 
NHS Atlas of Variation in Healthcare203 p.70). 
The case of M1a highlights the extent to which adoption of innovative 
technologies changes practice. M1a has made an important change to the 
nature of the GP-patient consultation and improved patient participation in, 
and understanding of, clinical decisions. However, the impact of this is very 
difficult to assess so balancing them against the cost of the technology is 
difficult. Linked to this change in practice were the medico-legal 
implications discussed above. At the heart of the issue of increasing 
precautionary behaviour is the fact that use of M1a does not necessarily 
result in an increase in certainty around diagnosis. It is quite possible that 
the extra data provided by M1a results in increased uncertainty rather than 
increased confidence. 
Finally, the case highlights the significant issue of how implementation of 
innovative technologies should and/or does change job roles and 
responsibilities. The extent to which nursing staff and healthcare assistants 
are comfortable with using technologies that shift responsibility for clinical 
decision-making towards them, even when done so with significant support 
from more senior clinicians, can be a significant block to implementation 
within novel service designs. 
7.4 Discussion 
Both cases in this pair are examples of diagnostic devices that inform, 
rather than automate, clinical decision-making. Though they are used in 
different clinical areas, several common themes emerge from the pair of 
cases. As such, for these technologies the extent to which NHS origin 
impacts on adoption seems very small. None the less there are several 
important themes that can be developed from the cases. 
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7.4.1 Adoption decisions 
Within the evidence-based paradigm, adoption decisions should be based 
on established evidence that a technology is clinically and economically 
effective. Neither of these two cases had uncontested evidence on which to 
base adoption decision-making. Adoption decisions were made without full 
knowledge of the technologies’ actual performances. Therefore, both cases 
highlight the extent to which adoption decision-making only partially follows 
the rational evidence-based paradigm. The pair of cases also demonstrates 
that supporting evidence for adoption of diagnostics can sometimes be 
heavily contested. In both cases the completion of large multi-centre trials 
took several years so potential adopters had to either wait for the trials to 
be completed, or go ahead without trial evidence. Even on completion, it 
could be claimed that the trial results were equivocal and could be 
contested, thus leaving the way open for adopters to believe they have 
made the correct decision when relying on their professional experiences to 
make judgements about effectiveness and risk when adopting innovative 
technologies. 
7.4.2 Implementation 
A striking feature of both cases is the extent to which the purpose of 
adoption of a technology was flexible and subject to change. The nature of 
diagnostic devices, as compared to many other classes of medical device, is 
such that multiple-purposes can be served by a specific diagnostic 
technology. For M1a, purposes served included: cost reduction, self-
administered screening, triage, diagnosis and supporting shared clinical 
decision-making between clinician and patient. Similarly, the role of M1 
varied between it being understood to be to provide a more rapid test, an 
additional test, a replacement test or as a means of monitoring patient 
outcomes. The range of purpose illustrated the extent to which users of 
diagnostic devices will shift their understanding of a technology and its 
espoused purpose over time. This suggests that while initiatives to promote 
adoption of new technologies may assume the technology will serve a fixed 
purpose, there is significant interpretive flexibility in how technologies can 
be implemented and adoption initiatives need to recognise that the local 
implementation will be subject to negotiation and change. 
The extent to which interpretive flexibility impacts on sustained adoption 
into practice depends upon three factors. First, the flexibility may be caused 
by users discovering new purposes for a technology. In this type of 
situation the basis for an adoption initiative may have been inappropriate, 
yet users have discovered how benefits can be gained through their use of 
the technology. Second, the flexibility is a consequence of the sustained 
ambiguity of the technology’s purpose. The extent to which M1 was viewed 
as either a replacement or an adjunct created ambiguity. Finally, the 
technology’s purpose may be affected by inter-professional disagreements 
on the technology. 
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stakeholders including the original developer of M3. A large number of 
published sources were also studied. These included refereed journal 
articles, government-backed reports and other items of grey literature such 
as newspaper and magazine articles and sales material. 
8.2 The development of M3 
The origins of M3 can be traced back more than 40 years to research 
funded by the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust and 
conducted at a London Medical School. The findings of this early research 
were extended over the following decade or so by other groups of 
anaesthetists and medical physics experts working in a number of 
countries. Independently of them, a then Medical Registrar in an NHS 
hospital had the idea for the technology that has become M3. He 
approached a commercial firm with highly relevant expertise and they 
worked together to produce the probe that lies at the heart of M3. Rather 
than being based on any existing technologies, this development exercise 
started from first principles. Importantly where this current research into 
the origins of technology is concerned, the development of M3 was able to 
benefit from the hospital setting in which it was being carried out because 
the hospital possessed CT scanning equipment which was new at that time. 
This equipment allowed anatomical measurements of the thoracic region to 
be obtained and used to inform the design process.  
By undertaking a clinical study the developer was able to show that the 
probe was capable of collecting the data needed for accurate noninvasive 
monitoring and he was able to establish relationships between important 
variables and build a nomograph that would allow the data collected to be 
interpreted. 
The findings of a randomized trial, carried out in a London teaching 
hospital, to evaluate the technology were published in 1995. This study 
looked at 60 patients undergoing cardiac surgery. The patients in the 
protocol group were monitored using the technology and given fluid 
replacement based upon the results and those in the control group were 
treated according to ‘standard practice’. The study found that use of the 
technology delivered a number of benefits including: 
 Reduced incidence of gut mucosal hypoperfusion 
 Fewer complications after surgery 
 Reduction in mean number of days spent in hospital 
 Reduction in the mean number of days spent in intensive care 
Two years later a report of a similar study looking at use of the technology 
during operations to repair fractured hips found similar benefits. However, 
a short time later an editorial in the British Medical Journal called for more 
studies to be undertaken. In total, the results of seven high quality 
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randomised trials (596 patients in total) that compare use of the technology 
with standard care have now been published. There have also been two 
systematic reviews and a number of other studies that investigated use of 
the technology and compared it with options other than ‘standard care’. A 
number of informal evaluations have also been conducted by anaesthetists 
in their own hospitals. 
8.3 The adoption process 
Adoption of this technology only requires purchase of the necessary 
equipment and training in its use. (The amount of training needed has been 
described elsewhere as “brief” and insertion and removal of the probe has 
been described as “straightforward”.) Its use during surgery only alters the 
work of the anaesthetist. No other members of staff are affected directly. 
Essentially, the anaesthetist deploys the probe when he or she feels it is 
appropriate to do so, adjusts the position of the probe to get the best 
reading, observes the results on a separate set of monitoring equipment, 
and uses his or her judgement to decide whether fluid or drugs should be 
administered in order to try to optimise blood flow. This requirement for 
skill in focussing the probe and judgement, and hence a substantial degree 
of tacit knowledge, are important points to note. Some of the other 
monitoring equipment used by anaesthetists gathers data automatically 
and uses it to generate very clear signals that require little or no 
interpretation on the part of the anaesthetist. M3 is different. The 
anaesthetist has to: decide when to gather a reading; undertake the 
actions necessary to obtain it; and then interpret the result. In the words of 
one interviewee: 
You need to use it sensibly and not just believe whatever it says and ignore 
other evidence. However, regular use does lead to greater faith that it is 
giving accurate results. It is occasional use that is problematic because it is 
user-dependent. There are also some patients, albeit a small minority 
where it is difficult to obtain and/or maintain a reliable trace. 
Adoption can occur on an individual anaesthetist basis. For example, in one 
site where interviews were conducted members of a team of four 
anaesthetists each used the technology to different degrees that range 
across the whole spectrum from ‘every occasion where its use is indicated’ 
to ‘not at all’. These different patterns of adoption are the result of personal 
preference on the part of the four clinicians themselves and reflect their 
individual views on the usefulness of the technology and the consequences 
it had for patients. It is worth noting, however, that at most of the other 
sites investigated all anaesthetists or no anaesthetists are using the 
technology and some of them spoke of the efforts they had made to extend 
use across colleagues after becoming personally convinced of the benefits 
of adoption.  
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At 2011 prices the initial cost of the monitoring equipment is £11000 per 
monitor and the disposable probe costs are approximately £85 per patient 
but there is good evidence that the cost savings are in the region of £1100 
per patient. 
 
8.4 Slow growth of adoption 
The adopters interviewed fell into three camps as far as their own initial 
awareness of the technology was concerned. Some were introduced to it 
quite some years ago during their own training or when studying for 
advanced qualifications, usually through contact with the developer and/or 
his collaborators/colleagues. (Three of this group were studying overseas at 
the time they became aware of it.) Others have a very long standing 
interest in cardiac output monitoring and became aware of the technology 
from the developers’ or first wave adopters’ research. At the other extreme, 
two interviewees had only been introduced to the technology much more 
recently by colleagues in their current hospital.  
It is clear from many of the interviews conducted with anaesthetists that 
this technology has some extremely strong supporters. Those spoken to 
who remain current adopters use it as part of their standard practice for all 
cases involving major or high-risk surgery and for high-risk patients. In 
some cases, having started to use the technology they had participated in 
clinical trials of it, and almost all of those who had not been involved in 
formal trials had carried out or taken part in some other form of evaluation 
of the technology. Some of the current adopters interviewed had authored 
scholarly papers about the technology and a slightly larger number of them 
had spoken at professional gatherings, conferences, training events and the 
like. They were all extremely convinced of the benefits delivered by the 
technology and were entirely happy with their experiences of using it. Most 
of them also expressed disappointment or even dismay that its use is not a 
lot more widespread. When asked to suggest reasons for non-adoption the 
suggestions they put forward included: 
 It requires anaesthetists to perform more activities during surgery and 
they might be reluctant to undertake these or believe that they divert 
attention from other more important matters. 
 Perceived lack of user-friendliness, ‘especially where probe focus is 
concerned’. 
 It is only suitable for sedated patients and some anaesthetists are 
working in surgical areas where a lot of regional anaesthesia is used. 
 The main concern of some anaesthetists is what happens to patients up 
to the point they leave the Recovery Unit but the main benefits to 
patients from using this technology are only seen subsequent to that. 
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 Accounting processes mean that the cost of using the technology is 
incurred in a different cost centre from the one where cost savings are 
accrued. 
 Historically, outcome data has not been collected and reported on a 
routine basis and even where it has, its accuracy has been questioned. A 
consequence of this is lack of appreciation of the size of the opportunity 
adoption offers.  
 Reluctance to change on the part of some anaesthetists. 
8.5 Efforts to increase level of adoption 
Although the technology has been in use for two decades it is only recently 
that the level of adoption has started to become significant. This big 
increase is a largely a consequence of substantial efforts on the part of 
organisations linked to the NHS. These efforts began following a technology 
assessment with positive results published in the US in early 2007. In the 
UK, a report by the Improving Surgical Outcomes Group appeared a short 
time later. It looked at three key areas for improving surgical outcomes, 
one of which involved use of this technology. Very positive results from two 
hospitals were featured in the material used by the Department of Health to 
alert all NHS trusts and strategic health authority Chief Executives to the 
report’s contents. 
The US technology assessment also formed the main basis for an evidence 
review conducted by an executive agency of the Department of Health. This 
appeared in 2008. This review found that for patients undergoing high risk 
surgery use of the technology alongside conventional clinical assessment 
was likely to reduce the number of complications experienced after surgery, 
decrease the death rate and reduce the amount of time spent in hospital. It 
concluded that the technology had ‘significant potential’. At around the 
same time as this evidence review’s findings were published, a project 
supported by the NHS Technology Adoption Centre (NTAC) began at three 
sites. This project was designed to generate information on procurement 
and implementation of M3 that could be used to develop a guide for other 
adopters. It is interesting to note that the existing baseline usage in eligible 
patients across the three sites was only 12 per cent at the start of this 
project but it had had risen to 63 per cent by the end. The NTAC guidance 
is now available and covers topics such as: a summary of the clinical 
evidence for using the technology; advice on how to draw up an 
implementation project plan; a summary of the benefits of the technology 
and the barriers to implementation; and factors that are critical to 
successful implementation. It also incorporates a roadmap for 
implementation. There is considerable overlap between the barriers to 
implementation identified by NTAC and those suggested by interviews 
during this research. NTAC found that the clinical barriers were: resistance 
to changes in practice; need for training; technical difficulties of operation; 
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not suitable for all forms of major surgery; additional monitoring equipment 
could be distracting; need to develop a business case. The NTAC study also 
identified barriers from a service/trust manager’s perspective, all of which 
centred on financial aspects.  
The most recent boost to adoption has been provided by NICE guidance 
recommending this particular technology. This appeared in 2011 and stated 
that the case for adopting the technology for use by anaesthetists during 
major or high-risk surgery, or when high-risk patients are undergoing any 
surgery is supported by the evidence and that the technology should be 
‘considered for use’ on this set of patients. It also accepted that the cost 
saving per patient is about £1100. The report was, however, also careful to 
say that this recommendation was not suggesting that M3 should be used 
in preference to other technologies that offered similar benefits. 
Another major initiative that is encouraging adoption is the Innovative 
Technology Adoption Procurement Programme (iTAPP). This was 
commissioned by the Department of Health’s National Director of Efficiency 
and Improvement as part of the QIPP (Quality, Innovation, Productivity and 
Prevention) agenda and is seeking to bring about the adoption of 
technology that will allow the NHS to improve the quality of care it provides 
whilst reducing costs. Under this initiative a prioritised list of technologies 
was developed and each of the ten Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) 
were asked to select two or three technologies from the list and provided 
with support from NTAC to implement their choices. M3 lies at the top of 
the list in terms of the financial benefits it offers (it was estimated that if all 
10 SHAs had selected it there would be a net saving of £807 million) 
though it is only half way down the list in terms of the number of patients 
who would benefit from its introduction. The consequence of iTAPP is that 
implementation of M3 is now being rolled out by a number of the SHAs into 
hospitals that were not using it before or were only using it to a limited 
extent. 
The efforts described above are specific to M3 but there have also been 
initiatives that encourage use of cardiac output monitoring for fluid 
management during surgery more generally rather than emphasising the 
adoption of one particular technology for achieving this. Important amongst 
these broader initiatives are the Enhanced Recovery After Surgery (ERAS) 
Programme and the Department of Health’s Enhanced Recovery Partnership 
Programme that grew out of it and which began in 2009. The requirement 
to provide ‘individual fluid therapy during surgery’ is one of the components 
of enhanced recovery against which the Enhanced Recovery Partnership 
Programme monitors compliance. A set of guidelines agreed jointly by a 
number of professional guidelines and published in 2009 (British Consensus 
Guidelines on Intravenous Fluid Therapy for Adult Surgical Patients 
(GIFTASUP) also supported fluid therapy guided by monitoring during 
surgery. 
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Suggestions for additional ways of increasing the level of adoption that 
were made by interviewees included better targeting of the Commissioning 
for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework to encourage 
innovations of this type and making use of the technology part of the 
minimum monitoring guidelines set for anaesthetists by bodies such as the 
American Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA) and the Association of 
Anaesthetists (AAGBI). It was also suggested that levels of adoption are 
likely to grow even without further measures as recent changes to the 
validation process for anaesthetists are rolled out and as greater and 
greater attention is paid to patient outcomes data. There are also a number 
of other clinical studies underway in the UK and around the world that may 
produce results that win over doubters and reluctant adopters. 
Efforts such as these to increase the level of adoption of M3 are ongoing 
and there is evidence that they are having some success but there is still a 
long way to go to reach the levels of adoption many hope to achieve. One 
interviewee suggested in March 2011 that for every 30 patients who could 
benefit from the technology only one was actually doing so at that time. To 
put this in context, it is estimated ten per cent of all surgical procedures 
(801,000 in England) can be classed as major or high-risk or are carried 
out on high-risk patients.  
M3’s manufacturer revealed that the company sold its single use probes to 
approximately 200 NHS hospitals in 2010. They thus sold to about two-
thirds of the NHS hospitals that regularly carry out moderate or major 
surgery. However, only a proportion of these will be intended for use during 
surgery (the same technology is also used on non-conscious patients in 
intensive care and perioperatively). Furthermore, the number of probes 
sold to individual hospitals varied from five (the minimum number possible 
because they are sold in boxes of five) to 1400, thus indicating an 
extremely wide variation in level of use even after allowing for differences 
between hospitals in the amount of activity.  
8.6 Technology M3a 
As was said at the start of this pair of cases, a range of minimally invasive 
monitoring technologies are available for assessing the cardiac output and 
haemodynamic status of patients. These technologies vary greatly in terms 
of the amount and quality of evidence to support their use. During the 
research into M3, participants were asked which of the alternatives 
available is the closest equivalent to M3. There was very widespread 
agreement that the nearest is the technology that will be referred to here 
as M3a, hence its inclusion in this research.  
8.7 The development of M3a 
M3a is a much more recent technology than M3. It is a version, specifically 
for use in the operating theatre, of a monitoring technology that was first 
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marketed in the UK in 2001. This monitoring technology has been the 
subject of a number studies but the first randomised controlled trial of M3a 
has not yet reported its findings. This trial is a single-centre study that is 
looking at patients over the age of 65 being treated for acute primary hip 
fracture. It is comparing fluid administration informed by use of M3a with 
fluid administration provided just at the anaesthetist’s discretion.  
The cost elements are broadly similar to those of M3 and are made up of 
the initial cost of the monitor plus a cost per patient for a sensor and 
associated disposables. 
Although M3a has not been classed as NHS-developed it does have very 
early links to the NHS in that its underlying technological basis was 
invented by a Research Fellow at a London teaching hospital in the early 
1990s. Therefore, like many other commercially-developed technologies it 
has benefitted from NHS involvement in its development.  
8.8 The adoption process 
Many of the adoption characteristics of M3a are just the same as those for 
M3. For example, M3a can be adopted on an individual anaesthetist basis. 
However, two major differences emerged during interviews with 
anaesthetists and some other stakeholders. These are ‘ease of use’ and the 
perceived differences in quality of the information provided by the 
technology. The manufacturer had made a very conscious decision to make 
the technology as easy to use and as adoptable as possible. Their aim was 
to design a technology that ‘would fit seamlessly into the existing 
infrastructure’ and get as close as possible to ‘plug and play’. ‘Ease of use’ 
was definitely a major influence on M3a users’ decisions to adopt and those 
who had switched from M3 to M3a said they had done so because 
colleagues who had resisted M3 had been willing to use M3a because it was 
so much easier to use. It is certainly the case that the manufacturers of 
M3a emphasise this point in their sales literature. They set out the 
instructions for using the technology in four simple steps that start with 
attaching a cable and finish with ‘begin monitoring’. They also list ‘quick 
and easy to set up’ as the first of the technology’s 11 features though it 
should be noted that the company does offer clinical training workshops in 
the use of its products. These are offered in conjunction with the London 
teaching hospital that hosted a major trial of its monitoring technology. 
Also, one of the anaesthetists interviewed for this research who had 
experience of M3 and M3a and of introducing more junior colleagues to the 
technologies suggested that although the training is different for each 
technology the total amount of training needed is roughly the same. 
Perceived differences in the quality of the monitoring information provided 
by the technology operates in the opposite direction. M3 has a large body 
of evidence, built up over a number of years, demonstrating its 
effectiveness and the benefits it delivers. M3a as a much newer technology 
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does not have this at present. Attitudes to this discrepancy in the amount 
of evidence vary. One interviewee who was an early adopter of M3 and 
continues to be a major user has tried M3a. He described the latter as 
“easier to use” but also commented that for it “the evidence base is not 
there”. However, another interviewee pointed out that although it is the 
case that alternatives to M3 may not have the same weight of evidence 
behind them this does not necessarily mean that they perform less well. It 
might just be that the evidence has not been gathered or made available 
yet. 
8.9 Efforts to increase level of adoption 
Some of the efforts to increase the level of adoption of M3 also encompass 
the alternatives to M3, especially M3a which is felt to be a closer equivalent 
to M3 than some of the other options. These efforts are those referred to 
earlier that encourage use of cardiac output monitoring for fluid 
management during surgery more generally. Regardless of which 
technology they had currently chosen to use, many of the anaesthetists 
interviewed stressed the value of monitoring and were critical, sometimes 
highly critical, of those anaesthetists who had not adopted any of the 
technologies that are available. One commented: “Any method is better 
than none – it is measuring versus guessing.”  
It is the case, however, that M3a has not been the subject of any specific 
initiatives other than those taken by its manufacturers to increase the level 
of adoption. Unlike M3, M3a is not the subject of NICE guidance and despite 
the best efforts of the manufacturer and other supporters, M3a was not 
included in the NTAC supported project.  
Adoption of M3a was also increasing at the time this research was 
conducted and was expected to benefit substantially if positive results 
emerged from the study that had yet to report. It was estimated that 
overall, the monitors produced by M3a’s manufacturer have about 7 per 
cent of the worldwide market for this type of technology. This is perhaps a 
greater share than M3 but the proportion of M3a’s sales accounted for by 
the overseas market is greater than those for M3 where the UK market is 
more dominant at present.  
8.10 Discussion 
Across all of the interviews conducted for this pair of cases two things have 
stood out very prominently. The first is the high level of passionate support 
adopters of M3 expressed for the technology. Without exception, all 
adopters, even those who had transferred most of their usage to M3a, were 
extremely convinced of the benefits it delivered for patients and the overall 
costs savings it delivered for trusts. They were also all very critical of those 
anaesthetists who had not adopted any of the less-invasive technologies for 
assessing the cardiac output and haemodynamic status of patients. This 
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provided the clinical evidence that the technology works) it has little 
motivating potential in itself unless the individual concerned views the 
outcome as desirable enough to pursue it. If an anaesthetist were to 
experience greater ‘felt responsibility’ for patient outcomes in the days 
following surgery then it is very likely the outcomes achieved through use 
of the technology would be valued to a greater extent. 
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9 Q1: a clinical assurance technology 
Q1 and Q1a are technologies designed to support quality assurance (QA) 
and hospital governance. These, and other technologies that are similar to 
them, comprise the delineation of standards, systematic protocols, audits, 
reporting arrangements and quality improvement methods. In this sense 
they are computerised management information systems. Unlike the other 
technologies in this study they are therefore concerned with the 
management and control of processes in healthcare rather than with the 
direct delivery of care.  
Periodically, QA emerges as one of the top priorities in healthcare. Usually 
this follows the emergence of serious shortcomings in one or other part of 
the health service. These include serious outbreaks of hospital acquired 
infections such as C Difficile and MRSA, the administration of the wrong 
clinical procedures, and the substantial neglect of patients. QA of clinical 
care has been stipulated as a priority for board directors of hospital trusts 
on at least equal par with financial focus204. Technologies designed to help 
provide clinical assurance are therefore part of the core mission of 
healthcare organisations.  
The main purposes of healthcare QA technologies are threefold. The first is 
to enable conformance with top-down imposed reporting requirements. The 
second is to provide nurses and other clinical practitioners with clear 
protocols and guidance which enable them to achieve consistency of 
practice and work to recognised and defined standards. The third is as a 
means of identifying opportunities for continuous improvement.  
These technologies therefore have multiple objectives and are required to 
serve multiple stakeholder constituencies. They are designed to meet the 
needs of nurses and other clinicians by clarifying standards, measuring 
conformance with standards and providing feedback while also meeting 
managerial needs by providing the tools and the data which allow clinical 
governance to be exercised. They also aim to meet the needs of national 
policy level agents by responding to their demands for systems to be in 
place to demonstrate accountability. And they may also be required to meet 
the needs of patients by offering reassurance that systems are in place to 
ensure quality and safety of care. 
No single technology designed to support QA and hospital governance 
dominates the market. Instead, a range of largely locally developed 
systems have emerged, often very similar to each other. Some of them 
have been adopted and adapted by trusts beyond the originating site but 
others have been more or less confined to the developer’s organisation. The 
scopes of the technologies available vary. Some are narrowly focused on a 
specific aspect of clinical practice such as infection control while others seek 
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to cater for the quality reporting requirements of a whole NHS trust, 
including the various demands of a whole array of external audit and 
regulatory bodies, in one single package. There are thus significant choices 
to be made by potential adopters. In practice, the QA technologies available 
often combine a response to expectations placed on a trust by national 
policy with locally perceived requirements in order to underpin governance 
across all or part of a trust. The balance between these two drivers leads to 
significant variance between QA technologies based on a number of 
variables including: 
 Local interpretation of national policy and initiatives 
 Scope 
 Balance of purpose between control, QA or improvement/development 
 Range of data sources to call upon 
 Frequency of audit 
 Balance between complex, holism or simplicity of use 
 Focus on nursing or wider 
 Methods of audit  
 Aspiration to make information transparent to staff, patients or external 
organisations 
 Intent to create internal competition 
 Challenging targets or minimum standard thresholds 
 Scope of use: single department, division, hospital, trust or beyond 
 Involvement with commercial partner 
9.1 Choice of case technologies 
Q1 exists in more than one form. It began as a wholly paper-based system 
but a more sophisticated version, provided as a spreadsheet program is 
now available. It has been adopted in one form or another by several trusts 
but individual adopting sites vary in the extent to which they have adopted 
it.  
In identifying a technology to pair with Q1 it was seen as important to 
maintain a focus on QA rather than select another category of management 
information system. The specific characteristics of QA in the NHS mean that 
external policy pressures have a strong influence on the development and 
adoption of technologies to support such systems. Commercial involvement 
in the development of Q1 was minimal and was largely confined to 
marketing. It was therefore decided that the choice of the second 
technology for this pair of cases should be guided by the extent of 
commercial involvement in the development of the technology. Q1a was 
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chosen because a commercial organisation had played a very large part in 
its development. A commercial software company had started with some 
software originally written by staff from an NHS trust but the commercial 
company had reverse engineered it and then rewritten the software. As a 
consequence, in contrast to Q1, Q1a is a software package written to 
commercial standards and supported by a coherent service package. 
A third case (Q1b) is also included because it reveals very different 
motivations and dynamics in both development and adoption. 
9.2 Data Collection  
Interviews to gather data for this pair of cases were conducted within five 
separate NHS hospital trusts, four of which were foundation trusts. Staff 
from two commercial companies which undertake technology development 
and technical support were also interviewed. Information was also gathered 
from senior NHS staff and from three independent experts/consultants with 
backgrounds in health service policy and administration. The interviews 
have been supplemented with information from documentary sources, 
including extracts from the technology packages and papers describing the 
technologies which had been prepared for clinical governance committees 
and boards.  
9.3 Q1 
Q1 lies at the broader end of the spectrum where scope is concerned. It 
was developed within a trust in response to a number of background 
factors and triggers. ‘Standards for Better Health’ had been issued by the 
Department of Health in 2004 become operational in April 2005 as the 
basis for the inspection and audit regime used by the then Healthcare 
Commission. The trust realised it needed some means of organising its 
response to these externally-led requirements. Around the same time the 
trust also experienced a higher than expected incidence of infections. A 
third prompt was the arrival of a new Head of Nursing who had been 
involved in a nation-wide project looking at clinical governance and nursing 
practice.  
The early phases of development were driven by a small team of nurses 
and a member of the audit department. The team used ‘Standards for 
Better Health’ as a starting point to develop a paper-based version of Q1. 
Their aim was to translate the standards into a form which would allow 
nursing care to be assessed on a regular basis. An important priority was to 
decide what kinds of evidence could be used in order to show compliance 
with the standards. In the end, a number of measurement techniques were 
combined. These included: a matron’s spot check of each ward or 
department; a checklist of questions for matrons to use in order to assess 
the awareness of different levels of staff about practical matters related to 
patient safety; a quarterly medicines management checklist; an audit of 
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paper records showing, for example, whether patient observation charts 
were up to date and up to standard; staff perception questionnaires; and 
patient questionnaires. Each group of standards is rated using a traffic light 
grading system:  
 Red: need for urgent corrective action; 
 Yellow: non-urgent further work needed; 
 Green: the ward or unit is functioning to the standard; 
 Blue: an area of excellence meriting wider sharing of good practice. 
Q1 seeks to combine a holistic view of clinical assurance issues with data 
from multiple sources to assess performance against key measures. Q1 was 
refined over three years and then a computerised version was developed in 
collaboration with the IT department. After a further three years the 
computerised version was implemented across the whole trust. In addition, 
a number of specialised variants were developed for areas such as 
outpatients, maternity, day cases, operating theatres, critical care and the 
radiotherapy suite. Although Q1 is still mainly nursing focused its 
development has continued in order to adapt it to reflect priorities at both 
national level and local levels. Its champions regard it as an organic rather 
than a static application and so various adaptations continue to be made. 
Q1 also allows quality monitoring and continuous improvement by drilling 
down into the detail beneath the overall results. This helps managers clarify 
the link between activity, performance, and the quality of outcomes and 
then use this knowledge to improve practice within the trust. It also feeds 
into clinical governance and reporting to external regulatory agencies. 
The extensive adoption of Q1 within the developing trust can be explained 
by the support/ pressure from the higher levels of the trust’s senior 
management. A Practice Development Unit within the trust also played a 
significant role in promoting and supporting the use of Q1. 
The developing trust has been willing to share Q1 and its own experience of 
implementing it with other NHS trusts. It has done this by offering Q1 in 
both a paper-based and electronic version at nominal cost, using support 
from an NHS innovation hub. The trust has also provided additional support 
by hosting visitors from other trusts and running workshops. Q1 has now 
been adopted in a small number of trusts, though in each case far less fully 
than in the originating trust. The trust has shown little desire to market Q1 
aggressively and has not attempted to gain significant income from sales to 
other trusts. 
9.3.1 Adoption of Q1 by Trust A 
This example of Q1’s adoption approaches a wholesale adoption with very 
few attempts to alter the technology. Exactly the same set of standards 
was used along with the same methods of collecting performance data. A 
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key factor in the adoption decision by Trust A appears to have been the fact 
that Q1’s main champion, a senior nurse, had previously gained direct 
experience of Q1 while working at the trust where it was developed. When 
asked by Trust A to develop a clinical assurance system he recommended 
Q1 be adopted instead of starting from scratch, arguing that Q1 offered 
simplicity and ability to integrate data and would enable the trust to 
conform to standards. A small team from Trust A visited the trust where Q1 
had been developed and on the basis of that visit decided to adopt Q1. 
However, there has only been partial adoption across Trust A. The division 
of the hospital where the champion had a direct responsibility and authority 
for clinical governance matters embraced Q1 thoroughly but other divisions 
were slow to adopt. In part, this was because legacy systems were in place 
which, in a more fragmented way, collected similar data. Staff, including 
senior staff in most divisions, were reluctant to abandon their existing 
systems and there was little sign of support/pressure for adoption from 
trust level senior managers and directors. Furthermore, there was no 
equivalent in Trust A to the Practice Development Unit that had played a 
part in diffusing Q1 throughout the developing site. To a large degree the 
champion in Trust A is a lone voice in advocating diffusion across the trust. 
Hence, although the technology is essentially the same in Trust A and the 
developing trust its utilisation is dramatically different in each. This reveals 
the importance of sponsorship for these kinds of technologies to be used in 
everyday practice. 
9.3.2 Adoption of Q1 by Trust B 
Trust B, a large teaching hospital, has also adopted Q1. In common with 
Trust A, the local champion for Q1 in the Trust B already had some direct 
personal involvement in the development and use of the technology and 
this played a key part in Trust B adopting it. The champion had an interest 
in and responsibility for nurse education and continuing professional 
development. She also had experience within the trust’s organisational 
development (OD) unit. She arranged a visit by a small team to the 
developing trust to explore how they were using Q1 and this visit resulted 
in the team supporting its adoption. Trust B did not consider any 
commercially-develop alternatives to Q1, in part because an alternative 
would be likely to have required a business case to be made. Q1 was seen 
as a low cost and viable system that could be tailored by the hospital to 
meet its own needs. Subsequently, Q1 has been adopted across the whole 
of Trust B, albeit with some amendments. Work on these amendments was 
carried out over a period of 20 months by a small team comprising matron 
representatives and ward sisters from each division. Being able to make 
this input was seen as crucial in building a sense of ownership of the toolkit 
across the trust. For example, a three day event was organised involving 
matrons, infection control nurses, and other senior nurses where they 
reviewed a range of standards and other recommendations to help assess 
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the adequacy and suitability of the acquired toolkit. National standards 
were balanced alongside local needs. The exercise helped reduce the 
breadth of coverage to concentrate upon what were regarded as the ‘critical 
standards’. As a result, the refined version of Q1 used in Trust B is shorter 
and simpler than the original and requires less data to be inputted. As in 
the trust which originated the technology, a practice development unit in 
Trust B helped to bring Q1 into routine use. As a consequence of the 
introduction of Q1, several groups of senior staff at Trust B are now 
involved in the quality assessment process, but the higher echelons of the 
trust’s management, including the trust board, make little use of the 
information Q1 generates. 
9.4 Q1a 
Q1a has a narrower focus than Q1. It is specifically concerned with infection 
control. It is a web-based system marketed by a computer systems supplier 
as one of a portfolio of applications that support healthcare processes in 
primary and secondary care organisations. One of the company’s other 
products has been very successfully taken up by a large number of NHS 
trusts but to date, Q1a has had less commercial success with only four NHS 
trusts adopting it.  
As noted at the start of this section, development of Q1a was not carried 
out completely separately from the NHS. (Indeed, effective development of 
a QA system for use within the NHS would be very difficult without any NHS 
involvement.) Development of Q1a has therefore followed a process that 
can best be described as ‘lead user innovation’. A commercial company has 
collaborated with expert users, based in an NHS trust to produce a 
commercial product. The nature of this development process has 
undoubtedly affected the design and functionality of Q1a in a positive 
manner and the close collaboration with an NHS organisation has given it a 
level of legitimacy it might not have otherwise had. It is worth noting that 
this mode of development had been used by this company before when 
developing other applications for use in the NHS. Their strategy was to 
identify promising new systems that were in an early stage of development 
and then re-develop them as commercially robust systems. This strategy 
was helped by the company’s geographical co-location with a technology 
transfer organisation working with the NHS. 
The commercial company after reverse-engineering the prototype and 
developing a new system, now markets Q1a to NHS trusts as a managed 
service and charges an annual license fee. Because Q1a is web-based 
integration with a trust’s own IT systems is not required. 
A full, formal, and quantitative evaluation of the Q1a has not been 
undertaken. Such an evaluation would be difficult because it would be hard 
to distinguish between the consequences of changes to national policies and 
other initiatives and those resulting from the adoption of Q1a. Some 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
130 
 
evaluations of administrative savings, such as data input costs, and 
improvement in availability of information, have been made and there is 
anecdotal evidence it motivates ward staff to improve practice. No evidence 
has been gathered to show whether it improves outcomes. 
One of the trusts comprises a number of hospitals that are geographically 
dispersed across a wide area. The largest hospital adopted Q1A first and is 
using it comprehensively but the other hospitals in the trust are not using it 
to anything like the same extent. Ensuring adoption across the whole trust 
has been challenging. 
Despite the pressure at national level to improve infection control, the task 
of selling Q1a to potential adopters has been extremely difficult. Most 
hospital trusts already have existing internal systems and this presents a 
marketing challenge if Q1a is to displace these systems. Furthermore, it is 
common in the NHS for doctors to undertake audits and improvement 
projects as part of their training. At present these projects tend to run 
alongside but separate from the use of Q1a; again constituting a 
complicating factor to Q1a’s potential use. Without unequivocal evidence to 
support the adoption of Q1a it is difficult to see how convincing arguments 
to adopt it over locally developed solutions can be prepared by the 
commercial company. 
9.5 Q1b 
As explained earlier, Q1b is being included here because it is an example of 
an NHS-developed technology that has a particularly interesting feature in 
the context of this research: its wider diffusion or commercialisation is 
being resisted by its developers. It was developed in a trust controlling a 
major teaching hospital, using the original paper-based version of Q1 as a 
starting point. This trust considers Q1b to be strategically important and 
central to the success of the trust as a whole and during the development 
of Q1b there was significant high-level, top-down championing of the 
project. However, far from wanting to see its wider adoption into other 
trusts across the NHS, the originating trust wants to keep its much 
enhanced version in-house as part of the organisation’s core capability. The 
competitive advantage it is perceived to provide stems from the improved 
and assured high quality of care which results from Q1b’s use in the trust’s 
wider system of continuous improvement. The trust’s focus is on earning a 
high reputation for good quality of care amongst GP commissioners and 
patients. This concern far outweighs any concerns about loss of revenue 
that might have been derived from licensing Q1b’s associated IP. 
Involvement of commercial developers in Q1b by has been very limited. A 
private sector developer has been used to provide system development and 
user support but they do not have ownership of Q1b or any licence to 
market the system to other trusts. 
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9.6 Findings and conclusions 
NHS hospital trusts now require clinical QA tools and technologies to 
support them. This is stimulated by requirements at a number of levels: 
individual clinicians; internal performance management; and the external 
regulatory system. Overarching all of these is the national policy level 
which from time to time launches campaigns and initiatives and provides an 
overall climate that is highly receptive to the development or adoption of 
QA technologies. Yet, despite these ‘readiness for change’ signals, the 
adoption of QA technologies is limited.  
Q1, Q1a and Q1b are all capable of having a political impact on adopting 
sites. The adoptions at all sites were politically charged processes with 
stakeholders using or resisting the technology in order to protect their own 
interests. The adoption of Q1 at Trust A also illustrated the competition 
between different innovations; adoption of Q1 was impeded by some staff 
believing it did not offer any more than their own existing systems. This 
provides a good example of where the adoption of information systems is 
unable to follow evidence-based principles, mainly because of the general 
lack of evaluation that would allow direct comparisons of effectiveness to be 
made. 
These cases show the extent to which the adoption is undoubtedly driven 
by external factors, principally expectations set by national policy on clinical 
governance. It seems unlikely that without these external drivers adoption, 
or even the development by NHS-developers, would have occurred. This 
highlights the impact that policy initiatives can have on technology adoption 
behaviour by individual trusts. This is especially the case where adoption 
projects were triggered by (sometimes negative) external inspection 
reports. The generally low levels of adoption of Q1 and Q1a reflected the 
wider picture where even well-sponsored national initiatives have often not 
been fully adopted across the NHS. Technologies such as Q1, Q1a and Q1b, 
despite their limitations, could in general be considered as well ahead of the 
norm. According to several participants in this study, the utilisation of 
systematic QA packages even now remains very patchy across the wards 
and departments of NHS hospitals.  
There was significant adaptation of the clinical governance technologies. In 
fact adoption sites clearly ‘borrowed’ features from the systems developed 
at other trusts to inform development of their own systems. This is perhaps 
a significant benefit of NHS-development of such technologies. The result of 
passing systems between trusts has been that the key features have been 
transferred between trusts and through adaptation tailored to the needs of 
adopting trusts. The transfer of the systems is therefore very beneficial for 
facilitating transfer of learning between trusts. The clinical governance 
systems are therefore important objects that facilitate organisational 
learning across the NHS. This also echoes themes in the NPfIT in which a 
major tension was between nationally standardised systems and the need 
for local contextualisation. Adoption was complicated by the need to 
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dovetail the new system with existing systems, especially in those areas of 
a trust outside the most immediate influence of the local champion. It is 
clear that existing systems would often stubbornly be retained, despite the 
introduction of the new system. The power to decommission a technology is 
as important as the power to decide to introduce a new one. 
Probably the most striking feature of this class of technologies is the extent 
to which the NHS-developers were active, or not, in gaining wider adoption 
of the systems that they had developed. Developers of Q1 were keen to 
allow other trusts to adopt their system, to the point that they made it 
available for nominal sums. They used commercialisation processes to try 
to improve amount of adoption. In the case of Q1b the developing trust 
was resolute in not wanting to the drive diffusion to other competing trusts. 
Obviously, these different positions have implications for technology 
adoption. For the systems that were essentially, ‘given away’, the adopters 
often treated the systems as prototypes from which to develop their own 
systems. Furthermore, though the sharing of technologies between NHS 
trusts would appear laudable, the limited income gained from sharing 
means it is not possible to fund sustained development to improve the 
technology or support its wider use. 
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10 S3: an engineered component 
In 1977 a Scottish orthodontist invented an appliance for the treatment of 
severe cases of overbite where the upper jaw and teeth overlap the bottom 
jaw and teeth by far more than the normal 2 - 4mm. Various clinicians 
experimented with the appliance and found that adjusting it during the 
course of treatment so that the relative position of the upper and lower jaw 
changed gradually gave better results and was much more comfortable for 
the patient and therefore less likely to be abandoned before treatment was 
complete. These gradual adjustments are referred to as 'advancing the 
appliance'. The standard method of advancing is to add further cold- or 
self- cure acrylic to the appliance. This is either done chair-side, i.e. in the 
clinic, or in the laboratory.  
This pair of cases looks at two alternatives to this standard method. 
Although there are some differences between these two alternatives they 
share many similarities to the point where it is sensible to consider only 
some aspects of them separately. This sub-section will therefore set out 
information relating to each of the technologies separately before 
presenting a single analysis section. A single conclusion section will also be 
presented, highlighting any differences where appropriate. 
10.1 Data collection 
Data for this pair of cases was collected from two main categories of 
sources. The first is a series of interviews (face to face and telephone) with 
Consultant Orthodontists, hospital-based laboratory managers and 
technicians and non-hospital-based laboratory personnel. The second is 
published sources, including journal articles and on-line resource and 
personal electronic communication with NHS and commercial company 
staff. 
10.2 The development of S3 
S3 was developed by a Technician working in a major hospital that is at the 
heart of a foundation trust. The innovation process was initiated at the 
request of the Consultant for whom he worked. The Consultant was very 
aware of the drawbacks of the standard method of advancing the appliance 
and felt that a better alternative could be found. When advancement was 
conducted in the clinic using the standard method it exposed the clinician 
and the patient to the health hazards associated with mixing and using 
acrylic. It was also time consuming, lengthening the time needed for each 
appointment, and thus costly in terms of clinician time. When advancement 
was carried out in the laboratory instead of the clinic the risks to health 
were reduced but an additional appointment was necessary after each 
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advancement to re-fit the appliance. This was inconvenient for patients, 
and those who accompanied them to the appointments, and also took up 
clinician time. 
The Technician's attempt to find a solution began in 1994. Relying entirely 
upon his own skill and expertise, the Technician made various prototypes. 
He undertook all of the activities involved with this and often worked in his 
own time and at home. These prototypes were tried out on patients and 
refinements added as a result of that. For example, one change was to 
replace the nylon screws in the advancement mechanism with metal screws 
and at a later point a screw housing was added. Eventually a version was 
arrived at that met the requirements and it started to be used on patients. 
The design of the product that is used today dates back to 1997.  
The Consultant was keen to share the technology with colleagues from 
elsewhere so the need to protect the intellectual property arose. The 
Technician himself drew up and filed a UK patent application. The fees for 
this and the cost of some assistance from a Patent Agent were paid for by 
originating trust. The laboratory started making the advancement 
mechanism available to other trusts and embarked upon what was to 
become a long and difficult search for a commercial partner to manufacture 
and distribute the product. Finally, in 2001 the product was licensed to a 
UK company. The Technician believes that this result would not have been 
achieved without assistance from an intellectual property project that ran in 
his region from 1998 to 2002 and which covered three teaching hospitals 
and four universities.  
This was the commercial partner's first experience of taking on an NHS-
developed project and they found it more time consuming than expected. 
They spent some time considering 'design for manufacture' but the bigger 
task was securing regulatory approvals such as those required to obtain CE 
compliance. They contract out manufacture to a firm local to them that 
makes a lot of products supplied to the NHS. 
10.3 Efforts to secure adoption of S3 
The developer and the Consultant for whom he works have made significant 
efforts to draw the attention of their counterparts elsewhere to the 
advancement mechanism. They have written papers, spoken and presented 
posters at conferences and delivered lectures. Indeed, all but one of the 
adopters interviewed for this project had become aware of the product as a 
result of conference or meeting attendance; the remaining adopter heard 
about it through a conversation with a fellow Consultant. The mechanism is 
also promoted on its manufacturer's website. This provides illustrated 
instructions on how to use S3 and offers on-line ordering. It is also featured 
on the website of the NHS innovation hub that took over from the 
intellectual property project that had helped to find the commercial partner. 
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10.4 The development of S3a 
In the very early days of the development of S3 the developer approached 
an orthodontic manufacturer that occupied, and continues to occupy, a 
leading position in the worldwide market for orthodontic products with a 
view to working with them on the project. This company, which is based in 
mainland Europe, turned the proposal down, but subsequently, in the mid 
2000s, they worked with a leading orthodontist based in Germany and 
Switzerland to produce an alternative advancement mechanism. The 
products are similar in the way they work. The major difference between 
them is that S3a allows a total of 5mm of advancement whereas S3 is 
capable of up to 12mm.  
10.5 Efforts to secure adoption of S3a 
S3a’s developer has also made significant efforts to draw colleagues' 
attention to the advancement mechanism with which he is associated. He 
has also written papers, spoken at conferences and delivered lectures. S3a 
is also promoted on its manufacturer's website which provides illustrated 
instructions on how to use it and in 2011 the manufacturer uploaded a 
video on YouTube to promote the product. 
10.6 Findings 
Both alternatives can be described as very self-contained. Adoption alters 
the work of the clinician and technician involved but it in any one adoption 
site it would be perfectly possible for one clinician to adopt and another 
working alongside him/her not to. Both alternatives are equally applicable 
in a setting that has on-site laboratory facilities and one that does not.  
The NHS-developed alternative is only marketed in the UK whereas the 
non-NHS-developed alternative is marketed internationally. In the UK the 
NHS market is much larger than the private market because patients 
suffering from the condition to the extent that use of the technology is 
indicated are highly likely to be referred for NHS treatment. Obviously, the 
market for each of these alternatives is entirely confined to users but that 
is a much larger market that either, or indeed both taken together, are 
reaching. The standard method of advancement using acrylic remains the 
most widely-used option. Contact made with actual and potential adopters 
suggest that the NHS-developed alternative is used far more widely in the 
UK than S3a. Indeed, it was very difficult to find adopters of the non-NHS-
developed alternative and those that were located were only using a very 
small number of items. It may, of course, be the case that adoption is great 
in other parts of the world where the NHS-developed version is not 
available. 
For the NHS-developed version the rate adoption in increasing has slowed 
considerably over the decade since it became available via the commercial 
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S3a because its purchase price is higher. However, for either technology 
the cost savings are small in relation to the bigger picture, totalling in the 
region of perhaps a few thousand pounds per annum for a large trust. 
Very interestingly, however, there is a perception elsewhere that the 
standard method is cheaper. An interviewee from a laboratory that supplies 
NHS and private clients (referred to above) said "Use of an advancement 
mechanism increases the cost of the appliance by £30 to £40. Though it 
reduces the 'chair side time' in the surgery the main alternative (adding 
acrylic) is cheaper." The Consultant Orthodontist who abandoned adoption 
after early failure said that although cost was not factor in his decision to 
discontinue, "it may mitigate against adoption elsewhere, particularly in the 
private sector, because it adds between £20 and £25 to the cost of treating 
each patient." Because the findings of the detailed cost/benefit analysis 
that was prepared have been classed as confidential there is no firm 
information available to dispel this misapprehension. 
10.7 Conclusion 
The development of S3 showed high levels of skill, expertise and 
commitment on the part of the developer. His efforts led to a product that 
was successful in meeting an identified need and which was capable of 
delivering benefits to adopters and their patients. Some potential adoption 
sites are using the technology and are very pleased with it but the overall 
level of adoption is disappointing. S3 and S3a have failed to displace the 
standard method despite the advantages they offer. 
The biggest difficulty S3’s developer experienced was in finding a 
commercial partner and he regrets that this was not done sooner. At the 
time he also felt he was out of his depth in terms of protecting the IP 
though the knowledge he gained in the process has had longer terms 
benefits because he has subsequently been able to use it to help others in 
similar situations.  
S3a came to market substantially later than S3 and is a very small part of 
the large product range of a leading international manufacturer. Perhaps for 
this reason it has made little impact in the UK and neither it nor S3 has 
been able to dislodge the standard method of advancement despite offering 
advantages over it. 
The differences in perception of the financial costs and benefits are very 
interesting. It is very likely the case that belief that the standard method is 
cheaper than using S3 or S3a is due to the fact that purchase costs of the 
technologies are more visible than savings in the Orthodontist's time per 
patient, especially since this reduction leads to more patients being treated.  
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11 Discussion 
This chapter examines some of the wider themes that have emerged from 
the research. It is in the nature of empirical studies that a broad range of 
anticipated and unanticipated findings emerge as a result of the fieldwork. 
Some of the issues are specific to individual case studies and have already 
been discussed in previous chapters but others are common across several 
technologies and so it is worthwhile examining these in more detail here. 
The emergence of themes across cases not only suggests a level of 
triangulation that improves the external validity of the research, it also 
provides valuable additional perspectives that increase richness. 
The development of themes in the chapter has been based on a clustering 
of findings across both stages of the research. Table 4 shows a summary of 
this analysis. Reading across the table each finding is listed along with 
exemplar technologies and mapped against one or more of the research 
questions and the relevant theme to which it contributes. 
When interpreting the table a couple of points are worth noting. First, 
specific findings do not always relate to just a single research question and 
several of the themes identified are related to a number of research 
questions.  Secondly, some of the findings have been further validated by 
data relating to technologies that were investigated at the start of Stage 1 
but failed to meet some of the criteria for criteria in the study.  
The remainder of this chapter is split into three sections. The first section 
outlines issues that arise from defining technology as either NHS-developed 
or commercially-developed. The second section considers the impact of a 
technology’s origin on it subsequent adoption into the NHS. The final 
section looks at the wider health technology innovation system and the 
potential for applying an open innovation perspective. 
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Finding  Exemplar 
technology 
Related 
Question 
Theme 
1 2 3 4
NHS Developers create overly 
narrow/niche technology 
L1, L3 ● ●
Role of NHS Developers in 
affecting trajectory of 
development and subsequent 
adoption 
NHS Developers create technology 
‘ahead of the curve’ 
Q4  ●
NHS developers create incremental 
rather radical innovations 
S5, I1 ●
Scope for adoption limited by need 
for significant investment or 
extensive service change 
C3a, I4, Q1, Q2 ● ● ●
NHS development enabled direct 
user‐input to design 
I2, C5 ●
Motive of NHS‐developers not 
always commercial ambition 
C3  ● ●
NHS development linked to wider 
research projects 
C3, M1, M3 ●
NHS developers members of 
extensive professional networks 
C3, M1, M3 ● ● ●
Dual role as developers and NHS 
staff roles creates potential conflicts 
of interest 
M1  ●
Difficulty in gaining ideal industrial 
partners 
S3  ●
Innovation partners 
Partners lack necessary capabilities 
for effective development of the 
technology 
S2  ●
Partners do not see NHS as a 
primary market for the technology 
Several technologies 
excluded from study.  ●
National policy leads to 
driver/barrier to adoption 
C2,C4, C6, Q1, Q2 
and S2  ● ● External adoption drivers Treatment tariffs acting against 
adoption of new technologies 
M3a  ● ●
Absence of relevant evaluations  M1a, C3a ● ●
Evaluation and evidence 
Adoption not dependent on 
rigorous evidence 
C1, I5, Q3, Q4, S5 ●
Complexity of building evidence 
base 
C3a, M1, M1a ● ●
Existing evidence contested by 
different stakeholders 
M1  ●
Time lag involved in 
building/publishing evidence 
C3a, S2 ●
Ownership of technology/services  C3, C3a, M3 ● ● Professional and structural 
barriers Professional/budgetary silos C3, C3a, M1,M3 ● ●
Piecemeal adoption funding C3, M1 ●
Adoption decision‐making In‐direct motives for adoption  C3a, M1 ●
Table 4. Development of themes from findings 
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11.1 NHS-developed versus commercially-
developed innovations 
This research set out to examine the extent to which the origin of a 
technology influences the level and success of its adoption into the NHS. 
Specifically, a comparison has been made between NHS-developed 
innovations and equivalent technologies that were commercially-developed.  
Within this study, a range of technologies have been identified as ‘NHS-
developed’. This group is by no means homogenous in terms of the way in 
which innovation occurred. For some, the initial invention was devised by 
an NHS member of staff but quickly taken up by a commercial partner. For 
these innovations, the balance of control over how innovation was managed 
lay predominantly with an industrial partner. In contrast, other NHS-
developed technologies remained under the control of the individual or 
group within the NHS who made the original invention. Overall, it is fair to 
say NHS-developed technologies have been found to have been developed 
using a range of innovation processes, controlled through a diverse range 
of structures, and with varying degrees of success where subsequent 
adoption is concerned. 
Technologies that are classed as commercially-developed technologies may 
still have had NHS involvement in their development. For some, though 
they originated outside the NHS, involvement of NHS staff was still an 
integral part of the innovation process. For instance, NHS staff may have 
been involved as advisors or as ‘lead users’. Other commercially-developed 
technologies have been developed within UK universities with involvement 
from staff within adjacent teaching hospitals. There are also examples 
where innovations have been created by NHS staff but the innovation 
process took place almost entirely outside the NHS. Therefore the 
distinction between NHS- and commercially-developed is not always clear; 
many commercially-developed technologies have benefitted from 
knowledge and skills possessed by NHS staff. 
The extent to which a specific innovation is described as either NHS-
developed or commercially developed is not always straightforward. It 
became evident during Stage 1 of this research that the original criteria for 
NHS-developed - that an NHS member of staff developed the technology or 
played a very large part in its development - needed refinement. The 
survey of technologies suggested that an important distinction was where 
the balance of influence/control between NHS and commercial stakeholders 
lay during and after the development process. Figure 19 illustrates how the 
extent to which innovations are either NHS or commercially-developed can 
vary depending upon a combination of the source of knowledge and this 
balance. The Stage 1 survey suggested that the NHS-origin become 
important where both the source of knowledge and influence/control over 
development lay with NHS staff though initiatives, such as lead user 
collaboration or technology spin-outs can have a mitigating effect. 
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Figure 19. Balance of control between NHS-developed and 
commercially-developed technologies 
One factor affecting the innovation process followed by NHS-developed 
technologies is the level and type of management support provided to 
innovation projects within the NHS. Across the technologies examined, the 
quantity and quality of support was very variable. This was partly due to 
regional differences in the level of innovation management support 
available to NHS staff but it was also due to changes that have taken place 
over time. The invention and early development of some of the innovations 
included in this study occurred before 2002, when more formal 
arrangements were put in place for managing IP created by staff within the 
NHS. For these earlier innovations the role of the NHS was often passive, 
with NHS organisations playing no formal role in the development. The NHS 
context was still important though. The innovations drew on the training 
and experience of NHS employees and their employment by the NHS 
provided developers with access to tangible and intangible resources. More 
recently, NHS–developed innovations have usually been much more closely 
linked to the inventor’s trust and support at local and regional level has 
been made available to exploit inventions commercially. For these 
innovations the NHS has therefore played a significant role in the 
innovation process. This role has included a more formal process for 
protecting and exploiting IP, with NHS trusts asserting their ownership of 
the IP. It is now common for NHS-developed innovations to be 
commercialised through licensing agreements with partners (two-thirds of 
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the technologies surveyed in Stage 1 had been licensed in this way) or in 
some cases spin-out companies have been formed. Through these 
mechanisms, NHS-developers and the NHS trusts have been able to 
maintain a degree of control over innovation projects beyond the early 
stages of development. 
11.2 Impact of origin on technology adoption into 
the NHS 
This research has shown that the relationship between an innovation’s NHS 
origin and its subsequent adoption by the wider NHS is not a simple one. 
The blurred boundary between NHS-developed and commercially-developed 
technologies makes it difficult to prove beyond doubt that one or other 
origin has a positive or negative impact on adoption. There is, however, 
strong evidence to suggest that the origin of an individual technology does 
give rise to certain characteristics that encourage or inhibit its adoption, but 
looking across a range of technologies there is not a consistent pattern of 
benefits or disbenefits. In short, being NHS-developed can, under certain 
circumstances, bring significant advantages in terms of securing adoption, 
but this is not the case for all technologies. There are circumstances where 
it does constrain adoption. For example, NHS origin can have a negative 
impact on potential adoption due to the technology produced having a 
rather narrow focus. Narrow applicability may be the result of a single 
inventor taking a somewhat blinkered view of the purpose of the 
technology being developed or the range of its possible uses. In the case of 
C3, the number of potential sites for the systems as originally developed 
was relatively small so it was only when the concept was applied across a 
number of specialist areas that a critical mass of potential adopters in the 
NHS emerged. Evidence that some NHS-developed technologies were too 
narrowly focused emerged during the early search phase of Stage 1 of this 
study. It was clear that some technologies developed within the NHS were 
failing to reach the market because their very restricted focus made them 
commercially unviable. In contrast, the more market-oriented approach 
taken by a commercial developer ensures that the scope of a technology is 
extended to attract as broad a market as possible. 
It is also the case that the simpler the technology, the less marked the 
effect of origin. I2 was selected for inclusion in Stage 2 because it is a 
simple piece of equipment and its adoption is extremely straightforward. It 
is therefore representative of the eight technologies surveyed in Stage 1 
that lie at the lower end of the complexity range. The I2 case study makes 
the point that a well-designed product emerged as a consequence of 
community nurses identifying a particular need and using their knowledge 
and expertise to engage in a collaborative design process. However, as the 
case goes on to say, this does not mean that the NHS necessarily needs to 
be involved beyond the identification of need and guidance on what 
properties an effective solution needs to possess. At that point development 
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could be handed over to a commercial company. This would still lead to the 
product being available for NHS adoption but it would also mean that the 
NHS would have little or no financial reward for its input. If sales of the 
product were very high then income would be likely to outstrip the financial 
costs of supporting and produce a good return on investment. However, the 
Stage 1 survey suggests that sales of the technologies in the low 
complexity category are often disappointing in which case the return on 
investment could well be negative if all the costs are taken into account. 
There could still be other benefits such as increased staff morale but 
perhaps an evaluation exercise ought to be undertaken to assess the real 
costs and benefits of developing technologies such as I2. 
Role of NHS developers 
One of the reasons for studying the impact of NHS-development on 
subsequent adoption was the extent to which NHS developers have an 
opportunity to influence, not just the trajectory of technology’s 
development, but also its subsequent adoption into the wider NHS. The six 
NHS-developed cases have illustrated a range of ways in which developers 
influence subsequent adoption, but they have also shown that the extent of 
this influence does vary considerably. 
All the research showed that NHS-developers were well placed to recognise 
a specific need within their own practice and were able to develop solutions 
to the problems that they perceived. Sometimes these needs were too 
narrow to attract commercial organisations to invest in development effort. 
For example L1 and L3 all addressed very niche or emerging problems. The 
problems addressed were also sometimes ahead of the curve with respect 
to commercial development and concerns in the NHS. For example, Q4 
addressed a problem that was yet to be seen as a widespread issue in the 
NHS though the developer believes it will only take one high-profile crisis to 
increase interest and potentially lead to widespread adoption of the 
technology.  
The sophistication of solutions produced by NHS-developers was variable. 
Sometimes solutions were just incremental improvements on existing 
technologies. For example in the case of S5 and I1 the solutions were 
neither radical nor sophisticated. The extent to which these developers 
were driving a significantly new technological trajectory was limited, but 
the value of their work lay in succinctly identifying a clinical or operational 
problem and suggesting a viable solution. Other technologies were much 
more sophisticated technically and required very significant amounts of 
development effort but were very context specific. This meant that their 
scope for adoption was limited to a small number of specific organisations 
or processes. I4 is an example of this though it is a very high value 
technology for which there is a worldwide market. Other technologies, such 
as Q1 and Q2 address widespread needs but require tailoring for individual 
adoption sites. In one sense, the most successful group are those 
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technologies that were developed to solve the NHS-developers’ immediate 
problems but are widely applicable and have ended up being highly 
adoptable. 
The overriding property of the NHS-developed technologies in Stage 1 is 
that they represent innovations that were the product of direct user input 
into the design process. As noted in the I2 case study, the products of 
NHS-developed innovation can benefit from collaborative design processes, 
where the users can work with specialist designers. NHS-developers can 
also be important lead users for the healthcare technology industry as in 
the case of C5. 
Each of the NHS developers of technologies in this research has his or her 
individual motives for embarking on the innovation process. It is striking 
that the vast majority of NHS developers are primarily concerned with 
improvement of patient care and/or bringing benefits to colleagues and 
they are seldom driven by commercial motives. Commercial success was a 
concern for many NHS developers only in as much as it represented the 
point where an innovation had become viable for use within the NHS and 
adoption elsewhere validated their work.  
For NHS-developed technologies, the NHS developer would often become 
active in marketing of their technologies. In this role NHS staff can be 
valuable champions for a technology, especially in the case of senior 
clinicians. The impact of NHS staff promoting a technology can be to 
increase credibility and legitimacy. In particular they are in a position, often 
through membership of networks, to communicate benefits of a technology 
to their own peer group more effectively than sales representatives. For 
research-active clinicians, promoting the use of their technologies is closely 
coupled with their own research projects and development of new 
knowledge in their discipline. In these cases, adoption of a technology will 
often be just part of a broader initiative within a specialism. For example, 
M3 grew out of research and C3 and M1 were both technologies that 
supported wider research initiatives with M3 subsequently becoming an 
important component of a wider initiative on enhanced recovery. It is 
common for NHS-developers to be active in speaking at events and 
conferences and writing articles and journal papers. These are important in 
legitimising research underpinning the technologies, raising awareness 
amongst their professional peers, and actively marketing technologies. C1, 
for example, has gained many of its adopters from attendees at 
conferences where the developer has presented. 
Technologies have been embraced by the inventors’ peers working within 
the NHS, especially when the inventor was an active member of a 
professional group. For example, for C3, the network of clinicians that 
made up an emerging specialism was a very receptive group and the status 
of the inventor as part of the group clearly improved the acceptability of 
the technology. Even for technologies where the overall level of adoption 
has been recognised as problematic (e.g. M1 and M3), take-up has been 
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strong amongst a network of clinicians with common professional values, 
whose paths had crossed earlier in their careers or who had got to know 
each other through involvement in special interest groups. In contrast, 
commercially-developed technologies seemed less likely to attract this 
peer-group commitment. 
There are however several potential risks of NHS-developers taking a role 
in promoting adoption. NHS staff may themselves feel, or be seen by 
others, to have a conflict of interest. This might lead to potential adopters 
believing the information provided by an NHS-developer to be biased or 
invalid in some way. Similarly, the politicised nature of some medical 
specialisms can mean that low adoption rates reflect competition between 
centres or other factors that have provoked a ‘not-invented-here’ response. 
NHS-developers require significant commitment to become involved in the 
marketing of technologies. NHS staff with busy routine work commitments 
struggle to make time to promote technologies to others within the NHS or 
elsewhere. Though potentially very valuable as a way of facilitating 
adoption, the ability of staff to put in the required effort is easily lost, 
especially when new priorities emerge. It can even be the case that once 
the innovation is in place for their own use the developers regard the 
innovation project as finished. This appears to be the case for S5. 
Innovation partners 
NHS-developed technologies very rarely become viable products, marketed 
back into the NHS, without the collaboration of one or more commercial 
partners. These partners provide key capabilities that are unavailable within 
the NHS, including management support, product design, manufacturing, 
marketing capability, and make capital available for investment. Without 
this support it seems likely that most NHS-developed technologies would 
not get beyond prototype stages of development. 
Within this research a recurring theme has been the role taken by the 
industrial partners. Despite the undoubted benefits of partnership, the 
ultimate success of gaining adoption of the technologies back into the NHS 
is inextricably linked to appropriate choice of partners. Developing 
partnerships was difficult for many of the technologies, as it was not always 
possible to develop an agreement with the ideal partner. For example, the 
ideal partner to progress S3 was a market leading supplier, but this 
supplier was not interested in the project and later brought out its own 
version of the technology. Generally for NHS-developed technologies, there 
is only a constrained choice of partners and so partnerships seem to be 
more often based on whether there is the opportunity to create a 
partnership, rather than whether it is the most appropriate partnership. 
It was evident in this research that choice of industrial partner from those 
available was mediated by a number of factors. One was the perception of 
how easy the potential partner would be to work with. (Often a smaller 
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organisation was perceived as easier to deal with than a larger one.) It was 
also common for partners to be selected on the basis of existing 
relationships. This obviously increased levels of trust between developer 
and partner, but perhaps also introduced a tendency to limit the search for 
a partner to known organisations, rather than to look for and cultivate 
those organisations that might be most appropriate. During Stage 1 of this 
study, a number of NHS-developed innovations were excluded as they had 
not yet come to market, despite several years of development. It was 
apparent that one reason for stalling of innovation projects was poor choice 
of industrial partners.  
In at least one example (S2), partnership with a small organisation resulted 
in the innovation project being impeded by a lack of technological capability 
and ability to attract financial investors. NHS organisations are poorly 
placed to make financial investment in product development so the role of 
partners in attracting funding to support development and marketing of 
technologies is critical. Unfortunately, the ability of small organisations to 
raise sufficient investment funding is also limited and so though a 
partnership may appear appropriate, subsequent failure of a partner to 
finance innovation, can limit both progress of development and marketing 
of technologies. 
A final issue related to choice of industrial partner is the extent to which the 
partners have an interest in the UK NHS as a primary market, as opposed 
to wider global markets. For many NHS developed technologies the only 
way for technology suppliers to gain significant sales is to promote 
technologies to global markets. It was not uncommon within this study for 
technologies to be marketed outside the UK, with at least nine technologies 
in Stage 1 already being marketed abroad. For widespread adoption, global 
marketing is vital to ensure that specialist technologies, with only a limited 
market within the NHS, have a market large enough to make them viable 
commercial products. It is also the case that differences in regulation, 
funding and local professional practice can make markets abroad easier to 
access than those in the UK.  
External adoption drivers 
For many technologies included in the Stage 1 survey, external drivers, 
such as national policy, were reported to have had little significant influence 
on their adoption performance. This is particularly true for the less complex 
technologies. However, for some of the other technologies (for example C2, 
C4, C6, Q1, Q2 and S2), external drivers or lack of them, did affect 
adoption to a significant extent. Three of the stage 2 cases (C3, M1, and 
M3) were complex technologies for which external adoption drivers did 
impact on technology adoption. The cases suggest that in order to gain 
widespread adoption of a technology it is necessary to set the broad policy 
context for NHS organisations correctly. Bottom-up initiatives to generate 
widespread adoption were not sufficient. National policy clearly has a role in 
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acting as a focus for adoption of new technologies, not least in relation to 
governance and patient safety issues as seen in C6, Q1 andQ2. Specific 
policies such as the inclusion or exclusion of a technology in a specific care 
guideline or policy can have a profound effect on adoption. For example, M3 
is now directly cited in several NHS policies and this has led to a significant 
increase in adoption. In contrast, the lack of detail on non-invasive testing 
within care guidelines has reduced the visibility of technology M1 to 
adopters. Less prescriptive policy leaves more discretion at the local level 
about which technologies are adopted which may explain why technologies 
related to implementing protocols or governance issues, such as C6, Q1 
and Q2, face a range of competing solutions, many of which have been 
developed at a very local level. Policy initiatives that identify key problem 
issues may result in local pressure to adopt technologies that address these 
issues. For example, publication of positive outcome data has undoubtedly 
increased pressure to adopt technologies such as C5 and M3. Whilst it is 
clearly the case that adoption of technologies does still occur in situations 
where there is a policy vacuum, it is also clear that adoption occurs more 
slowly and less extensively under those circumstances. However, it is 
equally true that even when initiatives are in place they do not guarantee 
success and there is often a lag between initiative and adoption. 
A wider issue that is illustrated by this study is the tension between formal 
external drivers for adoption, such as clinical guidelines and payment 
tariffs, and reliance on competition in the health technology market to 
achieve adoption of new technologies. Development of compliance 
mechanisms to encourage the use of innovative technologies is one 
strategy that can be used to increase adoption rates, but the question is 
whether they should they refer to a specific product, a generic technology, 
or some other means of improving an outcome. Strong adoption 
compliance mechanisms would be at odds with the competitive nature of 
the health technology industry and it is the latter that is often a major 
driver of innovation. Inclusion of a specific product in a guideline or best-
practice tariff would undoubtedly have a positive effect on take-up, but also 
needs to be seen as an active intervention into the technology market. This 
might suggest that where a number of different products can fulfil a similar 
purpose, then it may be more appropriate to provide a more general 
requirement, citing a generic type of technology rather than a specific 
product. In fact, being highly specific risks the blocking of wider innovation 
of technologies as prescribing specific product may reduce scope for 
competition. So though adoption of improved technology might be achieved 
in the short term, in the longer term newer technologies may be unable to 
displace older, less effective technologies due to their linkage with 
guidelines or tariffs. This issue has already arisen where M3 and the 
alternatives to it (including M3a) are concerned. 
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Evaluation and evidence 
One of the issues that appeared to affect both NHS-developed and 
commercially developed technologies is the extent to which evidence and 
the evaluation approach that produced the evidence impacts upon 
adoption. For five of the technologies in the Stage 1 survey (C1, I5, Q3, Q4 
and S5), formal evaluation is not relevant but for others a significant body 
of evidence was required in order to justify use within the NHS. (M3 is a 
prime example.) However, adoption did not automatically follow strong 
evidence.  
It is not always clear what constitutes sufficient relevant evidence. For 
example, M1 and M1a are measuring/monitoring technologies and as such 
the form their evaluation should take is not as clearly prescribed as for 
other technologies such as pharmaceuticals or certain classes of medical 
device. These two cases both illustrate the potential blockages to adoption 
caused by the absence, ambiguity, fragmentation or lack of legitimacy of 
evaluation information. The M1a case showed adoption decisions being 
made when only equivocal evidence was available, either due to the length 
of time needed to complete evaluation studies, or because evaluations 
provided only partial insight into how the technologies perform within a 
service. In contrast, M1 showed that it is possible for relevant clinicians and 
health professionals at potential adoption sites to be unaware of evidence 
that is available. This suggests that though technological developments are 
often reported in professional and academic journals, backed up with 
presentations at conferences and workshops, there is an inconsistent 
approach within the NHS for systematically reviewing new technological 
developments at a local level and absorbing it into practice. The extent to 
which this is due to the oversight of potential adopters, as opposed to 
complacency towards new technologies, procedures or service-designs is 
difficult to ascertain. A final relevant lesson from this pair of cases is that 
the evidence underpinning technologies, including peer-reviewed evidence, 
can be subject to negotiation and can be strongly contested. For both M1 
and M3 there was some evidence of clinicians’ professional judgement and 
assumptions over-riding evidence-based arguments for adoption.  
The consequences of selective use of evidence are complicated further by 
adoption decisions also relying on judgements about whose evidence 
counts for most. This study suggest that that a personal recommendation 
of a technology, such as C3, can have greater influence on adoption than 
published papers. While it may be that a published body of evidence can be 
vital in ‘qualifying’ a technology for consideration, the impact of the 
personal experience of a clinician perceived as a peer of a potential adopter 
may have greater power to ‘win’ the adoption decision. 
The M1a case identifies another potentially important aspect of technology 
evaluation. The case shows that the implementation of a technology can in 
turn play a role in supporting the implementation of a best practice but the 
evaluation carried out on M1a was unable to assess the technology’s impact 
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in this regard. It is almost always easier to assess the benefit of a 
technology in isolation than it is to undertake a full system-wide evaluation 
and yet it is essential to strive for optimisation across the whole. This is a 
crucial issue, especially in areas where variation in practice is very large. In 
this situation adoption of a technology that encourages implementation of 
best practice may be a substantial and important benefit in its own right 
and worth achieving even if the technology of itself provides little extra 
benefit. 
A further issue with making evidence available is the relative clock-speed of 
the technology development lifecycle compared to the technology 
evaluation lifecycle. For example the adoption of S2 was held back by the 
significant lag between coming to market and publication of trial results. 
This was partly due to the length of time required to carry out trials, but it 
was also exacerbated by the delays in the academic peer-reviewed 
publishing cycle. For other technologies such as Q2 and C6 there was a lack 
of evaluation data as developers did not have the time and resources to 
carry out detailed evaluations. 
The results of the study therefore suggest that to aid rapid adoption and 
implementation of healthcare technologies new approaches to evaluation 
are required. These may require a broader perspective than that given by a 
traditional clinical trial, using an extended epistemology. Furthermore, the 
range of approaches may need to be extended. The RCT model, adapted 
from pharmaceutical trials, may not be ideal for other classes of healthcare 
technology. Hence, the evaluation of measurement devices, diagnostics, 
assistive, clinical information systems and other technologies may require 
specific evaluation methods that can provide faster assessments that 
provide a more balanced view of a technology’s performance in context. 
Professional and structural barriers to adoption 
The extent to which financial and knowledge silos created by professional 
groups within the NHS form barriers to innovation is already well 
documented. Typically this relates to issues associated with the costs of 
investment falling on one area, while the benefits are gained elsewhere in 
the system. For example the capital cost and increased effort of using M3 
rested with anaesthetists, while the financial benefits gained from the 
enhanced recovery of patients were accrued in other cost centres. Related 
to this is another complicating factor in that it is the anaesthetist who 
makes the adoption decision but the surgeon is the ‘owner’ of the operation 
in which the technology is used. This was a factor that was also evident in 
the C3 case. 
Professional silos can also create some other less obvious barriers to 
adoption. For professional groups that believe existing practice is already 
sufficiently effective, challenging their beliefs that adoption of a technology 
is unnecessary is very difficult. For M1 and M3 the extent to which the new 
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technologies were recognised by clinicians as relevant (in the case of M1) 
or worthwhile (in the case of M3) to their practice was not always 
consistent. This suggests that the non-adoption of technologies may often 
be due to professional groups simply not recognising their need for a 
technology or its relevance to an individual’s practice, despite evidence to 
the contrary. A further factor that can cause professionals to ignore 
technologies is the perceived ownership of technologies. For M1 the 
ownership of technology was ambiguous between clinicians and 
technologists leading to lack of co-ordination between how diagnostic 
technology could be used within a pathway.  
Adoption decision-making  
If technology adoption was to follow a purely evidence-based approach, 
adoption decision-making would be an entirely rational process. A carefully 
constructed case would be produced and then objectively reviewed and, if 
accepted, a coherent plan for implementation would be developed and 
enacted. Unfortunately, the processes of adoption observed in this study 
rarely followed this process. First of all adoption processes were often not 
simple, deliberate linear processes in which the decision-making flowed 
naturally from stage to stage. Instead, they were often made in an 
incremental manner, gradually developing over time as various 
stakeholders built their understanding of a technology and ‘bought in’ to 
the decision. Decisions were also often triggered by significant events that 
prompted stakeholders to either take action to move adoption forwards or 
to stall progress. As such, though individuals were often taking decisions 
‘rationally’, based on their own perspective and situation, when the 
decisions taken by a range of stakeholders were reviewed over time and 
across the whole, the overall logic of the processes was not clear. 
It was evident that the adoption of technologies in the study were 
sometimes funded in an ad hoc fashion. For example, some of the adoption 
sites for M1 and C3 used research funds to purchase the technologies 
because there was no other budget available. Even where there is an 
economic argument in favour of adoption it is sometimes difficult to ‘spend 
money in order to save money’.  
Adoption decisions do not always just focus on the immediate, direct 
benefits of adopting a technology into a service. Cases such as C3a and M1, 
illustrate how part of the adoption rationale related to achieving wider 
objectives, such as shifting staff roles or building capacity in a new area. 
This might be by enabling staff to use a novel technology in preparation for 
future more extensive changes. Adoption can be part of an organisation’s 
aspiration to build technological capability by piloting new technologies. 
Under these circumstances, developing a cost-benefit analysis of the 
adoption is very difficult because short-term operational benefits are 
important but not substantial and longer-term improvements in 
organisational capacity are very difficult to quantify. 
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11.3 Open innovation and the wider healthcare 
innovation system 
At the highest level, this study highlights that technology adoption has to 
be seen as part of the wider healthcare technology innovation system. It 
has also shown that adoption is not a process that takes place in isolation 
of other activities in the innovation system but is part of a complex 
innovation pathway. Several interrelated factors affect adoption, many 
related to earlier phases in the innovation pathway. In developing an 
effective strategy to facilitate rapid adoption of innovative healthcare 
technologies these linkages need to be taken into account, not least the 
complex linkage between clinical need, research findings, complementary 
technologies and capabilities. A key challenge is ensuring the effective 
knowledge transfer between organisations, potentially in a diverse range of 
sectors. This suggests that it is valuable to adopt an open innovation 
perspective on healthcare technology innovation and adoption. Not all 
innovation will be based in the R&D departments of commercial 
organisations and it is necessary to recognise the role of technology users 
in the innovation process. Thus clinicians, technologists, managers and 
patients can potentially engage in user-led innovation activities. Finally, for 
both the NHS and commercially-developed technologies in this study there 
is a clear sense that the involvement of NHS staff as lead users in 
innovation projects was of great value. 
The relevance of open and user-led innovation suggests that to improve 
technology adoption a better model is needed of the wider innovation 
system. The following section proposes an extension to the triple-helix 
model technology transfer proposed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff205. 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff’s work on technology transfer emphasised the 
iterative relationship between universities, government and industry as 
representative of how technology transfer operates within the innovation 
process, most notably the triple-helix model of technology transfer. They 
suggest that the relationships between the three strands in the helix are 
dynamic and continue to be re-defined over time. This model represents a 
potentially useful basis for understanding the various transfers of 
knowledge that ultimately result in technology adoption in the NHS. 
The triple helix model’s main limitation is that it is not focused on a specific 
sector, nor does it explicitly address industries where user-led innovation 
processes take place. However, several other researchers have proposed 
candidates for a fourth strand to the helix model. Most notably, these 
include: intermediate organisations that support or enable innovator 
organisations206 p.20; Public/civic society207; users16 98 208-212; media-based 
and culture-based public213; and within the UK, the need for involvement of 
patients and the public in development has also been identified as 
important to healthcare innovation214-216.  
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Arnkil et al.217 reviewed many of the debates considering what might 
constitute a fourth strand in the helix and concluded that a prime candidate 
would be the users of a technology, as the quadruple helix would then take 
account of user-centred innovation more effectively. As a consequence, 
they suggested four variants of the quadruple helix that emphasised a 
continuum of user involvement. Their analysis was non-sector specific but 
has potential relevance to the healthcare sector this study might inform the 
refinement of the quadruple helix concept for healthcare technology 
innovation. 
The triple helix model applied Mode 2 knowledge production and the extent 
to which knowledge is often created within operationally-focused, rather 
than just research-focused settings218 219. The cases in this study illustrate 
this with innovation occurring on the periphery of formal research 
organisations and across boundaries. However, in most published examples 
of open innovation commercial technology manufacturers maintain a 
significant level of power over the trajectory and focus of the innovation. 
(See, for example, Huston220 and Lüthje209.) In contrast, several cases in 
this study exhibited a different power balance with NHS staff able to 
maintain significant influence on the process and trajectory of the 
innovations; acting also as clinical champions and opinion leaders. 
The study highlights that the process of technology transfer of NHS-
developed technologies does not match the triple-helix model. The triple-
helix model emphasises the interactions between industry, universities and 
government, while users development roles are subsumed to the 
“…emerging overlay of communications, networks, and organisations 
among the helices”205 p.112. This study illustrates that health professionals 
can control development and marketing; a function assumed associated 
with industry within the triple-helix. The role of the healthcare system in 
technology innovation is underplayed by the separation of just three 
distinct institutional categories: government, universities and industry. 
This study suggests the potential for extending the triple helix model by 
defining a fourth strand: the healthcare system itself. This addition allows 
the specific role of health professionals, as technology users and 
developers, to be reflected in the overall innovation process. 
The NHS is a significant source of knowledge and as a major strand in the 
helix has opportunity to assert its position as a source of knowledge in the 
healthcare technology industry. This suggests that the NHS would benefit 
from strategies that position it as the lead user of choice for universities 
and healthcare technology suppliers as part of a broadly based open 
innovation system. This would be advantageous as it would mean that the 
situated knowledge from the NHS would potentially be more effectively 
embedded within new technologies. This could result in development of 
technologies that have a fit with the NHS in general. In addition, the 
involvement of NHS staff in development of technologies would build the 
absorptive capacity of the NHS and support subsequent widespread 
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adoption. In addition to NHS staff, patients, their carers, and the wider 
public may also have a role to play as lead users, for further detail see 
Savory’s framework214 for integrating patient and public involvement in 
translational research. 
11.4 Limitations of the research 
Every research method has strengths and weaknesses so it should come as 
no surprise that the methods used here have given rise to some general 
limitations. For example, although some quantitative data has been 
collected there has been an emphasis on qualitative data and where 
quantitative data is provided it often lacks precision simply because more 
precise data would be very difficult to access. Another example results from 
using the case study method to undertake stage 2. Although a multiple 
case approach was used it remains the case that case study findings are 
not generalizable in the conventional sense. 
This section will look at limitations that are specific to this study rather than 
rehearse the limitations it shares with all work of this type.  
Lack of patient perspective and the ‘voice of the patient’ 
This research has gathered data that looks at the development and 
adoption of technologies from the perspectives of NHS staff and commercial 
partners. The views of patients have not been sought directly and the ‘voice 
of the patient’ with respect to technology adoption has only been included 
where recounted by NHS staff. The rationale for not including patients in 
the research was primarily because the research was concerned with the 
decision-making and processes of adoption by care providers. The extent to 
which patients are party to adoption decisions concerning the types of 
technologies considered was expected to be and was found to be very 
small. That is not to say, however, that for many of the technologies 
studies the extent to which a technology is acceptable to patients is not 
important. The acceptability of a technology to patients is a concern for 
many developers and adopters and so for several technologies (for example 
M1 and C3) trials were developed that specifically measured acceptability to 
patients. These studies have been available to the research as secondary 
data. As such, the authors are confident that where necessary the ‘voice of 
the patient’ has been included within the accounts of technology adoption 
to an acceptable extent. 
Hidden innovations 
Identifying innovations developed within the NHS is not always 
straightforward. It is bound to be the case that the NHS has produced a 
range of intellectual property that has led to innovations that have not been 
considered for inclusion in this study. That is because it is not always 
possible to identify where and when innovations are developed. More often 
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than not, the innovations included within this study have followed formal 
development routes using the support of trusts or technology transfer 
organisations. Very often development teams, trusts or technology transfer 
organisations have promoted their projects and so they are relatively 
‘visible’. Other innovations that have not followed formal development 
pathways (for example, those such as T5 where individual members of staff 
have organised the innovation process without formal support) are much 
more difficult to identify and it is therefore very likely that a number of 
examples of ‘hidden’ NHS-developed innovations have not been included in 
the study. It is not possible to say whether these ‘hidden’ innovations 
represent a significant proportion of NHS-led innovations or whether they 
differ in their characteristics,. 
Access to busy staff 
Researching the adoption NHS-developed technologies requires the good 
will of staff to participate in the research. For several of the technologies 
identified as NHS-developed, NHS staff were approached and asked to 
participate. Unfortunately, lack of available time meant that some staff 
declined to participate in the study, leading to the exclusion of a technology 
from the study. This has affected the inclusion of technologies in both Stage 
1 and Stage 2 of the study. It is worth noting that, for the majority of 
technologies, staff were keen to discuss their projects. The motives for 
participating are important to the validity of the research. For the majority 
of participants the researchers believe that the motivation was based on 
wanting to be able to tell their story and highlight issues that they believed 
to be important to improving the effectiveness of technology development 
and adoption in the NHS. 
Positive spin given by staff to project success 
Many of the participants recruited were generally very positive about the 
technologies of which they had experience. This may have led to some 
providing a potentially overly positive view of a technology in terms of its 
benefits and the success in its adoption. It is also likely that for commercial 
reasons there was pressure to provide a positive view of a technology. The 
researchers on the study have been aware of this and have where ever 
possible removed data that they believed was designed to over-emphasise 
the success of an innovation project. 
Focus on technologies rather than institutions and taking a 
snapshot view 
The unit of analysis in this study has been the individual technology. While 
this has allowed a broad view of how adoption takes place, it has meant 
that the specific features of organisations with regard to innovation and 
adoption have not been studied closely. Although this study has looked at 
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key events that have lead up to adoption where adoption is concerned it 
has tended to provide a snapshot view of a single occurrence within an 
organisation. To understand the attitudes, behaviours, processes and 
structures that an individual organisation exhibits and the way they change 
over time it would be necessary to follow a number of adoption projects. A 
longitudinal study might have provided a richer view of the organisational 
capabilities required of an NHS organisation to facilitate effective 
technology. A more detailed longitudinal approach also makes it possible to 
follow the dynamics of technology adoption and to include fully events such 
as discontinuation of use, decommissioning of redundant technologies and 
ultimately the results of service configuration. Taking a snapshot of an 
adoption situation cannot show how the dynamics of adoption change over 
time. 
Limited consideration of where adoption occurs outside NHS e.g. 
private, abroad or local authorities. 
For a number of NHS-developed technologies in the study it was clear that 
though the NHS was a potential adopter, other categories of organisation 
such as healthcare organisations in the private sector or outside the UK or 
other public organisations such as local authorities were sometimes seen as 
the prime market for the innovation. In such cases the study’s focus on 
adoption into the NHS has prevented a full understanding of how NHS-
developed technologies undergo adoption. This is particularly important for 
technologies that straddle the domains of health care and social care. 
Further research could take this broader view and would be valuable, 
especially with respect to technologies for which the NHS is generally a 
follower rather than leader in adoption. Hence the extent to which a 
technology is adopted into a healthcare service outside the UK may in turn 
improve its attractiveness for adoption by the NHS. 
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that would have to be in place in order to manage innovation projects 
successfully. 
 
Figure 20. Project-specific version of the Formal System Model 
(Adapted from White and Fortune221) 
12.2 Conclusion 
It is clear from this research that the origin of the technology does affect 
adoptability in terms of both the extent of adoption (within a site and 
across sites) and the level of success achieved in an individual adopting 
site. It is also clear that being NHS-developed sometimes has a positive 
effect and sometimes a negative. Paying attention to the issues identified 
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by this research could increase the proportion of NHS-developed 
technologies that gain a positive advantage from their NHS origin. 
However, it is fair to say that this research has shown that many of the 
adoption problems encountered by NHS-developed technologies are shared 
by those developed independently of the NHS so many of the 
recommendations that will be set out here apply to technology adoption by 
the NHS generally. 
The findings of this research support other studies examined in the 
literature review that have shown that the ultimate levels of adoption 
gained are mediated by a number of factors. Awareness of these factors is 
vital to attempts to deliver successful adoption of appropriate technologies. 
It is therefore essential to recognise the extent to which technology 
adoption is a ‘wicked problem’, especially as it is not possible to identify a 
single, comprehensive set of measures that will guarantee widespread 
adoption of a technology in as varied and complex an organisation as the 
NHS. There is no silver bullet to solve the problems of technology adoption. 
Having said that, this research does suggest a number of interventions 
have the potential to bring about improvements and these have been 
posited above. Interestingly, although the Innovation Health and Wealth 
report10 had not been produced until this research was almost completed, 
the suggestions made here do chime with some of the specific adoption 
issues that are relevant to actions proposed in that report.  
12.3 Further research 
This research needs to be seen as part of an ongoing search for ways in 
which the NHS can make greater and better use of technological 
innovations in order to help it fulfil its mission in difficult times. This piece 
of work has focussed on adoption of NHS-developed technologies but this is 
only part of the wider innovation system. Further work to look at creating a 
system for technological innovation in healthcare has been suggested here.  
In addition to that, the findings of this study suggest several potential areas 
for future research. These include 
 Exploration of the ways that broad open innovation principles can be 
applied to the NHS to support a more systematic development of 
technological solutions in response to clinical and operational 
problems. 
 Evaluation of the success to which NHS-developed technologies are 
successfully commercialised as part of a wider service package. For 
example as a social enterprise or some other organisational form. 
 Evaluation of the impact of initiatives that seek to promote a more 
interactive approach to technological innovation in respect of 
healthcare. 
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 Evaluation of how the revised NHS structures, in particular Care 
Commissioning Groups, support inward and outward technology 
transfer. 
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Appendix 1: Protocol and participant information 
sheets 
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Appendix 2: Stage 1 Analysis 
Assistive technologies 
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Infrastructure technologies 
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Learning/training/teaching technologies 
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Measuring/monitoring technologies 
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Security/Quality assurance technologies 
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Medical/Surgical instrument technologies 
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Therapeutic technologies 
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Appendix 3: Technology summaries 
A1 
A1 is an assistive technology that supports older people with a specific 
long-term condition in order to allow them to remain in their own homes. 
Essentially, it is a telehealth system, underpinned by mobile technology, 
developed by a consultant within the NHS but now operated by an 
organisation external to the NHS. It is being commissioned by the NHS, 
local authorities, and by individual patients/carers but has struggled to 
achieve widespread adoption. The industrial partner chosen for the project, 
though technically competent, has turned out to have insufficient resource 
to compete effectively. 
The developer had seen similar systems in North America and recognised 
the opportunity to put a similar service in place in the UK. He experimented 
with a number of configurations before settling on existing mobile 
technologies configured to support the new service. An innovation hub then 
became involved in providing support to the project and helped the 
developer to negotiate £15000 of funding to development the service 
further. Unfortunately this funding was insufficient to employ someone to 
provide a dedicated support function for the service and this, together with 
several teething problems, hampered adoption. The low levels of start-up 
funding also made it difficult to market the service effectively. A national 
charity that supports people with the specific long-term condition was 
enthusiastic about the service but felt unable to endorse it because of 
threats this may bring to its perceived impartiality. 
The business model used for the technology is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
approach. This makes A1 relatively easy to adopt but has also made it easy 
for competitors to set up rival services. Alternative suppliers include large 
well established companies with significantly more resources available for 
development and marketing. As a consequence, while A1 is still marketed 
to the NHS and some local authorities, it has been overtaken in the market 
place by competing services offered by larger, established providers. 
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C1 
Technology C1 is a database and associated software that allows dentists to 
conduct a structured search for a particular type of information. It was 
developed by a small team comprising a Consultant, a research student and 
a programmer employed by a local University. It was launched at a 
professional conference and the Consultant member of the development 
team has also attracted adopters when he has spoken about it at 
subsequent conferences. It is accessed via a website and some adopters 
have found out about it through the use of their internet search engines. 
Dentists wishing to use the service pay a subscription of £30 which gives 
unlimited access for one year, though the likelihood of an individual user 
needing frequent access is very small. Worldwide, there are currently 
approximately 100 users. This is not a settled population of adopters. 
Individuals tend to register when they have a particular need for the 
information available but allow registration to lapse when the year is up 
and then re-register if their need for the information re-arises. In part, the 
cost of providing the service and keeping the information up to date is met 
by sponsors who have a commercial interest in the information being 
supplied.  
The main beneficiaries of this technology are the particular patients who 
caused the dentists to use it. If the information the system provides were 
not available those patients would need more extensive (and more costly) 
treatment. 
 
C2 
C2 is a clinical decision support system (CDSS) that supports a service 
managing patients with specific long term conditions. The service is run as 
a clinic within GP surgeries by a trained nurse. The nurse carries out a 
periodic check-up for each patient, administering a number of physiological 
tests and then entering the data gathered onto the CDSS. The CDSS then 
produces a summary of the check-up findings for the GP and makes 
recommendations for the future management and treatment of the patient. 
These recommendations are based on the relevant clinical care guidelines 
produced by NICE and other agencies, thus ensuring that patients are 
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managed to the same standards as would be available in a consultant run, 
hospital-based clinic. C2 is available within a complete service package that 
can be commissioned by GPs. This package includes the technology and 
provision of the trained nurse.  
C2 was devised by a hospital consultant. He originally conceived of it whilst 
working as a registrar but he only had opportunity to develop it when he 
progressed to consultant and was able to negotiate with his trust that he 
would develop the idea further but in his own time so that he could retain 
ownership of any IP. After a year he had developed a series of prototype 
systems. In co-operation with the trust he then carried out a number of 
tests of the CDSS. He began with ‘synthetic patient data’ and then moved 
on to retrospective historical patient data before starting to use the 
technology in parallel with normal decision-making. After a successful trial 
using 50 patients a combined study of several hundred patients was carried 
out. Results from these studies were presented as posters at conferences. 
The service aspect was then built around the CDSS and piloted successfully 
in a number of GP practices. 
Following the success of these trials an NHS innovation hub became 
involved in the development of the service. Some funding from the local 
development agency was negotiated and a spin-out company was then 
created as a social enterprise in collaboration with the NHS trust. 
Agreement was reached with the trust that the consultant would be 
seconded for a third of his time to the company.  
C2 has been adopted by three clusters of GP surgeries. Process targets 
such as the 18 week waiting target and the 2 week cancer target made use 
of the service attractive to adopters. The total cost of the service to the 
NHS (taken across primary and secondary care organisations) is lower than 
similar service models where consultants visit clinics in primary care. 
However, the emphasis of the service is the management of the large 
majority of patients who can be managed in a routine fashion. It does not 
allow for management of more complex patients which leaves it open to the 
accusation of of ‘cherry picking’. Failure to offer a comprehensive service 
may make it difficult for C2 to fulfil the requirements of procurement and 
commissioning policies that are becoming increasingly common, such as 
the ‘any willing provider’ model of procurement. Ability to increase the 
number of adopters also depends on the willingness of GPs to commission a 
service that places the management of patients in the control of nursing 
staff using CDSS and there are some indications that there may be 
resistance to this on professional grounds. At present the critical mass of 
GPs needed to reach the roll-out across many locations. 
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C3 
C3 is an electronic questionnaire system to collect data on symptoms and 
quality of life from patients. The collected data can be used either as part of 
an initial assessment or for on-going monitoring of treatment outcomes. C3 
comprises two components: a questionnaire builder and a system for 
administering the questionnaires to patients. The questionnaire builder 
enables development of clinical questionnaires and includes a facility to 
define complex routing rules. Use of complex routing rules allows patients 
to complete, even detailed questions faster and more easily. 
C3 was the idea of a hospital consultant who subsequently assembled a 
team to develop a prototype system. The team comprised a range of 
clinical staff, technical staff from the hospital’s medical physics department 
and academic staff. Over several years the team iteratively improved a 
working prototype, implementing it into clinical use in the hospital and local 
community. Part of this implementation involved modification to existing 
service designs. In collaboration with the local NHS innovation hub, the IP 
associated with C3 was protected and a spin-out company was formed to 
commercialise the technology. The spin-out company was a partnership 
with a small, local software house with previous experience of developing 
healthcare information systems. The formation of the spin-out company 
was important for two reasons. First, it completely reverse-engineered the 
system and rewrote the software to a commercial standard. Second, the 
company developed the system into a web-based service. 
The company now licenses the system as a hosted service that includes 
user support. C3 has been adopted by a number of NHS trusts, mainly due 
to the marketing efforts of the inventor. Adopters have generally been 
active members of a professional network that includes him or have been 
influenced by direct contact with him at workshops and demonstrations of 
C3. Adopters are interested in the clinical evidence for C3 but it is not the 
main driver of their decisions. 
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C4 
This technology was developed by an NHS clinician though it took place 
separately from any formal NHS initiatives and was undertaken in his own 
time. Its purpose is to make up-to-date care guidelines for resuscitation, 
presented in diagrammatic form, available to health professionals as an 
iPhone app. The guidelines are developed by a third-sector organisation 
that funded the development of the technology and now shares ownership 
of the IP with the developer. (A senior clinician working in the same 
hospital as the developer is also an active member of this third-sector 
organisation.) 
The developer had already written another healthcare-related app when he 
conceived the idea for C4. Importantly Development was rapid. Within 
three months of the start of the project the then current guidelines were 
made available to a small group of users via the technology. The 
appearance of a new set of guidelines (the guidelines are usually revised 
every five years) meant major revisions had to be made in the months 
following the initial release but even so, a fully functioning version was 
launched within about nine months. 
Because the app is available for download free of charge, marketing in the 
conventional sense is not relevant. However, various steps have been taken 
to spread use of C4. These have included ‘word of mouth’ and generation of 
media interest. This has been successful - the number of downloads in the 
first year has exceeded 50,000.  
In order to test the effectiveness of the technology it was made available to 
40 junior doctors and, after they had been given time to become familiar 
with it, they were given a standard medical scenario simulating a situation 
where the guidelines should be used. They were then randomised into two 
groups: one working through the scenario using the C4; and the other 
relying just on their training. It was found that those using the technology 
adhered more closely to the guidelines. 
From the perspective of the third-sector organisation that generates the 
guidelines, C4 is an inexpensive form of distribution because it only costs 
them about £1 per download. However, there is one major drawback: the 
information can be accessed very easily by iPhone users but to clinicians 
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without an iPhone it is simply not available. Although iPhones are popular 
amongst clinicians and other health professionals (approximately 50 per 
cent of the relevant staff in the hospital where the technology was 
developed have them) they are by no means ubiquitous. Adoption of C4 is 
therefore dependent on factors that are outside the control of an NHS trust 
unless they provide the phones and many trusts might regard this as a step 
too far. 
 
C5 
C5 is protocol-driven, real-time clinical information system that is designed 
to improve patient safety and reduce length of hospital stay. Via a personal 
digital assistant (PDA), it takes data from routine bedside observations of a 
patient and uses the data to generate graded alerts if the condition of the 
patient has deteriorated.  
The original idea for C5 came from an intensive care specialist practising in 
Australia. The technology was brought to the UK by his commercial 
partners and re-developed in conjunction with an NHS trust. Although the 
core principle of the original version has remained the same, C5 is very 
different in a number of important ways. For example, the original system 
was designed to respond to subjective judgements that a patient was 
deteriorating but C5 uses objective measures of a patient’s condition and 
uses a scoring algorithm to convert these into a single numerical value. 
This value is then used to determine the severity of any alert that is 
required. The system then manages each alert to ensure that appropriate 
responses are made by medical staff within the timeframe allowed for the 
particular level of alert. If a doctor does not attend a patient within the time 
allowed the alert is escalated upwards to the next grade of doctor. 
C5 has been the subject of a full clinical trial. This was able to measure a 
number of benefits of adoption including a threefold increase in clinical 
responses made within the appropriate target time, hospital length of stay 
reduced by a third on average, and substantial reductions in the number of 
patients going into critical care and the number of critical care bed days. 
Overall, the trial found there was a strong financial business case for 
adoption. C5 is sold as a software product with a license to use it and on-
call support available. At the time the supplier was interviewed the cost of 
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this was in the region of £1 per bed per day. The infrastructure 
requirements are server space, wireless capability and PDAs to capture the 
data though these do not need to be dedicated to C5.  
A clinician at an adopting site reported that, although the system was 
welcomed enthusiastically by nursing staff, there was resistance to 
adoption from some junior doctors and Consultants who felt the system 
reduced their autonomy.  
 
C6 
C6 is a paper-based technology used in hospital wards to organize the 
recording of observation data such as temperature, pulse rate, blood 
pressure etc. and for using the data to ensure that early warning signs 
(EWS) are not missed. Several variations have been developed to cater for 
different groups of patients, such as adults, children, pregnant women. C6 
also includes instructions for use and a series of protocols. Though it was 
developed prior to the publication of NICE Guidance 50, Acutely ill patients 
in hospital: recognition of and response to acute illness in adults in hospital 
(www.nice.org.uk/CG050), it supports conformance to this guidance. 
C6 was developed by an R&D Fellow with support from a number of 
clinicians and senior nurses. The original trigger was a request by the 
Department of Health that the hospital should review its responses to a 
serious outbreak of an infectious disease in a local town that had occurred 
during 2002. This in turn led to a committee being formed to consider how 
EWS could be better managed. This committee, made up of 
senior/specialist consultants, anaesthetists and senior nurses, asked the 
R&D Fellow to examine current practice. He found that current practice was 
not always consistent and reliable, particularly where the calculation of 
EWS scores from observation data was concerned. He also found that 
appropriate actions were not always taken when the scores indicated cause 
for concern. These findings led to the development of C6. It was trialled it 
in a general medical ward and then a general surgical ward before being 
rolled out to other wards in the hospital and then across the trust.  
With some support from an NHS innovation hub, C6 has been made 
available to NHS and non-NHS organisations. It is provided free of charge 
to the former and the latter each pay a one-off fee of £500. 22 NHS trusts 
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have requested it, some with the intention of using it in its existing form, 
and others who thought it could inform their own alternative technologies. 
At the developing trust some attempts have been made to convert C6 into 
a PDA-based technology but lack of resources (there is, of course, almost 
no revenue stream from C6) meant that this development did not progress 
beyond implementation as an Excel spreadsheet instead of a paper-based 
version. 
 
I1 
I1 is a drip hook that was invented by a nurse working in intensive care. He 
had had his original idea some years ago whilst working at a different 
hospital and he then resurrected it and a colleague produced a metal 
prototype for him. His current trust’s R&D Department then became 
involved and arranged for further development activities to be undertaken 
by a local university’s design group in order to turn it into a commercial 
product. With support from the local NHS innovation hub, the trust 
protected the IP associated and entered into a formal agreement with a 
local company to supply I1. This company specialises in the marketing of 
innovations developed within the NHS and stresses the NHS origins of I1, 
including, for example, a photograph of the ‘senior staff nurse inventor’, in 
marketing materials. It also emphasises other features that are extremely 
important in the NHS context such as ability to withstand multiple 
sterilisation cycles. 
I1 has been adopted by a number of NHS trusts and sold successfully in a 
number of other markets outside the NHS but I1 is essentially a commodity 
item for which there are many competing, commercially-developed 
alternatives so it faces strong competition, especially on price which is an 
important factor in adoption decisions for this type of product. 
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I2 
Technology I2 is a portable drip stand designed for use during treatment in 
patients’ own homes and in the provision of emergency care. It originates 
from a care team working within a primary care trust who recognised the 
need for a stand that was lighter, and hence more transportable, than the 
stands used in hospitals. It also needed to be sufficiently robust to 
withstand everyday use and transportation. They also realised the selling 
price would need to be relatively low to avoid the temptation to continue 
using improvised domestic equipment rather than adopting a technology 
specifically designed for this purpose.  
Having developed the concept the team approached the innovation unit 
that had recently been set up in their trust. The unit brokered a partnership 
with a local SME and the care team, the innovation unit and the SME all 
worked together to enhance product design, establish intellectual property 
rights, gain regulatory approvals and make sure appropriate arrangements 
were in place for manufacturing and marketing. These processes took 
approximately two years to complete and resulted in a commercial product 
that could be marketed to the NHS and elsewhere. About six months after 
the original launch some improvements were made which lowered the 
weight of I2 still further and decreased production costs. 
Adoption is extremely straightforward. I2 has been purchased by a number 
of hospitals, PCTs, clinics and health centres. Adopters of I2 report 
satisfaction with the product and praise its detailed design, especially those 
that make it easy to clean. However, the SME partner who is now 
marketing I2 is experiencing some difficulty in NHS adoption due to it being 
a relatively ordinary product for which most trusts have established 
suppliers who they tend to favour. 
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I3 
I3 is a novel redesign of a piece of domestic equipment used by community 
nurses to provide a version that is designed specifically for the purpose to 
which they put it. Its advantages are: more portable; more comfortable for 
the patient; simple to use; and requires minimal training in its use. It is 
also thought that it might reduce the risk of infections.  
The idea for I3 came from a community nurse. She had been made aware 
that her local NHS innovation hub was able to provide support to develop 
innovative ideas so she contacted the hub directly to discuss her idea. The 
hub arranged for a design group from a local university to work with her 
and after several meetings a final design was agreed. The hub also gave 
support in protecting the IP. I3 was then entered into an innovation 
competition in which it won an award and subsequently the hub negotiated 
with a company to market I3. Under the agreement reached the nurse’s 
NHS trust receives royalties on sales.  
Adoption of I3 into the NHS has been slow. The main reason for this is 
probably that I3 replaces domestic equipment which is already available 
and therefore has no cost implications. Although I3 has advantages these 
are only available by buying an extra piece of equipment and therefore all 
of its purchase price is additional expenditure. No significant evaluation of 
the effectiveness of I3 has been carried out and it is perhaps the case that 
this lack of evidence contributes to the difficulty of justifying the purchase 
of I3. 
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I4 
I4 is a substantial and sophisticated piece of laboratory apparatus that is 
used during the provision of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment. It 
increases the success rate of the treatment and thus brings benefits to 
patients and increases cost effectiveness for the NHS. The idea for this 
technology was developed by embryologists working in a specialist NHS 
facility within an NHS foundation trust. It incorporates a substantial amount 
of advanced scientific knowledge and also relies heavily on the considerable 
expertise of those involved in its development. A start-up company was set 
up to undertake product development and commercialise it. It was 
patented for the trust by the local NHS innovation hub. After a total 
development period of around four years it was launched at a European 
conference in 2008 and is now manufactured by a partner of the start-up 
company. 
I4 is in use in a number of countries as well as in private and NHS clinics. 
Each I4 is customised to meet the buyer’s particular needs. These needs 
vary across a number of dimensions including the number treatments 
provided per year, the size and shape of the space available to house it, the 
technological features required and whether it needs to incorporate existing 
equipment. The manufacturer project manages each installation, trains 
staff in its use and provide ongoing servicing and support. 
 
 
I5 
Technology I5 was developed by staff within the Medical Engineering 
section of a teaching hospital’s NHS foundation trust. It has no direct 
consequences for patient care but prevents theatre staff and nurses in ICU 
wards from sustaining lifting injuries. It thus has health and safety benefits 
for staff and cost benefits for the NHS. 
The commercialisation process of this technology is particularly interesting. 
By 2005 prototypes were being used successfully in the originating trust. 
Interest in the technology from one or two hospitals in the locality led to 
contact between the developers, their trust and an NHS innovation hub. As 
a consequence an agreement was reached with a subsidiary of an 
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engineering company to manufacture the technology under license. In 2007 
the assets of this subsidiary, including these licensing rights, were sold to a 
newly-formed company. They relaunched the technology onto the market in 
2009. 
Each of the commercial partners did further development work on the 
product that affected its actual design and its manufacture. Some of these 
changes represented substantial improvements. For example, one 
amendment addressed infection control issues. These issues were 
overcome by encasing the technology’s working components in stainless 
steel so that they can easily be steam- or chemically-cleaned. 
Adoption is very straightforward. The biggest barrier to adoption is cost. 
The product is substantially more expensive than the low-technology 
version it would replace and the savings generated by preventing staff from 
sustaining lifting injuries are not immediately visible even though they can 
be substantial. Targeted mail shots have not been effective in generating 
sales but allowing hospitals to trial the technology for a few weeks has led 
to some adoption. Despite this, however, actual sales are only a small 
proportion of potential sales and competing products are now available. 
 
L1 
L1 is a computer assisted learning (CAL) system for training staff to plan 
the technical details of a specialist medical procedure. This planning relies 
on a combination of detailed calculations and professional judgement and 
the training used to be provided using pencils and tracing paper. 
Development of L1 occurred in a hospital’s Medical Physics Department. It 
was a natural progression from the development of some modelling 
software that lies at its heart. An interface was added that allows it to be 
used for in-house training.  
Students on placement from the local university undertook the training, 
reported back to their university which then asked if it could use it too. The 
university then suggested that it should be marketed to other universities. 
The university’s transfer office became involved in managing the 
exploitation of the associated IP. After several years an NHS innovation hub 
became involved and provided seed-funding for development of a new 
version of the software for a large university that wished to use the CAL 
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system within its distance-learning courses. The university indicated it 
would be willing to order a large number of licences but wanted the 
software’s interface to be made easier to use and more robust. In addition 
it wanted L1 to be capable of being used via the web rather than just being 
available on stand-alone computers. These requirements had a significant 
impact on L1’s development trajectory and led to very substantial 
improvements. Indeed, it can be said that the large university acted in 
many ways as a lead-user for the CAL system.  
L1’s popularity (it has been adopted into over 40 sites around the world 
with many adopters taking out multiple licences) and the continued renewal 
of licences suggest that it is very effective but, although some evaluation of 
the CAL system was carried out with the originating hospital’s own 
students, no substantial evaluation of L1’s effectiveness has been carried 
out. However, a decade has now elapsed since its development and the 
landscape is starting to change; it is likely that without significant 
investment L1 is reaching a point where sales will decline as better 
substitutes become available. Nevertheless, L1 has, for several years, been 
one of the most successful pieces of IP exploited by the NHS trust. 
 
L2 
L2 is an educational resource based on podcasts that supports medical 
students’ exam revision. It was originally developed for delivery via the web 
but has subsequently been modified to become an app for the Apple 
iphone. The developers’ intention was to provide high quality revision 
materials in a form suitable for use anywhere, and at anytime. 
Commercially-developed revision resources were already available on the 
market but these were very expensive so the aim was to provide a much 
more affordable option. 
The technology was the brainchild of three medical students and used 
content provided by senior clinicians. The web site that was at the heart of 
the first version of L2 was developed by one of the team using a freeware 
web-site content management system. The subsequent iPhone app was 
developed in partnership with a small software developer. Development of 
the app was very rapid, taking only about six months. Funding for the 
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project was small and came from the developers themselves, a small 
donation from a pharmaceutical company and revenue from Google ads.  
In its web-site form L2 had over 5000 registrations. No specific evaluation 
has been done beyond gaining feedback on user satisfaction. The level of 
satisfaction was found to be high but it has not been established whether 
L2 prepares students better for their examinations than other types of 
revision materials. Because adoption of L2 is dependent primarily on the 
personal decisions of medical students its adoption in an NHS context is 
therefore independent of formal NHS organisations. As time goes on, L2 is 
becoming part of quite a large market where several major publishers have 
invested in the development of similar resources and are making them 
available on a variety of portable devices. 
Because the original project to develop L2 took place over a period of four 
years the developers became junior doctors during it and started to move 
between trusts. This meant that the development effort continued to be 
independent of their employing trust. Support for innovations developed by 
junior medical staff may have been more naturally provided at the level of 
a regional deanery, rather than an individual NHS trust. The status of this 
technology as an NHS-developed is therefore not entirely clear. In a strict 
sense, it is difficult to define the technology as one that is the result of a 
specific NHS organisation’s efforts to innovate technology but as an outlier 
on the spectrum of NHS versus commercially developed it has significant 
NHS-developed characteristics. It depends upon NHS knowledge, 
essentially donated by senior NHS clinicians, and then structured by 
medical students/junior NHS medical staff into a coherent resource. Though 
not an explicit intention, the main benefit for all of the developers has been 
that their professional profiles have been enhanced by involvement in the 
project. 
 
L3 
Technology L3 is a device used to simulate a patient in order to train 
anaesthetists in a particular aspect of their work. It was developed by a 
Consultant Anaesthetist in a Teaching Hospital who had observed at first 
hand the problems associated with trainees’ lack of opportunity to practise 
procedures and the consequent effects on the patients they treated whilst 
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still developing their skills. The length of time between the original idea and 
a prototype that could be used successfully was two years and much of the 
development was undertaken ‘out of hours’. After that, and with support 
from an NHS innovation hub, a partnership was formed with a 
manufacturer who developed the product further. 
Within the NHS the potential size of the market is 20 to 30 hospitals who 
between them are training around 100 doctors at any one time. The device 
could also be used overseas and a small number of units have been sold 
into other countries since the product came onto the market in 2004. The 
IP associated with the product is not protected but is not felt to be under 
threat due to the unlikelihood of a competitor making a similar product now 
that this one is on the market. 
The challenges faced by a potential adopter are trivial. A brief user’s guide, 
written by the developer, is available and essentially the technology can be 
purchased (for approximately £5000) and put straight into use. However, it 
does require effort to be made to accommodate its use because it has to be 
used in theatre and requires x-ray and other equipment to be available. 
Securing this access and timetabling it in is essential. 
The technology is not typical of many others developed within the NHS 
because it is a training device rather than something that is used to treat 
patients directly or to manage their care. It does, however, have a direct 
impact on patient care because it means doctors are much more skilled 
when treating patients and are able to avoid inflicting pain and discomfort, 
or even harm. However, no formal evaluation of the technology’s 
effectiveness as a training device or the consequences of its use has been 
undertaken. The developer does regret that such an evaluation has not 
been carried out but he himself has not been in a position to do it. 
This is very much a ‘stand alone’ product. It is probable that if the 
developer had not initiated the project, and seen it through from within his 
own role as a Consultant Anaesthetist and training provider, it would not 
exist. Although its benefits are very real they are limited in absolute terms 
where the NHS is concerned because the total size of the market is small.  
 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2013. This work was produced by Savory et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health.   
Project 08/1820/252                         
223 
 
M1 
M1 is a non-invasive diagnostic device that combines hardware with a 
software algorithm to generate information that can guide clinical decisions. 
M1 can be operated by a single member of staff, usually a nurse or medical 
Technologist and in principle can be used in clinics remote from a main 
hospital. The equipment capital cost is several thousand pounds but 
consumable costs are a few pounds per patient.  
M1 is an alternative to an invasive test. It has been shown to be to be a 
reliable predictor of whether a specific surgical intervention will be effective 
in alleviating symptoms but it does provide less comprehensive information 
for making a diagnosis. On the other hand, it has advantages for the 
patient because it involves much less discomfort and carries fewer risks 
than the invasive test procedure and advantages for the NHS because it 
requires fewer staff and potentially less clinic time.  
The development of M1 was based on the work of Technologists working in 
the medical physics department of a large teaching hospital. The hospital is 
a leading centre of urology research and was involved in development of 
treatments and new diagnostic technologies. The development project 
became a collaboration between clinical and technical staff in the hospital 
and local university. The medical physics staff had significant experience in 
designing clinical measurement devices and M1 was one instance of a range 
of innovations that the team had produced. An industrial partner was also 
involved from early on in the project.  
Evaluation of M1 has been rigorous. Trials of the technology started on 
volunteers and then on patients. Using funding from charities a clinical trial 
was carried out that assessed the reliability, acceptability and validity of the 
technology during clinical use over a five year period. A final study based in 
the hospital was a blind clinical trial and showed that M1 was reliable in 
predicting the outcome of a surgical intervention within certain groups of 
patients. The clinical lead on the project believed that the assessments 
carried out in the hospital were probably much more rigorous than those 
carried out on many other diagnostic devices. Prompted by feedback from a 
national agency, a further multi-centre trial based at six UK hospitals was 
carried to ensure that the technology’s benefits could be generalised to 
other sites.  
Development of the technology has extended over several years and the 
technology’s patent is nearing expiry. This means the technology supplier 
risks being unable to make substantial profits from the technology. 
Adoption of M1 has been in limited in the UK NHS, with just a small number 
of trusts adopting it into routine practice. Adoption in the US where several 
hundred devices are in use, and in other countries, has been more 
successful. 
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M2 
M2 is an electro-mechanical monitoring device designed for use in clinics 
and GP surgeries by a skilled healthcare worker. The device was developed 
by medical physicists in a major teaching hospital. The developers had 
close links with an international standards committee for the class of device 
and with a major manufacturer of existing devices. Development of M2 was 
triggered by a concern that use of the mechanical devices that were 
currently in place might have to be discontinued because they used a 
chemical that might be banned. It was also decided to seek other 
improvements over the existing devices such as less frequent re-
calibration, a better display and incorporation of indicators that would 
minimise errors during use. 
The medical physicists worked closely with the device manufacturer during 
the development. This manufacturer was a long-standing, family-run 
business with a lot of expertise in mechanical devices but no history of 
developing electro-mechanical devices. The majority of the technological 
capability therefore rested with the Medical Physics Department. 
Development took approximately three years and M2 was launched in 
2001. No extensive trials of were done within the teaching hospital where 
the development took place but the manufacturer funded a clinical trial at a 
major healthcare organisation ion the US. The results of this trial have 
unequivocally validated the device for clinical use and it was found to be 
more accurate than the traditional mechanical devices when diagnosing 
certain conditions.  
The device is now marketed by the manufacturer, mainly by inclusion in its 
catalogue, web-site and at exhibitions. Take-up of the device has been 
modest and despite several hospitals buying some devices, only three 
hospitals use the device exclusively. The device has been included in the 
data collection protocol for some drug studies commissioned by 
pharmaceutical companies and this has created some demand from 
hospitals and clinics. However, although take-up is widespread it has been 
slower than expected, possibly because the anticipated ban of the chemical 
has not yet materialised. M2 is therefore only purchased to replace the 
mechanical devices when they wear out and now that market is at risk 
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because automated alternatives from other suppliers have become readily 
available.  
M2 was developed during the 1990s when there was no comprehensive 
support for technology transfer from the NHS. It was developed by NHS 
staff with very little clinician involvement. The development was possible 
because the staff in the medical physics department were allowed the time 
and freedom to pursue promising ideas. It is unlikely in the current climate 
that the project would have been pursued as there is now much closer 
scrutiny of how staff time is spent. The bottom-up development of the 
project allowed the interests and creativity of the medical physicists to 
produce a novel technology. The strong links to the manufacturing 
company provided a default industrial partner though the extent to which 
the partner had the optimum mix of capabilities is perhaps questionable. 
The partner was well established and had a wide product range but its 
devices were all mechanical. M2’s market is now dominated by automatic 
devices so perhaps a partner with different skills would have resulted in an 
innovation that was more disruptive. 
 
M3 
M3 is a minimally invasive monitoring technology that is used by 
anaesthetists to assess the cardiac output and haemodynamic status of 
patients during surgery. The accepted target patient audiences are those 
undergoing major or high-risk surgery (such as cancer, transplantation, 
orthopaedics, colorectal, gynaecology and urology) and high-risk patients 
undergoing any surgery.  
The technology has been developed, perfected and tested over a very long 
period of time. The findings of the first randomized trial to evaluate it were 
published in 1995 and there has been six more high quality randomised 
trials since then. Two systematic reviews have also been undertaken. 
Despite this quantity of evidence, adoption is still patchy. M3 has some 
very passionate supporters, many of whom adopted it some time ago, but 
other clinicians are reluctant to adopt it. 
M3 is very self contained technology in the sense that if an anaesthetist 
decides to adopt it he or she can do so with no consequences for the work 
of colleagues. During surgery the anaesthetist deploys the technology when 
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he or she feels it is appropriate to do so, observes the results on a separate 
set of monitoring equipment, and uses his or her judgement to decide 
whether fluid or drugs should be administered in order to try to optimise 
blood flow. M3 does, however, impose an additional cost per operation, but 
this cost is more than compensated for in terms of reductions in costs that 
occur further down the line. This is because adoption of the technology 
leads to a reduction in the mean number of days spent in intensive care 
and the mean total number of days patients spend in hospital after surgery.  
 
Q1 
This technology is an computer-based tool used to assess the performance 
of individual wards and departments in a trust against a wide range of up to 
date standards that relate to various (mainly nursing) aspects of patient 
care provision. It generates information that can be used to guide 
improvement. Q1 can be used in a wide range of institutions from major 
teaching hospitals to small units. It was developed in a paper-based form 
by a small team in a teaching hospital and subsequently adapted into its 
current electronic form by informatics experts within the hospital. It is 
intended that further enhancements will be made to the tool, with 
particular emphasis on making it more multi-disciplinary and team-focused. 
The tool, and training seminars in its use, are now available via the 
hospital’s regional NHS innovation hub. It is recommended that a group of 
team leaders from a trust attend an initial training session before rolling Q1 
out across the trust and that this be followed by a second session six 
months later.  
A twelve-month impact study to evaluate the benefits of adoption was 
underway at the time this research was conducted. The belief was that it 
would show benefits from improved management such as better use of 
resources and more effective training provision. Although the trust owns 
the IP associated with the tool, the developers have not sought to make a 
profit from supplying it to other adopters. Indeed, it is likely that on 
balance there is a cost to the trust of supplying it because members of the 
development team host visits by potential adopters and sometimes pay 
visits to potential and new adopters’ sites. 
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Q2 
Technology Q2 is a web-based information system for managing the audit 
of infection control procedures within acute hospitals. The system has 
benefits at a high-level, such as enabling production of high level reporting 
data, and at the operational/ward level where staff on wards are able to 
see the performance of their own ward and other wards over time and thus 
see where opportunities for improvement exist. 
Development of Q2 began in 2006. The team working on it comprised a 
senior Clinical Improvement Manager, the Head of Nursing, an infection 
control specialist and a member of the trust’s IT department. The trigger 
for the innovation was a Department of Health report that criticised 
infection control practices in the trust and highlighted the poor level of staff 
awareness of good practice. As a result of this report the development of a 
suitable audit tool became central to the trust’s initiative to improve 
standards of infection control.  
An initial prototype was produced by the trust’s IT department within 3 
months and then an iterative improvement process began to develop this 
prototype further. Unfortunately this process was delayed because the IT 
department came under pressure to prioritise work related to the National 
Programme for IT. This delay continued until the Head of Nursing allocated 
funding to pay overtime to staff in the IT department to work on Q2. When 
the second prototype became available a small trial was set up to evaluate 
it. Positive results from this trial led to staged implementation across the 
trust.  
The trust recognized the potential for commercializing the system but 
realised it did not have the in-house expertise to pursue this. Support was 
sought from a local NHS innovation hub and this resulted in a partnership 
between the trust and a specialist software house to develop Q2 further. A 
small grant from a regional development agency was used to fund this 
development so the commercial partner reworked the system to turn it into 
a scalable, robust, commercial product. Further refinement allowed the 
system to be provided as a software package and as a hosted-service. 
Involvement of the commercial partner at this stage was fundamental to 
Q2’s commercial success. The partner effectively treated the original 
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system as a “throw away” prototype that informed the rewrite. A distinct 
characteristic of this particular partner was its interest in and commitment 
to finding NHS innovations and commercialising them. This mode of activity 
formed a substantial element of its business model, with several of its 
products having been conceived within the NHS. 
Q2 is accredited by the Department of Health and has now been 
implemented in four NHS trusts. Implementation on existing infrastructure 
is straightforward, especially because it stores no individual patient data. 
Configuration of the software is also straightforward with no need for local 
adaptations. 
Limited evaluation has shown that Q2 reduces the time and cost of 
collecting data but there has been no detailed evaluation of the wider 
impacts of adoption. Within the trust that developed it, Q2 has produced 
the information needed to audit and monitor infection control and senior 
managers believe it has been beneficial in helping to change staff behaviour 
on wards.  
 
Q3 
Q3 is a quality assurance technology that was developed by the Medical 
Physics team at a teaching hospital’s NHS trust. It allows dental surgeries 
and hospitals to bring the calibration of equipment in house at lower cost 
than using external contractors. The developers identified the opportunity 
for Q3 and developed a prototype version. With assistance from a local NHS 
innovation hub the technology was licensed to a manufacturer in early 
2005. The commercial partner undertook design for manufacture work and 
brought Q3 to market within a little over a year of becoming involved. 
The purchase cost of Q3 is £2100 and there are no ongoing additional costs 
other than staff time to actually use the technology. Adoption within the 
NHS is confined to one other trust but to date, ten machines have been 
sold overseas. 
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Q4 
Technology Q4 is a software security interface that aims to prevent 
misdiagnoses that result from viewing poor quality diagnostic images. It 
was developed about six years ago by a senior medical physicist and a 
member of his staff as a technical solution to problems associated with the 
growing use of remote transmission of digitised images. It provides ‘point 
of use QA’, thus aiding clinical governance, but also goes beyond QA by 
incorporating a control element. It denies access to an image if that image 
does not meet quality standards. This control element can be over-ridden, 
but if the viewer insists upon seeing the image a record of the over-ride is 
generated.  
Q4 is manufactured and sold by a commercial partner that was secured via 
assistance from the regional NHS innovation hub. Two versions of the 
technology are available: standalone; and server-based. For each version a 
detailed installation manual is supplied, together with an operating manual 
and first and second line technical support.  
Q4 is in full use within the developer’s trust and in a small number of other 
hospitals, but the level of adoption is low. Very few support issues have 
been raised by users though there can be minor technical difficulties in 
installing the system. Cost is also unlikely to be a major explanation of the 
low adoption rate. (Pricing was described by an interviewee as ‘NHS 
friendly’.) One potential explanation that has been suggested is reluctance 
to accept that the problem it is designed to prevent exists. (This reluctance 
may result from the knowledge that if the problem is widespread in may 
mean that many of the monitors that are currently in use need replacing.) 
Another barrier to adoption is the reluctance of IT departments to install Q4 
even when requested to do so by one or more departments. Installation 
has to be hospital-wide and so requires the support of IT. 
There are certain eventualities that could lead to a big increase in take-up. 
One would be a high profile legal action where the mis-reading of an image 
was shown to have led to serious harm to a patient. Another would be 
incorporation of its use into care guidelines or the publication of a new 
edition of the ‘Recommended Standards for the Routine Performance 
Testing of Diagnostic X-Ray Imaging Systems’. The current version, IPEM 
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Report 91, was issued at the start of 2005 so a revision may not be too far 
away. 
 
S1 
S1 is a device used during surgery. The concept behind the technology 
originates from a surgeon who also saw its commercial potential and made 
a patent application to protect it in 2005. He then began to search for a 
commercial partner and in 2006 an NHS innovation hub helped him to 
formalise a licence agreement with a manufacturer. The manufacturer says 
‘We basically took the basic design that had been done by the surgeon who 
developed the concept, and we developed it into something that was 
manufacturable and went on to produce the tooling and to prototype the 
product and eventually developed the commercial item’. 
S1 is registered with the Medical Devices Directive and between 20 and 25 
hospitals have adopted it. The advantages it offers are that it reduces 
discomfort to the patient and dramatically reduces procedure times, thus 
allowing more patients to be treated within a given timeframe. However, S1 
is competing with similar devices that some surgeons find easier to use but 
the cost of S1 is at the lower end of the range.  
 
S2 
S2 is a surgical instrument that allows a procedure to be carried out more 
precisely and with a lower risk of harm. It is a single use device costing a 
few pounds and replaces a conventional version of the device that costs 
less but is more difficult and risky to use. It was invented by a trainee 
clinician who had experienced difficulties in using the conventional version 
of the device. 
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The clinician’s trust used a local NHS innovation hub to develop a 
partnership with small technology supplier with a view to commercialising 
the clinician’s original idea. However, problems associated with the 
agreement between the trust and the supplier led to difficulties in allocating 
responsibility for funding development and as a consequence there were 
significant delays in the development process. It was several years before 
the device progressed from early prototype to working version. During this 
interval there were changes to the device’s specification, difficulties in 
selecting appropriate materials and in designing production processes. 
Despite these difficulties the resulting device won an award which 
recognised the improvements it offers over the conventional device.  
S2 underwent a rigorous clinical trial that validated the device for use in 
routine practice but holdups in the academic publishing process meant 
there was significant delay in publishing the trial’s findings. Before the trial 
findings were published, S2 was launched at an international trade 
exhibition and was subsequently adopted by clinicians in a number of 
countries. However, S2 has had little success in the NHS market. Active 
marketing was delayed until the trial findings were fully published and has 
been described subsequently as ‘modest’. The supplier believes that the 
purchasing process in the NHS militates against S2’s adoption. Central to 
this concern is the supplier’s belief that NHS purchasing processes 
emphasise minimising purchase costs and that lack of clinician involvement 
in purchasing can mean due regard is not given to the fact that purchase 
decisions can potentially mean sub-optimal devices are selected and that 
these in turn lead to complications or delays during surgical procedures. 
 
S3 
Technology S3 enhances a pre-existing functional appliance used in 
orthodontistry. It was developed by a Technician, acting upon a request 
from the Consultant for whom he worked. Even though one adopter 
describes it as a “very neat solution and a very simple solution” its 
development was a substantial piece of work that included a number of 
design cycles to refine it. 
An attempt was made to form a commercial partnership with a top 
international manufacturer of orthodontic products to manufacture and sell 
the product but this was not successful. Subsequently an agreement was 
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reached with an independent orthodontic supply company in the UK. This 
firm worked with the developer to improve the manufacturability of the 
product. 
Although purchase of technology S3 increases the cost of the appliance 
supplied to the patient and increases the time the Technician spends 
working on it to prepare it for use, adoption is, at worst, cost neutral 
because of savings in Clinician time. It also brings advantages to the 
patient in terms of time spent in the clinic and allows treatment of more 
severe cases than would otherwise be possible. 
The technology has been on the market for almost a decade. In the first 
few years the developer made substantial efforts to publicise his 
innovation, co-authoring a paper in a professional journal and attending 
conferences. The number of adoption sites rose but the increase stalled 
before use became widespread. The developer and industrial partner 
believe that once adopted the technology remains in use but there is at 
least one site where an attempt to adopt it failed. This may be the result of 
a training issue. An instruction leaflet is supplied with the product but no 
demonstration or training is supplied. Successful adopters are enthusiastic 
users, attesting to the reliability of the product and reporting failures as 
“very, very rare” but the unsuccessful adopter claims that each of the three 
items they tried to use failed. 
 
S4 
S4 is a surgical device used by eye surgeons. It was invented by the clinical 
lead for Ophthalmology at a major teaching hospital. He approached his 
local NHS innovation hub and they put him in touch with a Design 
Consultancy that had worked successfully to bring a number of innovative 
medical products to market. The project obtained a substantial amount of 
response-mode funding from a major charitable foundation to assist in the 
commercialisation of the technology. 
S4 makes it much quicker and easier to perform the most crucial and 
challenging step of one of the most commonly performed operations in the 
UK and around the world. It is particularly useful when operating on 
children. (Children are the group of patients that has suffered the highest 
incidence of secondary complications in the past.)  
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The devise is single use so has been designed to be manufactured at low 
cost. It also has other features that protect surgeons and patients from 
accidental sharps injuries during and after use. 
 
S5 
S5 is a low-cost, consumable item used during surgery. Before it was 
developed, the purpose it fulfils was met by the improvisational use of 
other items. S5 replaces them with a single, purpose-designed item that 
‘makes life easier’. It also improves patients’ comfort during surgery and 
though no evaluation has been conducted to show it is the case, it is 
believed to reduce the chances of infection.  
S5 was the idea of a surgeon. He heard about the local NHS innovation 
hub’s call for innovative ideas approached them. After discussing the idea 
with the surgeon the hub contacted a supplier who then incorporated S5 
into its product range. The hub has helped the inventor’s trust to protect 
the intellectual property associated with S5 and negotiated a licence deal 
with the supplier on behalf of the trust. The trust receives royalties on 
sales. 
The originating surgeon now uses S5 as part of his routine practice but 
adoption in the wider NHS has been minimal even though the procedure for 
which it is used is undertaken frequently in many trusts. Two possible 
explanations for the lack of adoption exist. First, the catalogue for the 
supplier is very large and S5 is one of many very similar sounding items. It 
is quite likely that potential adopters simply have not noticed that it is 
available. A second is another form of lack of visibility. The inventor is very 
pleased to have S5 available for his own use but does not really see the 
innovation as very significant and is not championing its adoption 
elsewhere. 
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S6 
It has been shown that up to 20 per cent of patients receiving mechanical 
ventilation for more than 48 hours will develop a particular form of 
hospital-acquired infection. The consequences of this are very serious for 
the patients concerned (indeed, it doubles their risk of dying) and very 
costly for the NHS. S6 is designed to prevent patients from acquiring this 
infection. It is a highly innovative technology and was developed by a 
specialist in intensive care in an NHS hospital. The trigger for its 
development was repeated observation by nursing staff of problems 
associated with the technology they were using and which had been in use 
since the 1970s. The whole project from inception until it became available 
commercially in 2008 took a number of years. During this time substantial 
experimentation and testing was undertaken to perfect the technology and 
evaluate its performance. This evidence gathering culminated in a trial 
lasting 14 months that demonstrated the very substantial benefits of using 
the technology. Indeed, following this study it was possible to say that 
adoption led to substantial reductions in morbidity and considerable 
financial savings even though the cost of S6 is many, many times that of 
the technology it replaces. This is because the costs associated with the 
problem it prevents are so high. Indeed, at the site where the trial was 
conducted it was calculated that the cost of a single case of the infection S7 
prevents is comparable to the annual costs of using it and without it there 
would be between five and ten cases during the course of a year. 
There is some difference of opinion over the difficulty of using the 
technology. It is claimed in the literature that the procedure required to put 
S7 in place is as easy or easier than using the conventional technology but 
one adopter interviewed expressed a different view saying ‘there is a lot of 
training involved in being able to handle it well’. 
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T1 
T1 is a device to help radiographers to give repeatable and precise 
treatments to patients. It was developed by a clinical researcher working in 
a large teaching hospital. The clinical researcher’s role was to manage a 
review of existing processes in the hospital’s radiography department to 
check that they were underpinned by evidence. She was also tasked with 
identifying the need to undertake investigations where no such evidence 
existed and to implement more effective processes if the review showed 
they were needed. The specification for T1 was derived from one such 
review of processes. 
The development of T1 was based on two successive prototypes produced 
by the hospital’s engineering department. Each of the prototypes was used 
in the radiography department in turn and a large body of data was 
collected. Based on this data it was shown that T1 reduced the potential 
toxicity of radiotherapy, speeded up treatment time and improved the 
experience of patients during procedures. These very positive results 
caused the trust to decide to commercialise T1. This was done with support 
from an NHS innovation hub and in partnership with a large producer of 
medical devices. 
The adoption of T1 is now widespread with most NHS radiology 
departments having bought at least one. However, as most radiology 
departments have several treatment suites, there is still scope for further 
adoption. The device has also been taken up widely in other countries 
including the US. T1’s adoption within the NHS has occurred without its 
inclusion in any specific care guidelines, though it its use is included within 
certain clinical trial protocols. 
The clinical researcher took a significant role in providing support to 
adopters. In addition to writing part of the device marketing brochure and 
the instruction manual, she also provided support and training to centres 
adopting the device. This has allowed her to encourage potential users of 
T1 and observe its use in different centres. The clinical researcher has been 
concerned that some adopters have not always used it effectively. When 
evaluating the performance of other centres where T1 has been adopted 
she has found they have not achieved the same levels of performance 
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improvement experienced elsewhere. Investigation has shown that the 
reason for this is that some centres fail to follow instructions given during 
training and in the instruction manual. Small but important differences in 
usage have led to suboptimal use. Several issues are raised by this. If 
centres do not know whether their use of T1 is effective then they will not 
know they need to take steps to improve practices. As a response to this, 
design of a newer version is underway which will include features that will 
reduce the possibility of wide variation in use. In particular, the low level of 
skills of some users will be addressed. 
 
T2 
Technology T2 was developed to prevent vaginal adhesions following 
radiotherapy or surgery. It was developed by a Clinical Nurse who 
specialises in Oncology and is actually a replacement for existing products 
that did the same job in the same way. However, it is claimed by those 
involved in the development that it is ‘cheaper, easier and more 
comfortable to use than others currently on the market’ and, in the words 
of one supplier, it ‘offers exceptional design benefits [over competing 
products] and value for money’. Adopters report that the appearance of T2 
is more appealing to patients than the alternatives that were already 
available. Because patients take the product with them when they leave 
hospital, packaging and ability to carry around discretely are also important 
and the product offers advantages here too. 
The developer began working on her ideas in 1992 but T2 was not launched 
until 2005. It was estimated then that in the UK about 234,000 women per 
year could benefit from the technology and that the figure worldwide could 
be as high as 24 million. The late stages of development were supported by 
an NHS innovation hub. The hub helped in securing a contract involving the 
developer, the trust and a commercial partner that has a small stable of 
relatively low technology NHS-developed products. 
Adoption is very straightforward and no different from the products that 
were already available. Adopters are split between those who know it is an 
NHS-developed technology and those that are unaware of its origins. Some 
of the former have been actively involved in its adoption and a sub-group 
within those have conducted their own informal trials. Where the latter are 
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concerned, they were not aware of the adoption decision process and had 
just started using it because it had been made available to them. All of the 
adopters interviewed were very positive about T2 and felt it represented an 
improvement over the alternatives available.  
 
T3 
Technology T3 is advertised as ‘a rehabilitation product’. It is purchased by 
individual patients and by prevention programmes. For users it is a cheap, 
effective and portable product that allows them to exercise their legs whilst 
in a seated position. Essentially, adoption consists of no more than buying 
it and using it. 
The technology was developed by a physiotherapist working with a non-
NHS person who was looking for novel uses of a particular material he was 
already working with in an entirely non-health sphere. Having developed 
and tested the product the developer approached some large multi-national 
firms in search of an industrial partner. After coming close to giving up 
hope of success, she came into contact with a very small UK company that 
already had links with an NHS innovation hub. Acting on the advice of the 
company’s Managing Director the developer approached the hub and her 
trust’s R&D Manager. In 2006, five years after the initial idea for the 
product, a contract was signed by the developer, the trust and the 
commercial partner. The trust funded a trial to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the technology and the partner made arrangements for 
manufacture, design of packaging, and the like.  
By the summer of 2010 between 500 and 600 units had been sold. The 
developer is extremely disappointed by this low level of adoption and she 
feels that the marketing is to blame. One aspiration is to make the product 
available via a large chain of pharmacies, another is to sell the product at 
airports as a means of preventing deep vein thrombosis (DVT) on long 
flights, but neither of these is happening as yet.  
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T4 
Technology T4 is also a rehabilitation product. It is used under the guidance 
of physiotherapists and podiatrists by patients recovering from lower limb 
surgery or to treat foot problems in the hope that surgery can be avoided. 
It is also used to treat sports injuries. It treats conditions and injuries 
associated with over-pronation by allowing users to undertake exercise of 
specific muscle groups in the lower limbs that is controlled and reproducible 
and that can be increased in intensity as recovery proceeds. 
The technology was developed by a specialist podiatrist with a particular 
interest in biomechanics who is employed by an NHS trust that provides 
acute and community health services. With financial support from an NHS 
innovation hub a prototype device was tested in a specialist laboratory at a 
local University, using 18 healthy volunteers undertaking lower limb 
stretching and squatting tasks, to see how they responded biomechanically 
when using the device. Data was collected using electromyography and 
photography and on the basis of those results the device was taken to a 
potential industrial partner and a contract was negotiated between the 
developer, the trust and a commercial partner that has a small stable of 
relatively low technology NHS-developed products. 
The product was launched in the autumn of 2010 and can be purchased 
from the commercial partner or a leading supplier of rehabilitation 
equipment. The latter describe it as a piece of “practitioners’ specific 
lightweight apparatus”, thus drawing attention to the fact that it can be 
used to treat patients in their own homes as well as in clinic. It is marketed 
at the NHS and the private sector with attempts being made in publicity 
material to link it to the treatment of injuries sustained by premiership 
footballers and Olympic athletes. However, there is some scepticism 
amongst podiatrists that the technology offers advantages over simpler, 
and much less expensive, ramp devices. One commented “Whether it be 
calf stretching or eccentric loading of the patella tendon, these are things 
that the patient would need to be repeating at least once daily, and 
therefore they’d need one themselves” and expressed doubt as to whether 
patients would be willing/able to buy the device for themselves given it 
costs hundreds of pounds.  
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T5 
T5 is a small, inexpensive device used by patients to self-treat a common 
skin condition. It can be used to treat a single episode of the condition but 
some evidence suggests that it effective in reducing the likelihood of future 
episodes. It is represents an alternative to pharmaceutical treatments and 
if effective represent a significantly cheaper treatment of the condition.  
The device was developed by an NHS GP in his own time. Development 
took place over several years and included a number of small scale trials to 
prove the concept of the technology. The GP formed a company and 
developed partnerships with existing device manufacturers. Some key 
hurdles in the development of the commercial product were the design of 
specialised components and the refinement for manufacture of the device 
design. The funding of the development of the device was all sourced from 
outside of the NHS and though the GP worked within the NHS, no NHS 
organisations were involved with the project. The only relationship with the 
NHS was the involvement of NHS patients in a clinical trial to compare the 
device against pharmaceutical treatment. NHS nurses were also involved in 
running the trial and collecting outcome data. Data analysis was carried out 
by the medical research department of a local university. A significant 
amount of the development took place prior to the changes in the NHS to 
manage innovation and IP developed by NHS-staff. The device is now 
marketed by a UK-based company with manufacture taking place in Asia. 
Though it is marketed under a tradename in pharmacies, shops selling 
healthcare –related goods, and from internet-suppliers, it is also sold in 
some large pharmacy chains with their brand identity.T5 is also available in 
the UK on prescription but low levels of awareness of T5 on the part of GPs 
means that only a small number of devices are distributed this way. The 
majority of sales are directly to the public. 
T5 is a technology that demonstrates the difficulty in defining ‘NHS-
developed technologies’. The concept for the device was developed before 
any significant management of IP was built into NHS organisations. The 
development of T5 was legitimately carried out separately from the NHS, 
though the experience of the GP involved was clearly rooted in his NHS 
work. Similarly the clinical trial that took place used NHS staff and patients. 
As such, the role of the NHS in the development of T5 was evident but the 
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IP associated with the technology is not even partially assigned to the NHS 
with the result that no revenue from the technology is received by the NHS.  
A second point about T6 is the extent to which a technology can be deemed 
as ’adopted’ by the NHS. The device is widely available for purchase directly 
by patients. Though clinicians may encourage use of the device or even 
provide one on prescription, the extent to which T5 can be seen as adopted 
by the NHS is unclear. T6 shows that the take-up by patients directly has 
potential to result in NHS patients no longer seeking further care.  
Finally, providing definitive evidence that T5 is an effective technology is 
challenging. The technology needs to prove its effectiveness compared to 
pharmaceutical alternatives but also to the consequences of no treatment 
because the condition it treats is self-limiting. The skin condition is such 
that the use of T5 at an early stage is critical to its effectiveness, yet the 
likelihood of the patient noticing the condition and starting treatment early 
varies considerably. Claims that the technology reduces recurrence of the 
condition are also difficult to prove.  
 
 
 
 
 
